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P.T.O.

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Wednesday, July 8, 1891.

GENERAL GEORGE ERSKINE, Vice-President, in the Chair.

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THE TRAINING OF OUR RECRUITS.

By Colonel G. HATCHELL, Commanding Rifle Depôt.

IN the great struggle to obtain young men to fill the ranks of our Army, it has seemed to me that once recruits have been secured a sort of reaction takes place, and they are allowed rather to pass out of mind and suffer from neglect, at any rate not to receive that attention which young soldiers both require and deserve.

For although the physical training of the soldier, from the gymnastic point of view, was very ably dealt with in this theatre three years ago by Colonel Onslow, then Inspector of Gymnasia, I do not remember that the general question of the best way of making the most of our raw material has ever before been brought under discussion in the Institution.

When, therefore, the Council were good enough to invite me, in the absence of a more competent exponent, to bring the matter forward, with many misgivings I consented, rather than that the subject should be postponed to another season.

I may say at once that I have no radical changes to propose, nor can I do more than offer for what they are worth the results of four years' experience in command of one of our largest depôts, where about 100 recruits joined every month, and about 300 were constantly under training.

To many, I am afraid, there will not appear to be much originality in my remarks, as, no doubt, the same ideas have occurred to them, and been put into practice, but I look upon this Institution as just the place for an interchange of experiences, and hope to hear to-day some valuable opinions and suggestions from Officers Commanding Regimental Districts and others who take a special interest in the subject.

The recruit's training naturally divides itself under two heads, the moral and the physical, and, as the former has, to my mind, hitherto received but scant attention, I propose to give more prominence to it by taking it first.

*Moral Training.*

Now these words will, no doubt, sound strange to many Officers, as somewhat beyond the scope of their professional duties, but I wish to use them in no narrow sense, but rather as embracing the whole of the soldier's education that is not physical, and while for generations past the recruit has been drilled and marched, and taught to shoot or perhaps instructed in gymnastics, what, I would ask, has ever been done to convince him that he has joined a noble profession, to arouse his nationality and patriotism, to kindle in him *esprit de corps*, in fact through him to raise the moral tone of the Army? I presume it will be admitted that if these qualities be instilled in the soldier, he will prove not only a more reliable man in the field but also a more exemplary character in quarters.

My experience of the recruit that joins in these days is that he is young, willing, anxious to learn according to his abilities, easily influenced, and grateful for any notice taken of him, with a keenness to get on, which, compared with many old soldiers, is quite refreshing.

Now what more promising materials can we have to work upon, and what a chance appears to be lost!

The recruits that join the Army may be broadly classed under two heads, (1) those who enlist because they always had a liking for soldiering, as they express it; and (2) those who are induced to do so from immediate pressure, being out of work. The first class, as one might expect, furnishes the better soldiers, and there is a larger number of them than many people suppose. They do not examine critically the recruiting posters describing the advantages of the Army, nor carefully compare notes as to the amount of pay and allowances they will receive, but take it for granted they will be adequately provided for, and in the Service afterwards they are not the grumblers. A large number of these come on from the Militia, where they have just had the experience of four hours' drill a-day to test their liking for the life! Of the other class, however, it is a great mistake to suppose that, because they are out of work, they are therefore the dregs of the population. It must be remembered that in all ranks of life the labour market is now and then affected, and numbers of respectable young men, such as shop assistants, servants, artisans, and clerks, even gentlemen's sons, owing to various circumstances, find themselves unable to obtain employment, and I think it is much to their credit that they enlist and lead an honest life instead of loafing about and living on their friends or on their wits.

The better class of these make excellent soldiers, and, with a little encouragement and gentle treatment, begin to like the life and show a desire to make the best of it. There are, of course, many other reasons of a more complex nature for joining the Army, and I know

the fair sex are responsible for a good share of enlistments, to escape from delicate entanglements! These men often do well, if they are left alone and their tormentors do not find them out. Indeed, it is impossible for anyone who has had to deal with the taking of recruits for his regiment not to be interested in each young lad, as he comes before him in his plain clothes, and, in answer to questions, gives an account of himself, and while the recruiting authorities devote their energies to ascertaining why the youth of the country do *not* enlist, it is the more genial task of the trainer of recruits to try and discover why they *do*.

For the recruit's moral training it is above all things essential to gain the sympathy and assistance of his company Officers. He should be taught from the beginning to look to his Officer as his best friend and adviser, and Officers should be required to know their men, and should take every opportunity of becoming more familiar with them by joining in their sports and amusements. They should also let the recruits see that they take an interest in them, and by the amount of interest they show they should be judged by their superiors. Hard words have lately been said of Officers at depôts by one of our legislators, that they go there to have an easy time and think there is nothing to be done, but my experience of Officers is that, although they will not, as a rule, originate work for themselves, they will always carry out with more or less zeal any task especially set them, and the mission of an Officer at a dépôt is the moral education of the recruits of his company, while the Adjutant is held responsible for their physical training.

This apportionment of the duties of Officers is rendered necessary by our voluntary system of recruiting. In conscript armies, of course the whole of the recruits of the year join on one day, and are handed over to their company to train, but when they keep dropping in all the year round this system cannot be carried out, owing to the inconvenient number of squads there would be for drill; consequently, it is better to relieve the company Officer of the responsibility for their drill, but make him answerable for their interior economy and instruction in all their duties as soldiers, excepting physical training.

A most welcome step in the direction of giving an impetus to this moral training was taken by H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief about two years ago, when a circular was issued enjoining the practice of giving oral instruction to recruits at depôts, but I should be glad to see the idea carried further and given more system and reality. The subjects of instruction suggested, though well chosen as far as they went, seemed to invite further development, so, acting on the spirit of the circular, with the assistance of some of the Officers and sergeants, I compiled a course of lectures or oral instruction to serve as a guide to the subjects to be touched upon. They are by slow degrees being printed in the dépôt press, and I think I may say that the lecturers find them convenient to refer to. The system found to answer best was to post all the recruits who joined in the first half of a month to one company, and those in the second half to the next company, and so on. At the end of each fortnight, a course of sixteen lectures was

commenced, one by the Officer and one by the colour-sergeant every week for eight weeks, when the recruit is due to go to his battalion. In this way the recruits went regularly through the course, neither missing nor hearing one twice. The lecture was given instead of a drill, and was, therefore, perhaps more appreciated. I have a set of these lectures by me here, should anyone care to see them, but will only just allude to some of the headings to show the great variety of subjects that may usefully be dealt with. The contents of each are summarized as follows:—

*First Week.*

Officer: Commands, ranks, &c.—Organization of dépôt and of battalions—Clothing and necessaries—Barrack damages—Local orders—Cleanliness—Ambition.

Sergeant: Names of Officers—Manner of making complaints, &c.—Various local orders applicable to recruits—Duties of orderly man.

*Second Week.*

Officer: Oath of Allegiance—Loyalty—*Esprit de Corps*—Sources of recruiting—School—Gymnastics.

Sergeant: Cleaning and care of arms, &c.

*Third Week.*

Officer: History of the regiment (first part).

Sergeant: The Rifle—History of arms generally—The Martini-Henry—The magazine rifle and its advantages.

*Fourth Week.*

Officer: Honours and rewards—The various medals and decorations—Good-conduct badges—Prizes for good shooting—Paid appointments and employments.

Sergeant: Cleaning, care, and fitting of clothing and equipment.

*Fifth Week.*

Officer: Advantages of the Army—Privileges of the soldier.

Sergeant: Soldiers' accounts—Various charges and credits—Regimental savings bank—Pocket ledgers.

*Sixth Week.*

Officer: Further history of the regiment.

Sergeant: Bugle calls and how to act on them.

*Seventh Week.*

Officer: Read and explain Army Act.

Sergeant: Further bugle calls—Orders for dress, &c.



*Eighth Week.*

Officer: Discipline—Drill.

Sergeant: Duty—Guards, &c.—On the march—On board ship, &c.

I may say they are entirely for regimental and local consumption, and could not be adapted for general use without considerable amendment.

The more important of the subjects touched upon are those that tend to make the recruit believe that he has raised rather than lowered himself by choosing the profession of arms and serving his Queen and country. The men I have been accustomed to are mostly town-bred lads, with much intelligence, and I have heard sufficient to know that the seed is sown in good soil, and that even in the first few months of their service it is possible to cultivate a certain amount of *esprit de corps* and self-respect, which produces excellent results afterwards.

A promising feature in the recruit of the present day is his desire to improve his education by going to school. His attendance is, of course, voluntary, yet, after completing four hours' drill at 3 o'clock, half an hour later about 50 per cent. of them fall in again and are marched to school. Every encouragement is given, and the school hours are changed in summer and winter to suit their convenience.

Now for a few suggestions. I am not one of those who think that everything the Germans do in military matters must be superior to our insular methods, but there is one and only one point in the education of their recruits that I would be glad to see adopted in our Service, and that is the prominence and solemnity that are given to the taking of the oath, which is made a most imposing ceremony. The German conscript is not sworn in until four days after he joins, and part of each day is devoted to preparing him for the ordeal. He and his comrades are then marched to church and solemnly pledge themselves on the colours of their regiment.

How different is it in our Army, and can anything be less likely to impress a recruit than the manner in which he is sworn in a recruiting office? The value of ceremony should not be underrated, and in my opinion everything calculated to stamp on his mind and senses the importance of his act and to arouse his enthusiasm should be brought into play. We cannot wait a week for the recruit to take the oath on attestation, but is there any reason why during Divine service every Sunday the recruits of the past week should not come to the front and repeat the oath of allegiance on the colours or badge of their regiment in the presence of their Officers and comrades? Even the wording of the oath itself, I would humbly suggest, might be made less formal and more hearty and intelligible to a recruit's understanding.

I find there is a good deal of laudable ambition or keenness to get on among the majority of our recruits, which it is very desirable to encourage, and an excellent way of stimulating this feeling is to promote liberally to the rank of temporary lance-corporal, that is,

only while at the dépôt. They are very proud of getting the stripe, and almost invariably rise to the responsibility thrust upon them, which is proved by my seldom having to revert to the ranks a temporary lance-corporal for misconduct as a non-commissioned officer, and so well have they as a rule turned out that Commanding Officers of battalions have occasionally on my recommendation allowed them to keep their stripes on joining, and all are placed on the roll of those next for promotion.

Another recommendation I would make is to keep a register, in which to enter the names of those recruits who on joining appear to be "promising," by reason of their respectability or any special qualifications, or who produce testimonials to character. It is a great help to taking an interest in a man to see him in his plain clothes and ask him questions, before he is lost in uniform among his comrades, and the Officer of the company taking recruits should be invited to be present. It brings to light any accomplishments a man may possess, and will be found a useful record afterwards. I have here a few pages taken at random from my book.

I think it is also a judicious thing to remind Officers, especially young Officers, when they join a dépôt for the first time, that recruits require a different treatment from the old soldiers they have been accustomed to, and that, in dealing with minor offences and irregularities, every allowance should be made for the thoughtlessness of youth, ignorance of the gravity of the offence, temper, and inexperience of discipline, which has *gradually and temperately* to be instilled into them by explanation and advice. The same precepts should also be constantly impressed upon the non-commissioned officers, as they are not found, so far as I am aware, in any regulations. It is hard, I think, on the recruit to have a page of his defaulter sheet filled with entries for trifling irregularities, which, with more knowledge and experience, he never would have committed, and I recommend, therefore, that Officers be enjoined to award, for minor neglects, either admonition, one day C.B., or an extra fatigue or parade, which do not entail an entry in the defaulter book, when considered sufficient to meet the requirements of discipline.

I should not like to omit mention of a part of the recruit's moral training, which can only be productive of good results, and that is the practice of giving him a personal introduction to his Chaplain. Once a week, at a fixed hour, the recruits of the past week attend in the Chaplain's room for registration; that is, to enable him to ascertain whether they have been baptized and confirmed, and to give him an opportunity of speaking to them individually, and showing the interest that is taken in them. I am not sure if this is generally done by Chaplains, but it seems to me a practice deserving of commendation; in fact, it is only fair to any clergyman, who is earnest in his work, that he should have such an opportunity.

And I think you will agree that the recruit's moral training would scarcely be complete were not some means taken to inculcate temperance. Many Officers are apt to think lightly of temperance societies and their works, and I, myself, until quite lately, have never

taken any prominent part in this cause; but when I am aware, from recent experience, that the recruit is generally a sober lad, and when the canteen steward tells me that it is the old soldiers that support the liquor bar, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that a large number of sober young men learn intemperate habits in the Army. Our aim and our duty should be, at any rate, to keep them as sober as when they joined, and when I mention that I know it to be a fact that in one of our garrisons nearly 200 out of 400 recruits are members of a temperance society and total abstainers, it shows a desire to keep away from drink, with a knowledge of its mischievous consequences, which is worthy of every encouragement. And yet I am sure many will be surprised to hear that there is not one temperance society for the Army at home, which soldiers of every religious persuasion can join with the full approval of their clergy! I think it high time that an Army Temperance League be established with branches in every barrack, and beginning with the dépôts, which should be unsectarian, and not only for the benefit of a particular creed; and I would be glad if some of those who are more conversant with the organization of these societies than I am would take the subject in hand, with a view of filling up the gap that undoubtedly exists.

And now, having given the recruit as much moral training as we can in ten weeks, in drafting him to his battalion, in order that his good points may not be lost sight of, I would suggest the desirability of company Officers being requested to send in the names of any who have brought themselves to notice and developed any useful qualities, and that these reports, with the Colonel's remarks, be forwarded to the Commanding Officer of the battalion. Recruits, in one of the lectures, should be told that these reports are sent forward, as it acts as an incitement to them to do their best; and I am told Commanding Officers are glad to have them to refer to in the selection of men for non-commissioned officers or various employments.

I will now turn to the second part of my subject, the recruit's

#### *Physical Training.*

The system of drilling recruits during the first three months of their service has undergone little or no change for generations. It was simply drill, perpetual, monotonous drill. It was not till about thirty years ago that gymnastics were introduced into the Army, and after the recruit had completed his drill and became a duty man, he was, when available, put through a three months' course of gymnastics, if there happened to be a gymnasium in his station; but two years ago a few lines quietly inserted in the new Queen's Regulations introduced a happy change in the system, which I for one had long looked forward to, and that was the order for a short course of gymnastics, concurrently with his drill, to form part of his dépôt training. No sounder move in the right direction was ever made, and now that the principle has been established, I only hope the means for carrying it out will be provided at all dépôts where the usual gymnastic appliances are not yet available.

The value of gymnastic training to the recruit was so thoroughly gone into by Colonel Onslow, in his lecture here three years ago, that I need not repeat any of his arguments or facts, but I am glad to be able to give my testimony to the satisfactory results produced by the new system, as not only is the recruit's chest and muscle well developed, and he himself made nimble and self-reliant, but, from the handiness and activity he learnt in the gymnasium, he picks up his drill with much greater facility.

The only defect of the course is that it is too short, lasting only six weeks, and consisting of about thirty attendances of an hour and a half a day; however, it may be interesting if I mention that, from careful measurements of several classes, I find that the average increase in chest, even after this limited course, is  $\frac{3}{4}$  inch, of fore arm  $\frac{1}{4}$  inch, and of upper arm  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch, but in weight only 4 oz.

I feel inclined here to say a word with reference to the town-bred recruit, of whom I have had a very large experience, and whom some Officers are ever ready to decry. If it were a question between a big, sturdy, country lad and a town man of inferior physique, doubtless I would take the former, but it must be remembered that in these days we cannot pick and choose, but must take any recruit that offers himself, provided he is up to the standard, and the town and country recruits' measurements being equal, I infinitely prefer the town man. It seems to me, quite independent of his intelligence and better education, that there is a greater capacity for expansion, especially among those engaged in non-laborious occupations, in the town-bred man than in the agricultural labourer who is accustomed to hard work; in fact there is a quantity of latent strength and muscle which has never before been brought into play, and which it only requires fresh air, exercise, and plenty of food to develop. In short, the town lad will improve in physique more than his brother from the country after joining. Moreover, their quickness and faculty for receiving instruction contribute to make them, if not such machines as the agricultural labourer, certainly more useful soldiers. Did not a battalion of city men take part in Roberts's march from Kabul to Candahar, and will anyone say that in the work they did, or hardships they endured, they suffered in comparison with other regiments of the force?

But to return to the question of drill, here again we are confronted, and to a greater degree, with the inconvenience of men dropping in daily. In actual drill this difficulty can be fairly well surmounted, as there are squads suited to every degree of proficiency and awkwardness, but when a man has to go through courses of musketry and gymnastics it requires much management to make everything fit in.

Experience shows that, besides his gymnastics, a recruit practically does not attend more than ten drills in the week in summer and nine in the winter. He also loses valuable time from vaccination, and perhaps sickness, and also from bad weather.

Under these circumstances, in his first ten weeks' service it requires all the energies of the drill instructors to make him pro-

ficient in Infantry Drill, Parts I and II; Rifle Exercises, except bayonet exercise; Infantry Drill, Part VIII up to Section 15, and Part X, Section 12 (duties of sentries). If more be attempted, I do not consider the result will be satisfactory; pushing on a recruit too fast is a common but short-sighted practice, and the mischief thus done is afterwards seldom, if ever, repaired.

The recruit's progress in drill depends almost entirely on the efficiency of his instructor, and on this subject I should like to say a few words.

Very great care is necessary in the choice of non-commissioned officers for dépôt duty, and the regulations are strict on that point, but the selection generally rests with Commanding Officers of battalions, who are naturally interested in keeping their best men with them; the consequence is that now and then a man totally disqualified to deal with recruits by reason of a quick temper and rough manner, though otherwise deserving, finds his way there, and does more harm than good. Non-commissioned officers should, I think, come to the dépôt on probation, and if found unsuited after three months' trial should be remanded to their battalions. There would be no expense incurred, as they would travel on duty with drafts.

The essentials of a good drill instructor are three. First, *he must know his work*, that is, he must study his drill book, and learn thoroughly those sections he is expected to teach. Not learn it by heart, far from it, but be able to explain in his own language what to do, and how to do it. The old habit of rattling through long cautions in the words of the book should be strictly forbidden, and it should be explained to him that these cautions are only intended for *instructors*, to describe how certain motions, and practices are to be done, and are not to be repeated to the squad. I am afraid this obnoxious habit must have had its origin at Hythe, where I believe no non-commissioned officer used to be considered qualified for a certificate, unless he could repeat all the cautions without a mistake, and hence it came to be considered the correct thing to do on all occasions! The best way to show a recruit how a thing is done is for the instructor to do it himself, drawing his attention to any points that may be necessary in words of his own, and the fewer the better. If there are awkward men, they should be taken in hand individually, while the squad is standing at ease, but to keep a whole squad waiting, perhaps in some constrained position, while the instructor goes round and corrects three or four men, is a method much to be condemned, as making drill most unpopular. Besides, what recruits require is *practice* at a movement, and these constant corrections only waste time.

The second qualification for a drill is a *good manner*, which includes a good temper. He must seem to take an interest in his squad and in his work, and try to interest the men in what they are doing, and keep them in a good humour. The old bullying drill sergeant of former days, before whom recruits trembled in their boots, I am glad to say, has almost disappeared, and we find we can get on just as well without him. While the squad is standing at ease, the instructor

should talk to them on matters of drill, explaining the reasons for each practice or movement, what muscles it is intended to call into play, &c.

The third essential is, of course, a *good word of command*. Every one knows what a good word of command is, but many from carelessness fail to cultivate it, and constant supervision by the Adjutant and sergeant-major must rectify this omission. I will not go further into this, as it is explained in the drill book, but I have ventured to mention the other requisites of a good drill, as they are not alluded to in the official instructions, and non-commissioned officers require to be reminded of them.

Another important point in drill is not to change men constantly from one squad or instructor to another, like going to a higher class at school. My experience is that it is a better method to allow the instructor to bring on his squad through all the sections of drill to a certain point, and then hand over the men to the senior drill to be finished. Awkward men can be dropped out and smart recruits, who have learned drill before, can be pushed on, but by this system the instructors take more interest in their squads, and, what is valuable, it creates competition, and enables one to compare the work done by the drills and to keep them up to the mark.

It is also desirable that about twice a week the senior squads should be taken out and drilled on grass, to accustom them to keep step when they cannot hear their footfall, and to teach them light drill.

The method of individual instruction is one that should be constantly practised. By this I mean causing each man of the squad to march past the instructor singly, and correcting his faults. It should be done in full sight of the rest of the squad, so that they may be led to criticize their comrades, and learn to avoid their defects.

When recruits become further advanced the smartest of them should be exercised occasionally in drilling the squad, more especially the temporary lance-corporals, to give them confidence and train their word of command. It is called in the drill-book "*mutual instruction*," a name it scarcely deserves.

As regards running drill, I would rather postpone it until the recruit joins the ranks of his battalion; it is a matter of training rather than of instruction, and his time at the *dépôt* is better employed with other exercises. Moreover, he should have a fair amount of running in his applied gymnastics, climbing, jumping, and *escalading*.

And now to turn to the third branch of the soldier's physical training, his instruction in musketry.

There seems to be no record of any regular system of training before 1855. In that year I am informed a course of instruction was instituted, when the Enfield rifle was given to the Army, and with constant modifications it has continued to the present time; but, unlike gymnastics, it is now relegated to the period after the recruit joins his battalion. A slight move, however, has latterly been made in the direction of grafting some musketry on to the recruit's other training at the *dépôt*, by absorbing what used to be called "*position*"

drill into the firing exercise, which must be preceded by aiming drill. The latest revision of the Red Book, among other things, abolished the time-honoured "one, two, three" motions for strengthening and suppling the arms, and this I can only account for by the supposition that his previous gymnastic training renders them unnecessary. I would, however, venture to say that the weak arms of most of our recruits of the present day require more than a six weeks' course to fit them to handle a rifle in a way to produce effective shooting.

I will now conclude with some general observations on the training of our recruits, as affected by the existing *depôt* system, and offer a few suggestions, which I hope may be taken into consideration and subjected to discussion.

No good object can be gained by diving into ancient history, and bringing to light the various *depôt* systems that have been in force for the last thirty or forty years up to the present time. The territorial system having been established and barracks built at the headquarters of regimental districts, we may presume that there is little prospect of any radical change in the present arrangements taking place for some time to come. Consequently the suggestions I propose to offer are only made with the view of carrying out more perfectly the existing system. The present practice, I may mention, is for all recruits, wherever enlisted, to be sent to the *depôt* of their regiment for training for a period of ten weeks, including a six weeks' course of gymnastics but not a recruit's course of musketry, and every six weeks, such men as are trained are drafted to the home battalion.

Now I am afraid there is little doubt about it that Commanding Officers of battalions at home are by no means satisfied with a system that sends them drafts of half-trained recruits, upon whom they must set to work to put the finishing touches for another month or so before they can safely place them in the ranks of the battalion; but their greatest grievance is that they have to put all these men through a recruit's course of musketry before they can undergo their annual training with their companies, and before they are eligible to form part of a draft to the battalion abroad. Some Commanding Officers go even so far as to say they would rather train their recruits with the battalion from the very beginning.

Now I must confess I think this complaint is a very reasonable one. If a *depôt* is established for the reception and training of recruits, it should do its work thoroughly, and send them to their battalion completely trained in musketry and gymnastics, and fit for all ordinary drill and duties. Moreover, the recruit, too, has reason to complain, for, however well he may be drilled at the *depôt*, on being turned over to new masters in the middle of his training, he gets little credit for what he has done, and has to go over much of his drill again, perhaps having just finished a couple of months' training with the Militia before enlistment.

My suggestion is that recruits should be allowed to remain fourteen weeks (instead of ten) at the *depôt*, and that no man be sent to join his battalion until he has completed a ten weeks' (instead of six)



course of gymnastics, his musketry course, and learned all ordinary drills and duties. There are some few subjects he cannot be properly instructed in at the dépôt, such as battalion drill, outlying picquet duties, &c., but I have made a careful diary of the work and have tried the experiment, and find it can be done, if the necessary appliances are at hand.

In theory I do not anticipate there would be any official objection to this proposal. There would be a slightly increased accumulation of recruits at the dépôt, for whom, I have little doubt, accommodation could easily be provided, but a more formidable obstacle is the absence of rifle ranges and gymnasia at many of the headquarters of Regimental Districts, although the latter, at least theoretically, are supposed to exist. The War Department has, however, at several dépôts erected temporary sheds for gymnastic exercises, which answer the purpose fairly well, and in the schemes for new rifle ranges I hope the requirements of the dépôts will not be overlooked. At any rate, the recruits will have the same facilities for musketry as the trained soldiers of the dépôt, and, although inconvenient, they might be detached for their twenty-one days' course, as they often are, after joining their battalion.

Let us suppose that at the dépôt of a double battalion regiment, 6 recruits join every week. At the end of 4 weeks there will be 24 men available to begin a course of gymnastics, which will go on for 10 weeks concurrently with drill and later with musketry, drill or musketry being performed in the morning and forenoon and gymnastics in the afternoon; 6 weeks later, or at the end of the 10th week, this same squad will commence its musketry, concluding it by the end of the 14th week.

What I wish to see introduced is a system, where, instead of the old method of doing gymnastics at one time and nothing else, or musketry and nothing else, gymnastics and musketry should be blended with the recruit's drill and work concurrently, producing at the end of his tour at the dépôt a soldier fit to take his place in the ranks of his battalion. But to carry this out, I have a suggestion to offer, which I trust will meet with support from the Inspector of Gymnasia. The difficulty at present is to obtain instructors and gymnastic accommodation for the large body of recruits under training at dépôts, but I maintain that that these highly trained gymnasts who perform wonderful feats on the horizontal bar are not needed for a simple recruit's course, and that every company non-commissioned officer, or at any rate a large proportion of them, should be required to undergo an easy course of gymnastics, sufficient to enable them to put a squad of recruits through when necessary. A non-commissioned officer has to obtain a drill certificate in musketry; why should he not be obliged to instruct recruits in gymnastics as a matter of course, as part of his duty? In this way, where there is no gymnasium or regular instructor, much outdoor work and dumb bells might be got through by recruits under their own non-commissioned officers.

I think we exact enough from our young lads in giving them from 4 to 4½ hours' physical exercise in a day. The German recruit, who



must be got ready for work with his battalion in 12 weeks, including instruction in musketry and gymnastics, has to perform 5 hours' drill and practical work daily, with an hour's oral instruction, and some lessons in cleaning and mending to fill up his evenings! I see no occasion to adopt such ideas. I like our recruits, for instance, to have time to go to school or voluntary gymnastics, and to have leisure to amuse themselves at manly sports, all which must be impossible in the German service.

There are several other questions connected with the early life of the recruit, although not immediately with his training, which I should like to have touched upon, but the present subject is large enough, nor do I intend to go beyond the day when he leaves the dépôt to join his battalion, but I cannot help feeling considerable interest, I will not say anxiety, in his career, and should be sorry to think that his moral training, in the broad sense I have used the words, came to an abrupt end on his ceasing to be a recruit, and joining the ranks of the old soldiers. I will therefore conclude by expressing a hope that some battalion Commanding Officer will take up the thread where I have left it, and tell us another day by what system he proposes to cultivate, strengthen, and maintain in the trained soldier his loyalty, patriotism, sense of duty, sobriety, and *esprit de corps* during the remaining years of his service.

Colonel R. S. LIDDELL (Commg. 23rd Regtl. Dist.): General Erskine and gentlemen, I have no intention of criticising the valuable lecture that we have heard to-day, as I am sure we are all most grateful for the many hints which have been given to us; but I think it is our duty, all of us who are commanding regimental districts, if we can, to supplement in any way what has been told us in this lecture by Colonel Hatchell. Colonel Hatchell spoke of Battalions not always sending their best Non-commissioned officers to their Dépôts. Where that is the case, I certainly agree with him it is most reprehensible. Fortunately for myself, the Battalions in which I am interested could not be more generous than they are to me; they send me everything of the very best, and they look on their Dépôt as the commencement of the career of every man in the Regiment. Therefore I can speak for myself, and I have no doubt there are a great many other Commanding Officers who can say the same thing. Still if there are, and I have heard of it, Regiments who are so foolish, I was going to say, as not to view their Dépôts in the right light, I think it is only cutting their own throats; still it is a great misfortune. Fortunately mine is not one of them. Colonel Hatchell spoke of the promotion of young recruits to be lance-corporals, which I know to be a most valuable step in the way of rousing emulation among soldiers. I have not only obtained permission to make lance-corporals at the Dépôt, but I have allowed them to go on pass to their homes as lance-corporals, which shows the youngsters in the village they come from how rapidly a man of good character, intelligence, and education can get on, and it helps recruiting. I certainly think it is a most valuable thing, and if all Commanding Officers behave as well as my Commanding Officers always do, and allow a man to remain a lance-corporal when he gets to the battalion, it makes it more valuable still. Colonel Hatchell spoke about reading the Records of Regiments as part of the instruction given by the Officer every week. The Regiment I am connected with, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, has only just published its Records, so that it has only lately been done, but it does give the men an immense interest in their own Regiment. "Barrack damages," that is a thing we ought to go into most thoroughly. A recruit comes to the dépôt for a short time only, ten weeks. On joining he has his crockery, amongst other things, to pay for, and his share of breakages in the monthly "barrack damages." He then goes to his battalion and has it all over again. Perhaps some of the barrack damages have not been assessed during his time, and they come on to the

next quarter. He may get off cheaply, but the next lot of recruits that come fall in for the damages that two lots of recruits ought to bear. This is only one out of many instances; but by careful watching barrack damages can be decreased enormously. Colonel Hatchell gave us some very valuable hints on the subject of punishments. Company Officers are very apt to think that the scale of punishment they deal out in their battalion should be dealt out to recruits, which, of course, is a mistake. I would go even a little further than Colonel Hatchell does. I really should like the Commanding Officer of a Regimental District to have the power of tearing up the company's defaulter sheet altogether on a man joining his Battalion. I would leave it to his discretion to tear it up, and let the man go away with a clean sheet. A young fellow perhaps gets a punishment that makes him careless, and he gets another. Then he goes back to his regiment with his sheet spoilt; whereas if we had the power to tear up the company default sheet he could make a fresh start. Colonel Hatchell, I think, did not allude to the subject of food. The young soldier wants more of it than the old soldiers. A bit of food in the early morning is a most important thing for the recruit. He cannot wait for his breakfast. He, perhaps, has a drill in the early morning, and a young boy of eighteen or sixteen—as he very often is, thought he ought not to be—wants a little something. I think it would be a great advantage if some one went round from the coffee-shop with biscuits and a coffee can, and gave the recruit some little thing that he could eat quickly and drink before going out to his morning drill. Then one other point. In my district, North Wales, many of the recruits only speak Welsh: they cannot speak English, and, therefore, they like to keep amongst themselves as much as possible. I think, if it can be done, a recruit on joining should be asked what company he would like to join. He very often has friends in a certain Company, and I think, if there is no great objection to it, that the recruit should be given the option and allowed to join some particular Company. I thank Colonel Hatchell for many valuable hints, which I shall act upon at once, on my return to my Dépôt.

Brigade-Surgeon MYERS: Although not a Commanding Officer, I have for many years taken very great interest in the training of troops, more especially the Guards, and I have certainly seen injury done to our soldiers by over-training. I consider it of very great importance indeed to keep this subject constantly before us, and therefore I have to thank the lecturer for bringing it again to notice. He said he had nothing very new to say, but he has given us some very important hints. On one or two points I cannot quite agree with him. In the first place, I think he would wish that Officers Commanding should more especially attend to the moral training of recruits, whereas the Adjutant should attend to their physical training. No man feels more than I do the importance of the moral training of the troops. It is probably not so much attended to even now as it ought to be, although far more than it was. I quite agree that the Commanding Officer of a Recruit Dépôt should watch over the moral training, but he should certainly not withdraw his close attention from the physical training, and leave this to the Adjutant, because sometimes Adjutants are more zealous than cautious, and, in their anxiety to train the recruits and make them look smart and know their duty before joining their regiments, they are apt to over-train them. Very great keenness is shown by some young Officers, who, when they want to make their men march well, put their strongest men in front, whereas older men know how injurious that is to the weaker soldier. I merely point this out as evidence that Officers in command should be most careful that enthusiastic Adjutants and drill sergeants should not over-train their men. I believe the lecturer remarked that it required extreme energy on the part of the drill sergeants to make the recruit efficient. The important thing is that they should not be too energetic, for they should allow the recruits to be trained gradually. With regard to his reference to the Chaplain, I have never heard that question publicly mooted before, but privately I have frequently drawn attention to it. I think the Chaplain is a most important person at the Dépôt. The recruit comes there raw; he wants a friend, and there is no man who can stand so much in the light of a friend to him as the Chaplain, and possibly the good that he does in a moral sense is retained sometimes through the whole of the recruit's service. He is the first real friend the recruit can go to and consult in time of difficulty. I certainly do feel that the

Chaplain's position is one of the greatest importance if he is allowed opportunities to get hold of the recruits. There was one point which struck me with surprise, viz., that during the six weeks' gymnastic training (I suppose the last six weeks) the recruits only increased about 4 oz. in weight. That to me is very small. I have been at the Guards' dépôt some two or three years, as well as at other times, and certainly, ten or twelve weeks after joining, I am much surprised if a healthy man has not increased in weight 4 to 8 lbs., sometimes 10 lbs., or even a stone.

Colonel HATCHELL: After what time?

Brigade-Surgeon MYERS: From the time he joins to the tenth or twelfth week, so that, if requisite, they can be discharged under the three months clause. I have instructed the Medical Officers to be careful to keep their weights most accurately, and the mere fact that a man does not increase in weight is a point of consideration whether he is likely to become an efficient soldier, because healthy recruits are almost sure to increase in weight, certainly 4 or 6 lbs. I should almost imagine that an average increase of only 4 oz. points to too much training. Then, again, with regard to town and country recruits, I do not think there can be a shadow of doubt that, given men of equal size and weight, the town recruit is a better man, a cleverer man. I think in this room Lord Wolseley stated that he preferred the town recruit. But then it was not only a question of men of equal strength, but whether the weaker man, when a town recruit, was not as good as a stronger country recruit. Taken all round, I should think more of the weaker town recruit if healthy than of the heavier country lad; we could make more of him in course of time by good feeding. Then, as to the question of running drill, I am very glad to hear the suggestion that running drill should not be encouraged much at our Recruit Dépôts. There is no doubt they have plenty to do; the tendency is to overtrain them. I should like to see at least sixteen weeks instead of fourteen for their training. The man has to be vaccinated, and if the results are not satisfactory he has to be revaccinated, and that means a loss of time. Then, with regard to the gymnastic instructors, I should be very sorry to see them superseded in any form by other men. It is a very important training, and requires great care, and if it is divided and certain portions given to sergeants who have not been well trained, I think the recruits might be injured thereby. I certainly think, although a man has only to train to a certain point, he should be a well-trained man himself to begin with. Of course we all agree that if a young recruit is worked hard he should have extra food, and I should like to see more food given to the young recruit. Speaking of recruits of the Foot Guards, they do supplement their food very largely. Instead of drinking beer, they spend a great deal of money in even bread, and I presume this is equally the case at other dépôts. With regard to the condition of the German recruit, the lecturer says he has to be completely trained in twelve weeks, including musketry and gymnastics, and has five hours' drill and practical work daily, &c. Is it not a fact that they start with men of better physical strength and training?

Colonel HATCHELL: Oh, no.


Brigade-Surgeon MYERS: I have not had any experience of them myself, but thought it might be scarcely fair to compare the training of the German recruit with that of the English recruit at the present time.

Colonel HATCHELL: General Erskine and gentlemen, I am very grateful to you all for the notice you have taken of the paper I have read, and also for some of the suggestions and kindly criticisms that have been made on it. Colonel Liddell alluded to one or two subjects which I left out, as I thought the lecture was long enough. There are several other points, such as food, clothing, the disposal of bad characters, &c., connected with recruits, which I did not go into, as I thought I would limit myself to their training only. I should like to take notice of the remark he made about his good non-commissioned officers. I should be sorry to imply that I have been badly treated in that way; but still, occasionally, instances do occur where you get some man who is very good in his battalion—a sharp, smart, non-commissioned officer, but not at all the sort of man for dealing with recruits. They require special qualifications, and though he may be a very good man, still, when he goes to the Dépôt, we find that he does not suit. In such a

case it does not necessarily reflect on the Commanding Officer sending him back after three months. As to barrack damages, which were also mentioned as being very hard on the recruit, I may make a suggestion. It is one of those trifling things; but I know that in the last four years I have reduced barrack damages, per head, from about 6*d.* a month, which the men used to pay, to about 2½*d.* I think that is chiefly done by having little notices printed and hung up in every barrack room, warning recruits about barrack damages. There is a useful order in the barrack department, which says that, if any article of barrack furniture is lost, you have to pay for it; but if you can produce the handle of a mop, or the half of a brush, you have not to pay for replacing it. By impressing these little things on the recruits, and telling them that by hunting up the pieces at the quarterly or monthly inspection, they will not be charged, we find a wonderful effect produced in reducing the barrack damages. Food is a thing also which I did not go into, as there is a great deal to be said about food; but I quite agree that the recruit does not get enough to eat; however, we give them every facility for getting as much as ever they like out of their own pockets. I have arranged a system of giving credit in the coffee-shop, which I find is very largely availed of by recruits. Every recruit, by going to his pay-sergeant, can get a 3*d.* ticket, so that if he has no money in his pocket—having spent it all—by getting the 3*d.* ticket he can go and hand it into the coffee-shop, and get a very good supper for 2*d.*, and a bottle of ginger beer, or something of that sort. A large number of these tickets are taken every day, so that the recruit can never say that he is without food. As to coffee in the morning, there is always a table spread just at the door in the barrack square, with cups of coffee at ½*d.* and 1*d.*, and a couple of biscuits, so that the soldiers can always get food, without trouble, in the barrack square. Of course it is only fair, as Colonel Liddell suggested, that a man should go to any Company he likes, and if he makes an application of that kind it is always complied with, if he gives a good reason. I am very pleased, especially at the way in which my observations about the moral training of the recruit have been taken. I think that is what has been most neglected in the past, and I cannot help thinking any well-matured scheme for the moral training of our young soldiers would have the best effect for good in their future life, either in the field or in quarters. Brigade-Surgeon Myers, I think, may trust to me, as I have said, towards the end of my paper, that I thought four hours' drill was quite enough, that recruits will not be overworked, and, as I said, that four hours' drill a day really resolves itself into only about nine or ten hours during the week, besides gymnastics. The fact is, these recruits think nothing of it. I came across a letter from one to his mother the other day, in which he said, "I have only had four hours' drill to-day." As to the gymnastic instructors, I am sorry Colonel Fox, the Inspector of Gymnasia, is not able to come here to-day; but I got a very satisfactory note from him. He is, unfortunately, abroad now, but I told him what I was going to suggest, and he was good enough to write that he thoroughly concurred in all my proposals, and that he was working hard himself to get a system of gymnastics established in every depôt where there are none at present. Dumb bells can always be used, and what is also of great use to recruits, is a sort of obstacle course, with jumps, like a steeplechase course, to practise the recruits. All that is easily got up at a very trifling expense. As regards the 4 oz. increase of weight, my weights were taken from the gymnastic measurements, that is to say, there was only six weeks difference between the two weights. They probably increased more in the month after they had joined than they did in the six weeks afterwards. No doubt the increase in three months would be considerably more. I do not think there are any further points I have to remark upon. I shall be satisfied if I have only aroused some sympathy for our recruits, and some interest in them, and if this sympathy should lead to some practical steps being taken afterwards in the direction which I have indicated in my paper.

The CHAIRMAN (General Geo. Erskine): Gentlemen, Colonel Hatchell has told us that he was invited by the Council to read a paper on the subject that we have had before us this afternoon, and I must say that he has responded in a way which is worthy of the character which he holds in the Service. He has produced a paper which, to my mind, is conceived in a most excellent spirit, and is full of wise suggestions which are the result of his experience in carrying on the various

duties devolving upon him in command of a large Depôt Battalion. I am sorry that he has not had a larger audience this afternoon, but I would say to him that he must not be discouraged on that account, because I call to mind that, when Lord Brougham delivered in the House of Lords that great speech on the abolition of slavery which is an historical event, there were, I believe, only about half a dozen peers sitting on the benches before him. However, the reporters were present, and that was quite sufficient for his Lordship, and his speech has gone down to posterity. As I listened to the description of the way in which Colonel Hatchell carries on the duties of his Depôt Battalion, I could not help contrasting what he said with what I recollected as being in vogue when I entered the Service. In those days, recruits were drilled, I should say, just as efficiently as they are in the present day, but their training was carried on in quite a different style. They were not encouraged to use their natural intelligence, rather discouraged I should say. I remember when I was a Subaltern in my regiment observing a squad of recruits being drilled. I believe I was being drilled at the same time myself. One of the squad made a mistake, and the sergeant who had charge called him to account for it. The man in his simplicity commenced making the excuse, "I thought," upon which he was taken up short by the sergeant, who said: "You think! What business have you to think? Colonels and Captains are paid for thinking, but you are not. Don't let me hear you talk any more about thinking." That is not the way in which Colonel Hatchell drills his recruits, and I think his plan is much superior to the old one. Of course you must not infer that what the sergeant said on the occasion to which I am alluding is a type of the feeling of all the Officers of those days, but it gives you an idea of what was very prevalent in the system at that time. Colonel Hatchell has said that he considers from 4 to 4½ hours' physical training quite sufficient in the day, and there I agree with him entirely. Then he goes on to say that he would propose extending the time of training at the depôt from 10 weeks to 14. I think he stopped short too soon. For my own part, I would extend the time much further, even further than Brigade-Surgeon Myers has suggested, which, I think, was 16 weeks. Of course I speak with some diffidence in the presence of an Officer who has come fresh from a training establishment, as my experience goes back to some long period, I am sorry to say; but still let us consider what has to be done with a young man when he joins the Depôt, at least, what should be done. I think before he is sent to take his place in the ranks of his Battalion, he should be thoroughly and completely trained individually, and I am quite sure that if some longer time than is allowed by the Regulations at the present period was devoted to that instruction, it would tell to the advantage of the Service in the end. It is a great mistake, I think, in all education that the first steps should be taken perfunctorily. The first steps are generally the most tedious, and they should have the greatest attention paid to them. I was much impressed by the concluding remark in Colonel Hatchell's lecture. Supposing that the young soldier is trained in the way which he describes as prevailing in the Winchester Battalion, I cannot help thinking it would be deplorable that when that young man was sent to take his place in a Battalion of his Regiment at some other station, all the moral training which he had received should come to an end, and I do not see that there is any reason than that should be the case. In fact, I see every reason why it should not be the case. Colonel Hatchell has said, in connection with that remark of his, that he would like to see the subject further discussed in this theatre, and I hope it will be, so. He suggests that it should be taken up by some Officer commanding a Battalion and I would like to propose an amendment upon that suggestion, to the effect that the work should be taken up by Colonel Hatchell himself, and I think most of those present, after having heard what he has said on the present occasion, will endorse my view. I think, gentlemen, now, that it only remains for me to express to Colonel Hatchell on your behalf, our thanks for the trouble that he has taken in preparing the very valuable paper which he has read to us, and coming here to take part in the discussion which followed.



## FOREIGN SECTION.

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THIS portion of the Number, hitherto the Occasional Notes, has now become the Foreign Section, and is reserved for articles, either original or compiled, on professional subjects connected with Foreign Naval and Military matters; also for notices of Professional Books, either Foreign or English.

The Council of the Institution wish that this section shall be developed still further, and I have undertaken to continue my Editorship during the current year, with a view of aiding them in carrying out this work. It seems to me possible to make this section, and consequently the Journal, the means of keeping our Members acquainted with all naval and military progress abroad *pari-passu* with that progress; and I shall be glad to receive from members of both Services, including in the latter those of the Auxiliary Forces, suggestions, information, or offers of assistance.

It is desirable, further, that I should state that, as regards editing the Naval matter in the Section, I shall have the aid of Naval Officers, thoroughly competent to give good advice and to pronounce sound opinions.

It must, however, be borne in mind that, as the change from a quarterly to a monthly issue has been made in order to ensure the more prompt publication of the Lectures after their delivery than has hitherto been the case, the Foreign Section will, as a rule, be restricted in extent during the Lecture season in the first half of the year, and will be prominent in the second half.

It is requested that communications and books for review (the latter under cover to the Librarian) may be addressed to me at the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall Yard, London, S.W.

LONSDALE HALE,

Colonel R.E. ret.

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PRÉCIS OF THE REGIMENTAL HISTORY OF THE 3RD  
BRANDENBURG INFANTRY REGIMENT (No. 20)  
DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1870-71.

Extracted by Colonel H. T. HILDYARD, A.A.G.

[The regimental histories of the German Army vary a good deal in value. Some of them are full of most interesting details, not only instructive, but throwing light on the campaigns in which the regiment has taken part. Of these, that of the 20th Regiment, of which a *précis* has been kindly undertaken by Colonel Hildyard, and is now put before the Members of the Institution, is one of the best. The only fault in the History is a deficiency of detailed maps and plans of the engagements and battles in which the regiment took part. There are in the History incidents well worth noting other than those here described, but only a full translation would admit of all these being recorded. Colonel Hildyard has successfully extracted those of most value, and, in compliance with his wish, I have exercised editorial functions in the shape of adding a few notes and some sketch plans. As regards the latter, it is only in connection with the Battle of Vionville that there are at hand plans on a scale sufficiently large to make the text fully intelligible.

The 20th Regiment was commanded by Colonel v. Flatow, who, except when acting as Brigadier, served with it throughout the campaign. It belonged to the 11th Brigade, 6th Division, of the IIIrd Army Corps. The 35th Regiment was the sister regiment in the Brigade. Colonel v. Rothmaler, commanding this regiment, was appointed Brigadier with the rank of Major-General; Lieutenant-General v. Buddenbrock was the Divisional Commander. At the outbreak of the war Prince Frederick Charles was in command of the corps, and had brought it to the highest pitch of discipline and training. On his appointment to the command of the IInd Army, of which the corps formed part, Lieutenant-General v. Alvensleben II succeeded him.—L. A. H.]

THE order for mobilization reached the 20th Regiment at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 16th July, 1870, at Wittenberg, on the Elbe. The machinery was at once put in motion, and worked with the greatest regularity.

On the fifth day of the mobilization the Reserve men arrived from Berlin, Potsdam, and Jüterbog, and immediately after their arrival on the drill ground they were allotted to the several companies. It was a pleasure to see the cheerfulness with which these men came to rejoin the colours. No one wished to go to the Ersatz battalion,<sup>2</sup> and every one endeavoured to be included in the mobile regiment.

After the arrival of this augmentation it was not possible to

<sup>1</sup> "Das 3 Brandenburgische Infanterie-Regiment (Nr. 20) in den Feldzügen 1866 und 1870-71." By Major Kirchhoff and First Lieutenant Brandenburg I. Berlin, 1881. Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn. Price 8s.

<sup>2</sup> Every regiment on mobilization forms an Ersatz or dépôt battalion, to which are drafted some of the Officers, N.C.O.'s, and privates from the regiment.—Ed.



quarter the whole regiment in Wittenberg; a portion of the surrounding villages were, therefore, occupied.

As early as the seventh mobilization day the regiment was able to report the mobilization completed. The short time that remained, after clothing the men, was utilized by the companies for drill. By regimental order, each company was practised once in field firing with ball cartridge.

On the 22nd July orders were received for the regiment to move on the following day. With the exception of two, commanded by First Lieutenants, all twelve companies of the regiment were commanded by Captains. Every company had, besides three Subaltern Officers<sup>1</sup> and nine<sup>2</sup> companies, a fourth. The Ersatz battalion was given two Captains and two First Lieutenants as company commanders. A Captain was detached as Adjutant to the 9th Division, and a First Lieutenant as Adjutant to the 8th Infantry Brigade. The Commander of the fusilier battalion was transferred to the command of the Jäger battalion of the corps.<sup>3</sup>

On the 23rd July the regiment was moved by rail by Magdeburg, Brunswick (here coffee was provided), Hannover, Bielefeld, Hamm (where the men had a warm meal), Dortmund, and Cologne to Bingerbrück, where it arrived on the morning of the 25th, and was placed in cantonments at Planig, Bibelsheim, and Bretzenheim. The rest of the IIIrd Corps was concentrated in cantonments at and about Kreuznach.

So as to facilitate the concentration of the 2nd Army, the IIIrd Corps was now moved further towards the frontier by march. The heat, and the hilly nature of the country, rendered the march very trying. On the 4th August, which was to have been a halt, the alarm was given in the early morning, and the regiment was moved forward again. The infantry had now approached to within some few miles of the cavalry divisions, which had been pushed forward earlier to the frontier.

The IIIrd Army Corps was now so near the enemy that the march was ordered to be carried out in large bodies, and cantonment guards posted.

On the 5th August the regiment went into cantonments at and about St. Wendel, where, on the following day, a telegram was received by the Colonel from Saarbrücken: "Immediately by rail, entrain there whatever portion of the regiment can be conveyed. 5th Division in action."

The 2nd and the fusilier battalions were actually in St. Wendel, and were formed up at the railway station within a quarter of an

<sup>1</sup> In these Subaltern Officers, however, were included six *Portepeeführer*. A *Portepeeführer* is a young man who has been a cadet, or is serving in the ranks, and having passed a special examination, is serving as a candidate for a commission.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> In 1866 none of the mobilized companies had more than three Subaltern Officers.—H. H.

<sup>3</sup> Including the regimental and battalion Commanders and their Adjutants, there were 54 Officers with the regiment. The strength of the regiment is not given, but probably each battalion was nearly 1,000 strong, exclusive of Officers.—Ed.

hour. The 1st, which occupied cantonments in a neighbouring village, was not long after them. But the first train, which left at 4 p.m. with the fusilier battalion, found the line blocked, and it was 7.30 before the last battalion left.

Consequently, only the fusilier battalion arrived on the field that evening, and it was too late to take any active part in the action. The other two battalions joined it early on the morning of the 7th August; they had arrived at Saarbrück between 9 and 10 the previous evening, but had, by mistake, been directed to Burbach.

The regiment profited by the capture at Forbach of French transport, inasmuch as company carts were allotted to it, which proved of immense service during the subsequent course of the campaign. Already, in the Palatinate, the pack horses told off for the companies had been found unpractical for the transport work required; but the regulations did not admit of their being used in carts. The value of this was now recognized, and the use of carts encouraged.

The order was now given for the advance of the three armies towards the Moselle. The 2nd Army marched by the St. Avold-Nomény road, moving off on the 9th August; the 20th Regiment formed a part of the advanced guard of the 6th Division. Notwithstanding the excellence of the roads, the intense heat rendered the marches very trying.

On the 13th August the 1st battalion reached Buchy; the 2nd battalion Silly, and were partly cantoned, partly bivouacked, at those villages. The fusilier battalion was on outpost duty, north-west of Buchy. On the 14th August the outposts had been pushed forward, close up to the Moselle.

Marshal Bazaine had now only two alternatives to choose between. Either he must offer battle, supported by the Moselle and by the fortress of Metz, or he must retire by Verdun to Chalons, and effect a junction there with MacMahon's army. As his retreat was already threatened by the wheel to the right of the German Army, he determined to adopt the latter course. But on the afternoon of the 14th August his rear was overtaken by the 1st Army, and attacked at Colombey.

The 3rd Army Corps occupied on that day a position across the Nomény-Metz road, fronting towards that fortress, to cover the flank march of the 2nd Army, in the direction of Pont-à-Mousson. The 6th Division was posted in the vicinity of St. Jure. The fusilier battalion took the outposts at Louvigny. The artillery engagement at Colombey could be distinctly heard in the bivouac.

On the morning of the 15th August there was not a Frenchman left on the right bank of the Moselle. The advanced cavalry patrols reported the French Army in full retreat on Chalons. But delayed by the immense train accompanying it, and by its columns being confined to two roads, its more advanced Army Corps had not retired by the evening further than the neighbourhood of Gravelotte and Rezonville, whilst its rearmost corps were still close to Metz. Orders were issued from the headquarters of the German Armies for the

2nd Army to press forward on the 15th, to the roads leading from Metz, by Fresnes and by Etain to Verdun.

The 20th Regiment left its bivouac at St. Jure at 8 o'clock. The order of march of the division was changed; the 12th Brigade formed the advance guard, the 11th Brigade the main body, with the 20th Regiment in rear. The Seille was crossed at Cheminot, and at 2 P.M. the column halted at Longeville-les-Cheminot, north of this place, and dinners were cooked.

The division was to cross the Moselle at Champey by a pontoon bridge, to be constructed by the Pioneers. The construction offered special difficulties on account of the swollen state of the river. While waiting the troops formed a bivouac, the 20th Regiment being situated in a meadow west of the road. Whilst the dinners were cooking Prince Frederick Charles rode up and said, "How are you getting on, my men?" The answer was, "Very well, your Highness, only we should like to see the French soon." "Then," said the Prince, laughing, "you can be satisfied. Only keep your legs well in hand to-day and to-morrow, and you will overtake them, and cut off their retreat on Paris." Shouts of joy resounded through the entire camp at the news.

About 7 P.M. the march was resumed. All fatigue was forgotten at the prospect of getting up with the enemy, and, accompanied by cheerful singing, the column marched by Bouxieres, up and down hill, to the high bank of the Moselle.

Late in the evening the head of the division reached the bridge at Champey. But as it could as yet be crossed only in file, the column following was put to the most irksome and fatiguing delays. At every moment the order was given, "Halt—Order arms." Soon the exhaustion of the men was so great that on the order, "Halt!" all threw themselves down on the road, so as to rest their legs a little. But only for a few minutes. Then followed the order, "Slope arms! March!" All struggled up and staggered on as if drunk, from sleep. At last the road is left, a fire is seen in the distance, marking the position of the bridge; and soon the turn of the regiment came to cross. It was now midnight. The march was continued until 2 A.M., 16th August, when a bivouac was formed at Pagny.

After hardly two hours' sleep the troops were on foot again. At 4 A.M. the regimental wagons arrived, after crossing the river at Pont-à-Mousson, and coffee was prepared.

In the early dawn the Colonel of the regiment was to be seen moving about the camp fires, encouraging the men, and expressing the expectation that in the event of a fight they would do their duty and maintain the credit of the regiment. From every side he was received with cheerful assurances that they could be depended on.

Shortly after 5 o'clock the order to fall in was given, and the advance resumed. Only the led horses, the medical and ammunition wagons, followed the battalions. The advanced guard was composed of a cavalry regiment, a battery, and a brigade of infantry; the main body of three batteries, and a brigade of infantry. In each case the batteries moved between the two regiments of the brigade.

On reaching Onville, the march was continued in a north-westerly direction through a hilly, wooded country, on the road to Mars-la-Tour. The heat was tropical, and the march most fatiguing. But the old Prussian sense of duty kept the Brandenburgers up, and impelled them forward.

At about nine o'clock a halt was made on the road, in a clearing in a wood. But hardly had arms been piled, and the men stretched out their weary limbs in the shade, when the sound of guns was heard from the north-east.

"Stand to," was the order repeated on all sides, and the advance was resumed towards the sound of firing. Buxieres was reached at a quickened pace, and a position taken behind the advanced guard brigade, which had already formed up.

The Commander of the Division was on a hill in front, awaiting reports from his cavalry, which had been sent forward towards Vionville to reconnoitre. The Army Corps Commander, who was with the 6th Division on this day, had himself ridden forward with two squadrons of dragoons to reconnoitre the enemy, visible about Vionville and Rezonville.

The whole of the French Army of the Rhine was there, in the same strength and composition as on the previous day. Marshal Bazaine had originally intended to continue the retreat on Verdun, at 4 A.M., but difficulties had been experienced, and he had postponed his march until the afternoon.

General v. Alvensleben quickly grasped the situation. But he did not hesitate a moment to lay hold of the superior enemy with his Army Corps. He knew the tenacity of his troops, and could trust in his Brandenburgers to hold the enemy, at least until the neighbouring corps should come up in support, and the enemy had to be held at all events.


In the meantime the thunder of the guns sounded unceasingly in the ears of the regiment waiting behind the heights of Buxieres, inspired by the prospect of being engaged.

The artillery of the division was already hotly engaged in advance. It had joined the batteries of the 5th Cavalry Division, which, by their unexpected appearance, had succeeded in driving back the enemy's cavalry in wild haste on to the infantry, in their camps at Rezonville. Now, however, these bodies of infantry had rapidly got under arms, and advanced to occupy the positions indicated beforehand, and prepared for the defence.


These positions extended from the plateau north of Vionville by Flavigny to the St. Arnould Wood. The 6th Corps (Canrobert) was posted north of the Metz road; the 2nd Corps (Frossard) was south of it.

Here, on the enemy's left flank, the infantry engagement broke out at this moment, for the 5th Division, which had crossed the Moselle at Noveant the previous night, had mounted the plateau from Gorze, and on debouching came upon the 2nd hostile Corps.

As reports soon reached the General Commanding from the 5th Division that pointed to the retirement of the French in a northerly



SKETCH . I .



Scale, about 900 yards to an inch.

direction, the 6th Division was ordered to advance by Mars-la-Tour on Jarny, in order to cut the enemy off from any outlet to the westward.

The advance was continued in rendezvous formation. The din of the battle commenced became louder and louder. With the thunder of the guns was now mixed the rattle of the mitrailleuses, and the crackle of the small-arm fire. At this time nothing was visible of the engaged troops. A halt was made on a level with the village of Tronville. It now appeared that the further advance in a northerly direction on Jarny was no longer required by the circumstances. The attack would have to be made eastwards in the direction of the Metz-Rezonville road. The direction was changed (see Sketch 1).

The Divisional Commander rode forward with his Staff towards Vionville to reconnoitre.

From time to time small clouds of smoke could be seen dancing high in the air. French shrapnel exploded with a crackling noise and struck the ground, but without reaching the flat heights behind which the brigade was situated. As yet the impressions were not sufficiently serious to stop the mouths of the jokers. "Levi, cheer up," said a private of the 2nd company to his front rank man; "we are going to the fair; they are tearing up the calico." There was soon enough to be an end of merriment and wanton wit. The mouth that made the above remark was closed for ever before an hour had passed. "Packs off!" ordered the battalion Commanders. A few minutes later, on the order of the brigade Commander, Fusilier Regiment No. 35, which was in the 1st line, was deployed into fighting formation. The 20th Regiment followed at 2nd line distance, having the fusilier battalion on the right flank.

Hardly had the regiment reached the eastern slope of the broad declining ridge,<sup>1</sup> and thus come within sight of the enemy's batteries posted beyond the village of Vionville, when a shower of projectiles was launched upon it. Shells plunged into the ground in front of and between battalions, shrapnel burst high over the men's heads; it appeared almost to be a miracle that the regiment did not suffer heavy losses.

On the order of the regimental Commander two companies from each battalion were now thrown forward. The objectives given for the advance were: for the 2nd battalion the village of Vionville; for the 1st battalion the battery situated at the south-western corner;<sup>2</sup> for the fusilier battalion a wall south of the village, which proved to belong to the cemetery.

The battalions advanced against the objectives designated in the quickest time. The companies were on the point of extending their leading half-züge, when an order came from the division Commander to the regiment to keep the two musketeer battalions in close order, to form the general reserve of the division. This was

<sup>1</sup> The regiment passed south of Tronville and close to the village, and at this time was about the point marked "a" on the sketch.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> That any French battery was ever at this point is most improbable. So far as I know there is no confirmation anywhere of this statement in the text.—Ed.

carried out in accordance with the orders conveyed by the Adjutants. The companies which had already suffered losses from the artillery fire had in a few minutes assembled again, and were placed in the hollow south-west of the village.<sup>1</sup> The 3rd company alone, which had the shortest line to go to reach the village, and had hurried forward in advance of the other companies, was at the time the order reached it already hotly engaged, so that it could not be withdrawn from the fight.

In the meantime the fusilier battalion had advanced in the direction of the village cemetery. The 11th and 12th companies were in advance; the 9th and 10th companies followed in close order as supports. The battalion Commander was with the 11th company.<sup>2</sup>

When the losses increased, and besides the shell fire the distant fire of the Chassepôt rifles began to take effect, the leading half-züge were extended. In this formation the battalion went down into the hollow that runs south-east, past the village of Vionville.<sup>3</sup>

For a few minutes the battalion was here out of sight of the enemy. The losses appeared to diminish; but a moment later, when the battalion had reached the edge of the undulation and entered on the open ground towards Flavigny and Rezonville, a veritable hail of projectiles of every kind poured down on the fusiliers.

In spite of the enormous gaps caused by the enemy's lead, the fusiliers pressed courageously on. The order of the Captains to extend and to reinforce the skirmishing line were carried out quietly and with precision. The two extended half-züge of the 11th company were reinforced by the 5th zug; those of the 12th company by the 7th zug.<sup>4</sup>

In the same manner the leading züge of the 9th and 10th companies were extended.

The 11th company had pressed further forward on the northern slope of the heights, and now observed that it had lost its original direction, for the cemetery lay to the right. In order to correct this mistake, perhaps also moved instinctively by the desire to find on the higher ground some shelter for a moment from the destructive fire, the company brought the left shoulder sharply forward. The next moment the whole company threw themselves down close to the cemetery wall. Only a brief moment of rest was accorded. Then came the order, "Up, double march; down the slope." Detachments of the 35th Regiment, which a short time previous had been driven back behind the cemetery wall by the fearful fire, joined the company. The appearance of this insignificant support sufficed to give the brave 35th the impulse for a fresh advance.

<sup>1</sup> About the point marked "b" on the sketch.—Ed.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently the 11th company was on the right of the 12th company.—Ed.

<sup>3</sup> The map in the official account, 5A, shows that the valley referred to is the one running N.E. between the village of Vionville and the cemetery.—Ed.

<sup>4</sup> Each of the twelve companies of a regiment is divided into three züge. In each company one of these was called the Schützenzug. The remaining eight were numbered consecutively from right to left through each battalion. The züge of the 1st, 5th, and 9th companies were numbered 1 and 2, those of the 2nd, 6th, and 10th companies 3 and 4, and so on.—Ed.



The furious fire concentrated at this spot from Flavigny, from the copse of poplar trees east of Vionville, and the troops behind, west of Rezonville, was traversed at the double. The company then advanced uninterruptedly up into a gap in the line of the 35th. The right wing of this regiment had its front towards Flavigny; the left wing fronted more to the north to the road.

On the right, near the latter troops, the 11th company now took its place, and with them occupied a meadow, through which flowed a small stream north of Flavigny, with the front towards the copse of poplars.

On the way to its present position the company had lost no less than 50 killed and wounded, of whom 4 were Officers, viz., 1 Captain, 1 First Lieutenant, and 2 Second Lieutenants. The battalion Commander and the company leader had their horses shot under them immediately beyond the cemetery.

The 12th company had advanced at first on the same alignment as the 11th company. Coming out of the hollow, its ranks also were dreadfully thinned in the shortest time. The impression produced by this led to the half right turn of the 11th company not being noticed. Following the principal line of the enemy's fire, the company advanced directly on the bridge between Vionville and the cemetery, in a direction which led to the south-eastern corner of the village. Nothing was now to be seen of the enemy.

The 9th and 10th companies now brought their right shoulder forward on the supposition that the battalion commander was with the 12th company, and had ordered the direction of attack on the village. They pressed forward in the first instance against a farm which lay south of the village, in the immediate vicinity of the church. From there they turned, accompanied by detachments of the 35th Regiment, towards the eastern outlet from the village.

The occurrences described above led to the 11th company fighting alone, separated from the remainder, during the first hours of the battle.

We left the 1st and 2nd battalions at the moment when, in accordance with superior orders, they were assembled as a reserve. After the battalions had been halted a short time in the hollow between Tronville and Vionville, they were pushed forward, by the order of the regiment Commander, on Vionville, in order not to lose their distance from the first line, and were opened out during their advance.

They had arrived at 200 paces from the village, when the Division General Staff Officer brought the order that the 2nd battalion was to move in a northerly direction with a view to its special employment. The General was waiting for the battalion Commander at the tall poplars on the road, west of the village, in order to give him more detailed instructions.

At the same time the 1st battalion was placed at the disposal of the regiment Commander, and received the order to advance between the village and the cemetery. The battalion Commander placed the 2nd and 4th companies in the first line; the 1st company followed as reserve.

Already, during the deployment, the losses became sensible. An Officer of the 2nd company was severely wounded; the regiment Commander and the fifth Field Officer<sup>1</sup> had their horses shot under them. The Colonel remained on foot during the remainder of the fight, and ordered the other Field Officers to dismount.

The battalion soon entered the space swept by the enemy's bullets. Death reaped again here a fearful harvest. A shell tore off the top of the colours. Directly afterwards the battalion Adjutant fell, severely wounded. But the cry was still "*Forward, into the advanced fighting line.*"

At this point, we must recall the participation of the 3rd company in the struggle, in order to specify the situation in which the 1st battalion found itself in its further advance.

We have already seen above, that the 3rd company did not receive the order for the battalion to assemble. While pressing forward in the meadowland, close to the southern border of the village, it had the good fortune to get on with comparatively small losses across the Vionville-Gorze road as far as a strip of meadow, from which the copse in front was fired on for a short time. As the fire from the copse appeared to become weaker, the company leader thought he might gain possession of it by a rapid advance, as the general attack to the left had not progressed yet beyond the border of the village. An attempt was made to gain the wood at the double by means of the extended zug, which was reinforced by the 3rd zug of the company. The company reached the edge with heavy losses.

Immediately afterwards, a company of the 35th Regiment pressed up on the left. Both companies endeavoured to gain ground further forward; but at this moment a whole French brigade (Pouget) advanced against the wood and opened so destructive a fire on it that its maintenance by the two weakened companies was not to be thought of, especially as the wood, being composed of slender poplar stems, did not offer the slightest cover.

The 3rd company was forced to retire, with great losses, in the direction of the village. The company leader still held the Vionville road with a portion of it, while the other portion had to retire to the farm nearest the village. The tactical order of the company was for the moment relaxed. The company had lost seventeen killed and forty-three wounded in the attack of the copse, amongst them three Officers.

In the meantime the attack of the 11th Brigade had led detachments of troops on all sides to points from which the copse and the road lying north of it could be brought under fire. Companies of the 35th Regiment pressed forward concentrically from the village of Vionville, and to the right in the direction of Flavigny, and threw themselves down, where the ground offered a slight cover, for a short fire action.

At this stage of the engagement, our 1st and fusilier battalions came into the fight also.

<sup>1</sup> This Officer is a Field Officer attached to the regiment mainly for administrative purposes.—E.L.

The 1st battalion had extended the leading züge of the 2nd and 4th companies, and found itself soon after crossing the Vionville-Gorze road on a level with the advanced fighting line. The 12th company, which had pushed itself up in the meantime, joined the left flank of the 1st battalion.

The advance was continued without interruption in the direction of the copse, from which the enemy delivered their Chassepôt fire with frightful precision into the ranks of the Brandenburgers, whilst shell after shell was thrown into the assaulting troops from the heights beyond the road. The züge which were still in close order reinforced. The first company was already brought up on the right flank of the battalion in the advanced line. The 2nd zug went forward; the other two remained a little longer in close order. A company of the 35th Regiment had been pushed up between the 2nd zug and the 4th company.

On the left the 9th and 10th companies, which came out from the border of the village at the moment of the general advance, joined the 12th company.

The Colonel of the regiment, who directed personally the attack on the heights east of the wood, had, therefore, united six of his companies here.

A general hurrah resounded. The copse and the elevated ground east of it were reached; the enemy gave way before the attack, and retired over the road in a northerly direction.<sup>1</sup>

But already fresh masses of French troops were drawn into the fighting line, which covered the ground about the poplar copse with renewed showers of lead.

It is not possible to remain here. Already some of the troops began to waver. A retrograde movement must inevitably lead to destruction, unless a line of cover could be reached. "Forward," therefore, was the cry on all sides, "up to the road."

A new lusty hurrah! and the road also is in the hands of the Brandenburg Regiments. It was just noon. A severe and bloody piece of work had been accomplished. The enemy had been driven out of his advanced positions into the main position on the edge of the plateau (see sketch).

This success had certainly been purchased by the regiment with heavy sacrifices. On their way to the road the six companies had lost in killed and wounded 19 Officers and about 300 men.

On the road all endeavoured to get as far as possible under cover.

<sup>1</sup> The following note in the original seems worth inserting:—

When this elevated ground was taken the shooters threw themselves down. Colonel v. Flatow with his Adjutant, First Lieutenant Wegener, and Major v. Pirch, the Commander of the fusilier battalion, were standing close behind the men. Suddenly Lieutenant Wegener fell and struggled convulsively. "Shot through the heart," remarked the Major to Colonel v. Flatow. After a few minutes Wegener made signs to have his neck loosened. This was done, and a few minutes later he was standing up fresh and unhurt. It appeared that when standing with lips parted to take breath on the summit, a Chassepôt bullet had passed between them, literally taking away his wind. A few days later a thick scar showed itself on each lip.—Ed.

The skirmishers ensconced themselves in the ditch on the south side, and the poplars on the road offered some protection, though little, owing to the small girth of the trees. Supports were no longer at hand.

As the regiment Commander passed along the firing line, he found the colour-bearer of the 1st battalion, with colours, alone 30 paces *behind*. If he had been hit, and the battalion had moved on, the colours would have remained there. He was, therefore, ordered up with the colours into the firing line.

A stationary fire action was developed here, with the superior enemy posted on the brow of the plateau, whose infantry were materially assisted by the fire of batteries posted on the rising ground in rear. The engagement here continued to cause much loss. The masses of the enemy posted on the prolongation of the road in front of Rezonville, enfiladed the road, and no cover was available against this flank fire.

The first care of the Commanders was now directed to re-establishing some order amongst their troops. In the heat of the combat they had frequently become mixed up. Men of the 20th, 35th, and 64th were mixed; whole *züge* were found in companies to which they did not belong.

While the Colonel of the regiment was giving orders regarding this to the fusilier battalion he was slightly wounded, and also the regimental Adjutant.

A complete assembly was naturally out of the question on account of the continued severe fire. It had to suffice to reunite those belonging to the same units, where this could be done without much movement. Especially scattered individuals managed to rejoin their companies, crawling on their stomachs.

The excellent bearing of our men in these trying hours, when they had to remain inactive while death was demanding fresh sacrifices to right and left of them, cannot be sufficiently acknowledged.

We will now turn to another part of the battle-field, and look for our 2nd battalion<sup>1</sup> there. We left it as it was ordered by the Division Commander to the western issue of Vionville. On the arrival of the battalion the Division Commander was no longer there.

The battalion Commander, therefore, sent it behind the large battery posted across the road, so as to get it out of the way of the enemy's heavy shell fire, and to avoid masking its own artillery. In the meantime he went himself to look for the Division Commander. After a long search he met the Division General and Staff Officer, who brought him the order for the battalion to be moved up north of the road into a wide gap that existed between the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 24th Regiment.<sup>2</sup>

This regiment was engaged on the extreme left flank of the fighting line, between Vionville and the Roman road, in a struggle as keen as it was bloody, with far superior and ever-increasing masses of

<sup>1</sup> The 2nd battalion was only three companies strong on the day of Vionville. The 6th company was detached as escort with the divisional baggage.

<sup>2</sup> About the point marked "c" in the sketch.—ED.

the enemy. Deployed in a long line, the further advance of the brave 24th had now been brought to a standstill. Its ranks had been fearfully thinned. The greater portion of the Officers were stretched on the battle-field, either killed or wounded.

In order to reach the point indicated, the Commander led his three companies, with the 5th company forming the advanced guard, through the Tronville wood, quitting it on the eastern side, in a northerly direction, until the fighting line was reached.

In advancing from the wood, the 5th and 7th companies formed the advanced line. They debouched from the wood on to the open ground with their advanced *züge* extended. Although the open space up to a small strip of meadow at the bottom of the valley was covered at the double, on account of the rapid fire directed upon the companies from all sides, the losses were, notwithstanding, considerable. They increased when the companies surmounted the opposite slope of the small valley. By the time the alignment of the 24th was reached most of the Officers were *hors de combat*. Besides the battalion Adjutant, the 5th company lost its Commander and two other Officers.

As the battalion was too weak to produce a change in the situation of the fight, it took part in the fire action of this flank, the men lying down.

The enemy was posted above on the edge of the plateau and the border of the wood, the other side of the Roman road, in enormous superiority. Fired on from the front and the left flank without intermission, the companies, now entirely extended in skirmisher lines, suffered fresh losses.

In order to strengthen the fire, the battalion Commander ordered the 8th company, which had been left as support in the hollow in rear, to extend and advance into the firing line. The 7th and 8th *züge* took their places on the left of the 7th company.

Soon this company began to gain ground to the front, following the example of its Commander. This was facilitated by the other two companies almost at the same time getting forward about 200 paces, the men crawling on one by one, so as to avoid the fire.

But the fight at this spot was too unequal. The fire of the needle-gun was here in no respect superior to the Chassepôt. To this was added the unusual difficulties of the ground, which offered only most incomplete cover.

Notwithstanding this, a sergeant of the 7th company succeeded in leading his *zug*, the Officer commanding which had been wounded, to a point nearly 200 paces in advance of the general front. This was in a field situated somewhat higher than the ground generally, where three single trees and the hedges abutting on them gave some cover to the men, who took shelter behind them. The 8th *zug* of the 8th company made its way to the same spot. It was possible from there to bring the enemy on the Roman road under an effective fire.

Repeated attempts to bring up fresh detachments failed on account of the watchfulness of the enemy, who swept the entire ground with his bullets whenever even a few men rose up. As this led to fresh

and heavy losses along the whole line, these attempts had to be temporarily abandoned.

In the meantime the situation of the troops at this place became worse and worse. It would have been an easy matter for the enemy with their entire 6th Army Corps to break through the thin lines by a determined advance.

Towards 1 o'clock, however, the left flank received a further reinforcement by the arrival of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  battalions of the Xth Army Corps ( $1\frac{1}{2}$  battalions of the Oldenburg Infantry Regiment, No. 91, and 1 battalion of the Regiment No. 78).

These troops endeavoured to advance from the north-eastern border of the Tronville copses, on the extreme left flank, against St. Marcel; but all their attempts, conducted with the greatest energy, failed here also, owing to the numerical superiority of the enemy, who outflanked the advancing troops and inflicted on them heavy losses with their long-range Chassepôts, at distances at which it was not possible to return an effective fire with the needle-gun.

The positions on the border of the wood were, however, maintained, notwithstanding that the arrival of considerable French reinforcements could be observed.

The French seemed gradually to have realized how small was the number of their opponents at this point. After they had strengthened their right flank by the entire 3rd Corps (Le Boëuf) and Grenier's division of the 4th Corps, these troops were put in motion for an enveloping advance against the Tronville copses.

Against such a superior force the wood could not be permanently held. After the troops of the Xth Army Corps had shot away their last cartridge, they had to relinquish the edge of the wood. Step by step they disputed the advance of the enemy pressing after them. He succeeded, nevertheless, about 3 o'clock, in getting into the plantations in rear of the position of the 24th Regiment and our 2nd battalion.

Naturally the maintenance of the position in front of the wood was no longer possible. As the left flank of the battalion was completely exposed, and the flanking fire was soon unbearable, they had to make up their minds to retire unless they wished to be cut off. The movement was carried out from the left flank, in the direction of the hollow, and along this to the south-east corner of the Tronville copses, with marvellous coolness. The enemy was kept at a respectful distance by constant halts, and the delivery of effective rapid fire.

Still it was impossible to prevent eight of the men, of whom most, however, were wounded, falling into the hands of the enemy during the retreat through the wood. Unhappily, also, the other losses of the companies during this dangerous retirement were considerable.

After the companies, having debouched from the wood, reached the road east of Tronville, the battalion Commander, himself slightly wounded, assembled the battalion on the same ridge from which it had commenced its advance in the forenoon.

The battalion set to work to occupy these heights against the enemy, who was pressing on, and to renew the fight. Our artillery,

however, by its heroic behaviour, succeeded in stopping the enemy in the Tronville copses. It was owing to its assistance that the French only gained ground very slowly, and did not reach the road.

It would not certainly have been possible to oppose for long such greatly superior forces. Already the shells of the enemy's batteries, which had come into action to one side of the Tronville copses, were falling in Tronville, when the heads of the 20th Infantry Division entered the field of battle at this point, and, by their instantaneous action, put an end to the advance of the French.

The men of the 2nd battalion, thoroughly exhausted after their glorious engagement with overwhelming superior forces, had to remain in the reserve position until further orders.

During the few hours occupied in the fight, the three companies had lost in killed and wounded 12 Officers, 15 non-commissioned officers, and 123 privates.

Let us now turn again to the right flank of our fighting line, where were the other portions of our regiment.

The 11th company was on the extreme right flank, separated from the other companies of the battalion. To the left the poplar wood had just fallen into our hands; on the right the hurrahs could be heard of the 35th, who, in concert with detachments of the 5th Division, had taken Flavigny. On both flanks the enemy was falling back in disorder.

The 11th company was moving with a company of the 35th north of Flavigny, along the hollow towards the road. The heights were just reached as French cuirassiers galloped up to attack some troops belonging to our 5th Division on the Flavigny plateau.

A few moments before, on the first signs of an impending cavalry attack being noticed, through the advance of single horsemen from Rezonville, the company Commander had hurried forward his company to the hedge of a high-lying field, from which the whole plateau could be commanded.

This short forward movement was now rewarded. The company was able from here to direct its rapid fire on the right flank of the cuirassiers.

In spite of the losses in men and horses which the cavalry suffered in galloping past, the attack was carried out with praiseworthy bravery. It failed, primarily, owing to the coolness of the 52nd, who allowed the enemy to approach to 300 paces in order then to receive him with a murderous rapid fire.

From the position occupied by the 11th company, the cuirassiers were seen to go back in confusion towards Rezonville, too far off to be reached again by our needle-guns. The attack cost the cuirassiers 22 Officers, 208 men, and 243 horses.

The battalion Commander now ordered the 11th company to join the regiment, by advancing to the road. The company Commander led the company, which was exposed to fresh losses, eastwards, past the poplar wood, up to the road, and took up a position there on the right, near the 1st company, with which the regiment Commander was at that moment.



In the 1st battalion, in the meantime, owing to the great losses it had suffered in attacking the line of the road and the stationary fire action that ensued, the rearrangement of the several commands, within the companies, was urgently required.

The whole of the Officers belonging to the three companies were now either dead or wounded. Of all the Officers of the battalion, only two Lieutenants were effective, though both were wounded. They assumed the command of the 1st and 2nd companies respectively; the company sergeant-major was placed in command of the 4th company.

The battalion Commander was not actually wounded, though the buttons at the back of his tunic had been cut off by a bullet, which caused a contusion.

On the left of the 1st battalion, first the 12th company, and then the 10th company, succeeded in making good their footing on the other side of the road. Advancing in a meadow bottom, surrounded by poplars, both had pushed forward to a fold of the ground in the direction of the road, from which an effective fire could be delivered on the enemy's lines. The 10th company had the good fortune to approach a battery of the enemy so unexpectedly that, surprised by the rapid fire of our Grenadiers at a few hundred paces, it withdrew rapidly, leaving behind an unlimbered gun. To reach the gun immediately under the enemy's fire, was not practicable, notwithstanding all the efforts of the brave Grenadiers. This was effected later, during a pause in the fight.

In this advance the Captain and a Second Lieutenant of the 10th company were wounded. One Second Lieutenant had been killed earlier, and also a Lieutenant of the 9th company, the Captain of which was wounded.

The greater portion of the 9th company, under the command of a Second Lieutenant, was on the left flank of the fusilier battalion; one zug, under a Second Lieutenant, had pushed forward still further to the Roman road, and had been posted since early in the afternoon north of the road at a small clump of poplars, mixed up with portions of its own regiment as well as the 64th and 91st Regiments. The greater portion also of the 3rd company took part in the further fighting at this spot. It consisted of the 5th and the rifle zug, which had been assembled by the company Commander after the advance described above, and led forward to the road at this point. He was severely wounded by two bullets, and the command was assumed by a Lieutenant. A Second Lieutenant was posted with the 6th zug, further south, on the road in action; he had been separated from the rest of the company during the advance.

The other companies, also of the 1st battalion, after a sanguinary struggle, pushing forward individual züge, had succeeded in crossing the road and occupying the long fold of ground beyond it. From time to time masses of the enemy attempted to advance against it. The rapid fire of our lines, and still more the accurate fire of our batteries, prevented these advances from succeeding. Soon the position was permanently occupied.



The fire, which had at first been directed at intervals with the greatest intensity against our positions, gradually diminished. About 2 o'clock that of the infantry ceased altogether. Everyone drew his breath! But it was only the calm before the storm. Before long the fire was taken up again by the enemy on the north with increased energy. Fresh batteries came into action on the Roman road, and the battle was soon in full swing again on this flank.

Things also became more lively in the front of our companies engaged east of Vionville. Here also the enemy brought up fresh troops, and sent them forward to make a new advance against the weak bodies of troops opposite to them.

The batteries brought into action on the heights north-west of Rezonville to prepare this attack fired shrapnel and shell on the position. The rattle also of mitrailleuses could again be heard.

Yet our riflemen held their ground bravely, supported by the artillery, which had come into action close to the infantry. The situation began to be critical. The troops had become extremely exhausted after the hour's fight in the hot August sun. And it was still little past two o'clock! Not a gun or a battalion remained in reserve, and fresh masses of the enemy continued to assemble against our position.

In this situation it became necessary for the cavalry to sacrifice itself.

Von Bredow's cavalry brigade, consisting of the 7th Cuirassier Regiment and the 16th Uhlan Regiment, undertook its self-sacrificing death ride before our eyes, passing north of the battle-field, and rode victorious up to the last French reserves. Here the two regiments, attacked on all sides by French cavalry masses, were forced to turn back. The enemy's artillery and infantry line had again to be ridden through on breathless horses, pursued by the French horsemen. The remains of the brave cavalry fell back hurriedly on our right flank, in the direction of Flavigny.

Under the powerful impression of this spectacle, the fight seemed for the moment to have ceased absolutely. Everyone watched the wild cavalry chase with breathless interest.<sup>1</sup>

The two cavalry regiments had, indeed, suffered regrettable losses; but their blood had not been shed in vain. The bold attack had so confused the enemy, that the advance prepared from Rezonville was never carried out. Our companies, indeed, assisted by the confusion which the bold cavalry attack caused at first, succeeded in posting themselves still further forward, and gained a favourable position against the Roman road.

This position was held, when, after a short time, the moment described above supervened, and the two new Army Corps attacked our extreme left flank from Bruville and St. Marcel, and forced the infantry fighting on the left, at the Tronville plantations, to go back.

The left wing was now in the air, and the situation became very

<sup>1</sup> General v. Bredow, among the last to retreat, was saved from a pursuing French Officer by a musketeer of the regiment.—Ed.

dangerous. But, happily, no further serious fighting occurred. The enemy appeared to be exhausted. The infantry fire became more and more silent. Only the artillery fire on both sides was continued, becoming at one time heavier, and at another less intense.

After the 24th Regiment had moved off, the 64th Regiment, posted in our positions, received the order to assemble at Vionville. The 12th Brigade was to form a reserve there, ready for all eventualities.

The battalion Commander, viewing the marching away of the 64th Regiment as indicating a general assembly, went with the 11th company in a southerly direction across the road to the poplar wood, with a view to assembling the fusilier battalion there.

After he had picked up the 9th company he led the two companies back to the heights south-west of Vionville. On the way he picked up scattered men belonging to all the companies. He took up his position at the cemetery.

The interior of the peaceful spot was filled with dying and wounded men, amongst them 20 Officers of the 20th Regiment, who were being attended to here by our surgeons. Many a shot still reached the spot.

The 10th and 12th companies received the order to join the battalion at Vionville. But the existing situation did not allow these companies to give up their position. The battalion Commander was informed of this, when his order was received and his sanction obtained for the companies to remain where they were.

South of the road, on a level with the Gorze road, two batteries were still posted in an important advanced position.<sup>1</sup> For the protection of these batteries there were at hand, besides detachments of the 35th Regiment, now only our two fusilier companies, and the 1st, 2nd, and 4th companies. The battalion Commander placed one zug from each of his three companies in the advanced line, and pushed forward the rest of the 1st company, in one body, to the left; the supports of the 2nd and 4th companies were somewhat retired to the vicinity of the road, so as to be withdrawn, as far as immediate conditions would allow, from the ground where the enemy's shells were falling.

Thus, these companies were the only troops which, tired to death after seven hours' fighting in the excessive heat, held the French 6th Corps in check between Vionville and Rezonville during the later hours of the afternoon.

About 4 o'clock P.M. Prince Frederick Charles appeared on the battle-field. His Royal Highness had first received the report at Pont-à-Mousson at 2 o'clock, that the fight about Vionville had assumed greater dimensions. After covering, as rapidly as possible, the intervening 3 miles (German), he now arrived on the right flank of the 5th Division. From here he took over the further conduct of the fight, which now became more and more extended on both flanks owing to the appearance of fresh German troops.

The 19th Division also had now arrived at Tronville at exactly the right time to meet the 4th French Corps, which threatened to turn our

<sup>1</sup> About the point marked "d" on the sketch.—Ed.

left flank again from Bruville. The movement was stopped by the 38th Brigade and the two cavalry brigades.

It was now 7 o'clock.

On the right flank, also, reinforcements—from the VIIIth and IXth Army Corps—had gradually come up and given fresh impetus to the fight by their immediate participation in it.

Prince Frederick Charles decided to make one last advance against the enemy's centre at Rezonville shortly before dark. Although, owing to the extreme exhaustion of the troops, an important tactical result was not to be expected, yet the enemy could be shown what could be achieved by Prussian tenacity.

The order to advance reached the fusilier battalion Commander south of Vionville, where, as we have seen, he had assembled a portion of his battalion. He moved off at once with both the companies, and marched south of the village as far as the poplar wood, and thence wheeling to the left up to the batteries on the road. Here the 10th and 12th companies joined the battalion, which was now reunited, though considerably diminished in strength.

As soon as the 1st battalion Commander received notice of the task undertaken by the fusiliers, he was delighted to join them with the remnant of his battalion. It was only a small body, of scarcely more than 200 exhausted men, he was able to dispose of. Animated, however, by unlimited trust in their leader, they all followed the order for a fresh advance—full of confidence. The advance was now made across the road, with the left shoulder forward, directly on the enemy's position. The 9th and 10th companies formed the first line with the rifle züge extended; the 11th and 12th companies followed behind; the 1st battalion was on the left flank.

The din of the day had been replaced by stillness; only here and there it was broken by the dull boom of artillery, or the sharp report of a volley far on the eastern horizon.

The crest of the heights had now been approached within about 500 paces. Suddenly masses of cavalry were seen to emerge from the enemy's position. "Lie down!" was shouted by the Officers, in the expectation of being attacked at once by the cavalry. Instead of this, the next moment the cavalry wheeled outwards and unmasked the enemy's infantry position. At 100 paces the musketry fire broke out at the same moment, and a shower of bullets whizzed through the air, happily too high to cause us serious loss. Only 9 men were hit; the fusilier battalion Commander had his second horse shot under him.

The fire was now taken up on our side, and a brief fire action ensued. It had already become dusky. A dark mass approached the 1st battalion on its left flank. Everyone observed it with breathless expectation. Suddenly the cry arose: "Hostile cavalry!" The 11th and 12th companies wheeled up, and, together with the 1st battalion, opened a rapid fire that forced the cavalry to turn about quickly. At this moment our Zieten Hussar Regiment came up from the rear. Greeted with loud shouts by our regiment, it rode through the infantry position and followed the enemy's cavalry. The fire of the

infantry in front of us, on the heights, broke out again with renewed intensity. The hussars had ridden up to the enemy's skirmishers, and were now between us and the enemy. By the efforts of the Officers, the fire from our side was soon stopped. In a few minutes it was shown how necessary this was, for the Zieten Hussars galloped back on our lines and assembled behind the infantry.

Once again they rode forward to attack. But in the dusk any result could no longer be looked for. It was 9 o'clock in the evening, and had become so dark, that friend and foe could no longer be distinguished from one another. The engagement gradually died away on both sides.

Deep silence prevailed in the ranks of the battalions as they now marched over the battle-field to the village of Vionville.

During more than eighteen hours no one had rested. For twelve hours the troops had been hotly engaged. Their last powers were used up.

After the men had had some rest at Vionville, and had been somewhat refreshed by water, the 1st battalion commenced its march back to Tronville, and bivouacked near the 20th Division. The fusilier battalion went into bivouac on the heights south-west of Vionville. Everyone stretched himself close by the arms, and all were soon wrapt in deep sleep. The exhaustion was so great that only few succeeded in keeping awake sufficiently long to recall the impressions of the eventful day.

And yet how much had happened between the forenoon hours, in which the battalions had first entered that plain, and the evening! The most sanguinary battle of the whole campaign had been fought. 8 Officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, and 140 men of the 20th Regiment lay dead on the battle-field; 34 Officers, 52 non-commissioned officers, and 481 men were wounded.

The regiment could say that it had done its duty, and contributed to the results of the day. And these results were far more important than the immediate tactical conditions seemed to imply. The German troops had gained a great strategical victory over an enemy more than double their number. The design of Marshal Bazaine to lead the Rhine Army to Verdun to join the Chalons Army had been frustrated. Without Vionville, Gravelotte would not have been possible.

On the morning of the 17th August the men were early afoot, awakened by the keen air, and collected in groups round the bivouac fires. The battalions of the regiment were ordered to assemble at the Vionville cemetery.

Soon the regimental wagons arrived in the bivouac. The men had had nothing to eat, except coffee and some bread, for nearly forty-eight hours; their joy, therefore, at the arrival of the provisions was accounted for. The wine which the regiment Commander had requisitioned from the village of Onville the day before was received from the company wagons with special satisfaction.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It may be remembered that the knapsacks had been taken off and left behind near Tronville. When these were recovered they were found rifled of their contents. The surgeons had ordered them to be opened, and the linen in them to be

The companies had, later, to be re-formed. Seven out of the twelve had lost their Commanders, either by death or wounds. The command of three of these was taken by First Lieutenants, that of the remaining four by Second Lieutenants. The Adjutants of the 1st and 2nd battalions had to be replaced.

The dead were buried in the evening at a spot close to the poplar wood.

Whereas, on the morning of the 17th, it was apprehended that the enemy would employ his great superiority in a renewed attempt to break through, the reports of the cavalry soon announced that the French Army was falling back on Metz.

As early as the forenoon of that day, it was decided to attack it on the 18th. During the course of the day five Army Corps of the 2nd Army, and two Army Corps of the 1st Army, were concentrated in front of the enemy's position.

The regiment had received the order to be ready to march at 5 A.M. About 8 o'clock it was ordered to cook, and to march at mid-day.

About 1 o'clock P.M. it moved off. The division marched in rendezvous formation in a northerly direction.

The corps, however, did not take any active part in the battle, and at night the occupation of Verneville was specially allotted to the 11th Brigade.

The 1st battalion was to occupy the village itself; the other two battalions and the 35th Regiment took up a position in reserve behind the village. The rest of the division occupied a position south-east of Verneville, with the front towards Malmaison.

While the regiment was settling down in the large divisional bivouac at Verneville, the order was received for it to march back to Doncourt to cover the headquarters, and bivouac there. The distance was not very great, but the night march appeared interminable.

Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the morning the regiment reached Doncourt, and bivouacked without wood or straw. Requisitions could not be made in the village, for it was full of wounded, whom it was undesirable to disturb at that hour of the night.

The three battles on the 14th, 16th, and 18th August had for their effect the shutting up of Marshal Bazaine and his Army within the walls of Metz. The next task to be provided for by the headquarters was the investment of the fortress, perhaps to besiege it and to prevent any attempt of the Metz Army to force its way out.

On the morning of the 19th August the necessary order was issued to the 1st and 2nd Armies. The 1st Army and the 3rd Reserve Division, the II<sup>nd</sup>, III<sup>rd</sup>, IX<sup>th</sup>, and X<sup>th</sup> Corps were to be employed in the investment.

The dispositions for giving effect to this order were arranged in the course of the 20th, and were in part carried out the same day. On the left bank of the Moselle, where attempts to break out were most likely to take place, a continued entrenched line was to be established. On the right flank of this position the VII<sup>th</sup> Corps, with the VIII<sup>th</sup> taken for binding up wounds. A similar instance occurred two days later with the 3rd Regiment in the Mance Valley.—Ed.

Corps on its left, was to occupy the ground as far as Moscow, the II<sup>nd</sup> Corps that between Moscow and the road from St. Privat to Woippy, and lastly the X<sup>th</sup> Corps the valley of the Moselle below Metz.

The III<sup>rd</sup> Corps was directed to occupy hutments in the vicinity of Caulre farm, the IX<sup>th</sup> Corps about St. Ail. The former was to act as a reserve to the right wing, the latter to the left wing of the line of investment.

At mid-day the regiment received the order to cook as quickly as possible, as it was to march in the course of the afternoon to Caulre farm.

At 6 P.M. the regiment left its bivouac at Doncourt, and after a short march bivouacked again, north-west of St. Marcel. The 6<sup>th</sup> Division took position here on the left flank of the corps.

After arriving at the spot named, at 7.30 P.M., a general endeavour was observed to make the bivouac as comfortable as possible, for a considerable stay here was not improbable. In the absence of straw, attention was given to the construction of huts made of boughs. The aspect of the weather seemed to warn us to make their construction as solid as possible. While still busied in making the huts there was a heavy storm with hail; but the rain was welcome. The long-continued heat had become by degrees unbearable. It was hoped also that the want of water, which was severely felt, might be mitigated by the rain. In contrast to the extreme heat by day, the mornings and evenings, and still more the nights, were often sensibly cold. This and the want of water were the chief causes that led to the condition of the troops as regards health not being a favourable one. Belonging to the regiment there were, exclusive of wounded, 9 non-commissioned officers, 1 musician, and 115 men sick in hospital.

In order to fill the vacancies amongst the Officers of the regiments in the 10<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade, Officers of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 35<sup>th</sup> had to be detached to them.<sup>1</sup> From the 20<sup>th</sup> Regiment eight 2<sup>nd</sup> Lieutenants were detached to the 12<sup>th</sup> Regiment. Most of these Officers assumed the command of companies which had no Officers and few non-commissioned officers. One-year Volunteers, in many cases, took over the duty of sergeant-major.

The proportion of Officers in the regiment was by this measure reduced to one per company, besides the company leader, inclusive of the vice-sergeant-major and the *Portepeeführer*.

Definite orders had been given from Army Corps Headquarters respecting the supply of provisions. Independent requisitions were only to be made quite exceptionally by the troops, and then only under the authority of the regiment Commander. As a rule, all provisions were to be drawn from the stores of the division, which were to be supplied under requisitions by the Intendance officials in the neighbourhood of Metz.

<sup>1</sup> The 10<sup>th</sup> Brigade belonged to the other division of the corps. The 12<sup>th</sup> Regiment had lost 16 Officers, the 52<sup>nd</sup> had lost 50, killed and wounded. Two of the 20<sup>th</sup> Officers detached to the 12<sup>th</sup> had themselves been wounded in the battle.  
—Ed.

Generally speaking, at this time there was no lack in the quantity of the supplies. Live cattle were available in large numbers; but the bread failed almost entirely and also spirits. Both were painfully missed; the latter especially, owing to prevalence now of rain and to the cold nights.

On the 23rd August the line of investment was drawn closer round Metz, which necessitated the movement of the IIIrd Corps. The new bivouac of the regiment was west of Verneville, where huts were again constructed.

On the 25th August the following was the strength of the regiment:—1st battalion, 698; 2nd battalion, 815; fusilier battalion, 685; total 2,198 men.

On the following day, the 25th August, the companies had just returned from drill and were busy cooking, when suddenly the camp was alarmed. The outposts had reported the advance of the French. In storm and rain, mixed with hail, the division marched out to a reserve position at the village of Amanvillers. But about 2 o'clock, after remaining there for an hour, it marched back. On reaching the bivouac it was found that the storm and rain had played havoc with the huts, and seriously weakened the soup left in the kettles. An extra ration was issued as a special case.

On the 27th the regiment received a great and joyful surprise in the receipt of the order to march at 10 A.M.; its destination was rumoured to be Paris. The march was by Jouaville on Conflans, and the regiment was cantoned at Warcq and Etain.

On the 28th the march was resumed early, and the division had just passed Morgemoulin when the order was received to halt. The troops stood for more than an hour in the streaming rain, until the return of the regimental Adjutant, who then brought the order for the return march to Metz.

March-quarters were arranged for the regiment for the night at Morgemoulin and other localities in its immediate vicinity.

The reason for this march was that on the previous day intelligence had reached Prince Frederick at Bar-le-Duc, that the Army of Chalons had marched off in a northerly direction in order to assist Marshal Bazaine. In consequence of this, the order was given for two Army Corps of the investing army to march on Damvillers, so as to be ready to attack Marshal MacMahon's Army from thence on the day following.

As on the 28th the situation had been so far cleared as to make it evident that the movements of MacMahon on the Meuse could be held in check by the IIIrd and the Meuse Army, the forward movement of the two detached Army Corps was at first temporarily postponed, and later on they were again placed at the complete disposal of the Commander of the Metz investing force.

29th August was to have been a rest day after the fatigues and the constant exposure to rain of the preceding days. But at 4 p.m. the cantonments were alarmed, and the return march to Metz commenced by Etain. It was greatly delayed in the most fatiguing manner by the train and other vehicles, which on a reversal of the direction of the



march, were partly in front of the troops. The new march-quarters, at Jeandelize and Boncourt, were not reached until 11 p.m. The regiment remained in them the 30th, and it was intended it should remain there on the 31st also; but shortly before 1 o'clock the whole of the cantonments were alarmed. The division marched in the direction of St. Privat la Montagne, and assembled at the eastern entrance of Jouaville about 4 o'clock, where it was halted. It was moved forward at 6.30 p.m. as far as the Batilly-Verneville road, where the troops bivouacked, the regiment with the advanced guard, its left flank resting on Batilly.

After the quarters it had occupied during the last few days, the regiment experienced again the most uncomfortable aspect of the bivouac. There was no straw, and only wood in insufficient quantities. The night was really cold, and the baggage train had been left behind at the cantonments. Hungry and cold, the men lay down in their half-dried clothes on the damp ground, to seek in sleep oblivion of the uncomfortable situation. Happy were those who succeeded in securing a place in the proximity of a warm fire.

It was no wonder, considering this anything but healthy life, that the sanitary condition grew worse from day to day, notwithstanding the endeavours of the superior Officers to neutralize as far as possible these harmful influences. Amongst other things the regulated issue of a small ration of spirits was rendered possible by the extensive requisition of brandy and arrack. It was also directed by an Army Corps order that an extra ration of flour was to be issued daily, to facilitate the preparation by the men of an evening soup, as the continued consumption of fresh-killed meat was found to be detrimental.

1st September.—The morning was bright and sunny, and the old humour of the men began to return. They could not get over the disappointment experienced through the hoped-for march to Paris not having come off. "Prince Frederick Charles loves us a great deal too much," said one, "how could we ever have thought he would permit his IIIrd Army Corps to go away from here?" Another suggested that it was in the interests of maintaining the purity of morals in the IIIrd Army Corps that it was not to be brought into contact with the Babel on the Seine.

On this day the battle of Noisseville was fought on the right bank of the Moselle. At 8.30 a.m. the 6th Division was moved to Marengo farm, but was not engaged. It subsequently occupied the section of the first line of investment, extending from Saulny to Châtel, relieving the VIIIth Corps, moved to the south front.

The 11th Brigade took over the actual outpost position, with the 20th Regiment on the left and the 35th on the right. The 12th Brigade bivouacked at Marengo in the 2nd line.

The entire extent of the outpost line occupied by the regiment was more than 3,000 paces; and the following was the distribution of the troops:—

5th company: 1 zug, pushed forward as a picquet; 2 züge as support at the Saulny Bath-house, communication with the 35th Regiment.



6th company: 1 zug as a picquet between the bath-house and the brick-kiln; the two others as support in the 2nd line.

7th company:  $1\frac{1}{2}$  züge in the brick-kiln, the remainder behind the barricade on the road.

8th company: in the alarm-house, as support to the 7th company at the barricade.

9th company: 1 zug as picquet behind the abattis north of the road; 2 züge behind in support.

12th company: 1 picquet to the left of the 9th company, with support behind, communicating with the Xth Army Corps.

1st battalion: in the alarm-houses of Saulny.

10th and 11th companies: 1 mile behind on the road to St. Privat as a general reserve.

An Officer's post of observation was established on a clear spot highly situated north of Saulny. Two Officers were detached there, one of whom belonged to the regiment. During the day the whole of the ground in advance was to be continuously observed, and any important movement of the enemy reported at once to the Commander of the outposts. To facilitate this, mounted orderlies were attached to all the observatories established on the elevated points around Metz.

Shortly before nightfall the outposts at Saulny were reinforced, and parties were sent forward in different directions to listen. Fires were not permitted during the night, because the French at once opened fire on them. On this day, when the regiment had only completed the occupation of its position as night began to fall, this precaution, though necessitated by the circumstances, made itself very unpleasantly felt by our men. Since the coffee at the Batilly bivouac, they had had nothing, and but few carried any provisions in their haversacks.

From 3 A.M. until daylight all the posts and picquets were under arms.

3rd September.—Consequent upon the arrival of the 5th Division from Maizières, a change was made in the dispositions of the outposts. From that day the section of ground was divided between the two brigades. The left portion, hitherto occupied by the 20th Regiment, was allotted to 12th Brigade; the right portion to the 11th Brigade. The regiments of the brigades changed places in such a manner that one was in the advanced line, while the other was placed behind in reserve. In consequence of this arrangement the 20th Regiment was withdrawn to Amanvillers, where it was bivouacked and extempore shelter constructed.

7th September.—It relieved the 35th Regiment on the outpost line. The following were the dispositions:—Right: the fusilier battalion, 1 company as picquet at the Châtel wood, behind an abattis, with 2 advanced non-commissioned posts in the most advanced shelter trenches. Communication with the IXth Army Corps. 1 company in shelter trenches, on the southern border of the Vigneulles wood; a non-commissioned officer's post, about 300 paces forward, on the Amanvillers-Woippy road; 2 companies in support, in front of St. Vincent. Centre: 2nd battalion, 1 company in St. Vincent, 1 in St. Maurice,

2 as support west of the redoubt (of the battery placed in the second line of defence). Left: 1st battalion, 1 company in the Vigneuelles wood, at the abattis, in prolongation of the line of shelter trench leading to the brick kiln from Saulny. Communication with the 12th Brigade: 1 company to its right, behind an abattis, which blocked the hollow running through the Vigneuelles wood in a south-easterly direction; 2 companies in support in front of St. Maurice.

The regiment, therefore, was placed in three lines, one behind the other. In the first line were 4 companies as picquets, which had pushed forward non-commissioned officers' posts. In the second line were three half-battalions as supports. In the third line 2 companies for the occupation of the two farms.

The regiment Commander commanded the outposts, having at his disposition the battery and the zug of cavalry attached to the outposts.

10th September.—The dispositions were slightly modified by the withdrawal by order of the division Commander of the centre support, and the occupation of St. Vincent and St. Maurice, each with two companies.

On the 10th September an Army Corps order directed that regiments were not in future to be kept for more than forty-eight hours together on outpost duty.

13th September.—A draft of 5 Officers, 9 non-commissioned officers, and 95 men arrived from the Ersatz battalion.

The marching out strength of the regiment on the 14th September was the following:—

1st battalion ...	14	Officers,	64	non-com. officers,	606	men.
2nd „ ...	10	„	62	„	735	„
Fusilier „ ...	14	„	43	„	732	„
Total .....	38	„	169	„	2,073	

From this date up to the 27th October, when the fortress and garrison of Metz capitulated after seventy days' investment, the movements of the 20th Regiment call for no special notice.

#### *March from the Moselle to the Loire.*

After the fall of Metz, the 2nd Army, with the exception of the IIInd Army Corps, which was ordered to reinforce the Army of investment round Paris, was directed on the middle Loire, to support the weak German forces already detached there from before Paris.

30th October.—The 20th Regiment, which was occupying Plappeville fort, received the order to march. It moved forward the same day.

31st October.—At Waville the regiment was rejoined by a detachment of convalescents, about 100 in number, sent from the Ersatz battalion. The strength of the several battalions was now as follows:—

1st battalion .....	16	Officers,	58	non-com. officers,	761	men.
2nd battalion .....	17	"	69	"	784	"
Fusilier battalion ..	19	"	49	"	764	"
Total.....	52	"	176	"	2,309	"

2nd November.—The greater part of the 6th Division entered the Department of the Meuse. The 1st battalion reached Boncourt; the 2nd battalion, St. Julien, and the fusilier battalion Commercy, and remained cantoned in these places during the 3rd November, which was a rest day. But there was plenty to do. Arrangements had to be made for putting into effect an order received from headquarters allowing of the attachment of two wagons to each battalion. Of the surplus teams, those of which the material was good were to be formed into a park carriage column, and the rest dismissed.

Further orders were also received regarding the manner of marching, which was in future to be by brigades or divisions, connection being maintained on the march between the two divisions. Strict injunctions were given that sick soldiers were on no account to be left behind during the marches, and that the artillery and train columns were to take them up.

4th November.—The 1st battalion reached Velaines, the 2nd battalion Ligny, and the fusilier battalion Nancreois le Petit. This day's march was a long one again. The few days' marching had been sufficient to improve the powers of the Brandenburgers, who had in some degree become unaccustomed to marching. There were hardly any footsore men. More attention was now paid to the measures for security. In the 1st and fusilier battalions, besides strong cantonment guards, alarm-houses were selected at the exits of the villages; the 2nd battalion sent forward picquets in the direction of Stainville. Besides these precautions patrols were sent out from the 1st battalion to search the Velaines wood, and from the 2nd battalion to the Ligny wood.

5th November.—The 1st and fusilier battalions reached Savonnières-en-Perthois, and the 2nd battalion Nancy. During this day's march a formed advanced guard was employed again. From the last rendezvous the units separated to march independently to their several cantonments. As a rule the Quartermasters went in advance to the cantonments from the general rendezvous. There was for the troops this disadvantage in the arrangement, that their coming was not known to the inhabitants sufficiently early, and they had frequently, therefore, to wait a long time after their arrival before they could get a hot meal.

During the further advance it frequently happened that single companies were detached. This was generally done with the object of obtaining better shelter, and often also to cover the larger bodies and staffs in rear.

6th November.—The regiment marched again closed up; but the wagons followed their own battalions. One wagon was employed to carry the sick, the number of whom had again increased during the

last two days. It was noticeable that those who fell sick were almost entirely convalescents, who had rejoined with the last draft from the Ersatz battalion. In the opinion of the medical Officers their strength had not been sufficiently re-established to support continuous fatigue. In the cases of some men who had been wounded, the wounds broke out again in consequence of the arduous marches. The Ersatz battalion was, therefore, notified from the regiment not in future to send back sick or wounded men before they had been quite re-established, and their powers of endurance tested.

The regiment suffered inconvenient delay in crossing the Marne at Bienville, where all the streets were blocked by the train of the IXth Army Corps.

10th November.—The country through which the march lay was so poor that the villages in which the battalions were cantoned were unable to provide sufficient food for the men, and recourse was had to the provision wagons. It rained almost all day, and was very cold.

11th November was to have been a rest day. But news was received from the headquarters at Versailles that the 1st Bavarian Corps had been forced by superior forces to evacuate Orléans, and that the enemy was advancing on Paris. Haste was therefore necessary, and the 2nd Army was directed to continue its advance by forced marches. In consequence of this the Army was moved forward half a day's march in the afternoon of the same day. The 1st battalion reached Montieramey; the 2nd battalion Lusigny; the fusilier battalion Mesnil St. Pere.

The first snow fell during the night of the 10th to the 11th November, the precursor of the severe winter that followed. During these forced marches the carriage of the men's packs on carts was permitted. The carts were requisitioned, and formed an imposing train behind the advanced guard.

12th November.—The 2nd battalion received the order direct from the division to advance to Troyes, and cover the headquarters there.

The other battalions moved again with the advanced guard; the 1st battalion to St. Savine; the fusilier battalion to St. Martin.

At Troyes traces began to be seen of the newly organized resistance. In the town itself were traces of entrenchments and barricades, showing that the original intention had been to defend it. Other bodies of troops had also been in contact with franc-tireurs. Picquets were therefore placed on the left bank of the Seine, on all the main roads leading in the direction of Némours.

The stay in the manufacturing town was utilized by making considerable requisitions of woollen clothing and stockings.

November 15th.—Headquarters arrived at Gens on the Yonne. Here, on the previous day, the Post and Telegraph Staff of the IXth Army Corps had been seized, and the post carts emptied; and generally in Sens feeling was very much excited, so that armed resistance appeared possible.

On this account, the 2nd battalion received orders to march there early in the morning, accompanied by a squadron, to free the cap-

tured postal officials, and, after restoring order, to prepare everything for the arrival of the troops behind.

Besides this, the 2nd battalion had another special duty to perform on the same day. On the previous night, an hussar of the 16th Hussar Regiment had been assaulted and robbed by the inhabitants of the village Pont-sur-Vanne. He had the pace of his horse to thank for his life. Until the end of the enquiry into this, a zug of the 5th company was left in the village. After the guilty persons had been identified, the punishment was carried out the same afternoon by shooting two of the inhabitants and burning the farm.

16th November.—After nine consecutive days' marching, the division was given a day's rest.

17th November.—The regiment moved, the 1st battalion to Villeb on, the 2nd to Lorrez-le-Bocage, and the fusilier battalion to La Villeneuve. The hospital cases were sent to Sens, where a convalescent company was left by the division, a measure rendered necessary by the hostile attitude of the inhabitants and the absence of  tappen troops.

19th November.—The 1st battalion reached Aulnay-la-Rivi re; the 2nd battalion, Grangermont; and the fusilier battalion, La Neuville.

With a closer approach to the theatre of war, the measures for security became more and more extended. The most advanced cantonments were now regularly secured by outpost positions. The non-commissioned officers to mark off the billets could no longer be despatched in front from the last place of assembly, as had previously been done, but formed the head of the advancing troops. The occupation of localities, therefore, was now generally carried out without billets for lodging.

The signs of the enemy's proximity increased with each day's march. The roads were found broken up more and more frequently, without causing, however, a real hindrance to the advance, for the pioneers knew how to restore them in the shortest possible time. When the roads were found to be blocked on the enemy's side of the advanced cantonments, the civil authorities were made to restore them under pain of considerable contributions. The work was generally duly carried out in an incredibly short time.

20th November.—Two companies of the fusilier battalion were sent on early before the advanced guard to occupy Pithiviers. The 1st battalion reached Escrennes, the 2nd Frenay, and the fusilier battalion Pithiviers.

On the arrival of the 1st battalion at Escrennes, the Commander of the regiment received a report that Santeau was occupied by the enemy. From the wording of the report, it appeared that the enemy was not in strength. The 1st and 2nd companies were therefore ordered to advance and clear the place of the enemy. They had scarcely marched off when fresh reports arrived to the effect that Santeau was occupied by strong bodies of infantry, apparently the outposts of the Loire Army, situated immediately behind them. The movement was therefore countermanded, and the two companies

advanced as outposts towards Santeau, the other two companies of the 1st battalion being placed in alarm-houses.

The German troops had re-established touch with the enemy, who were situated hardly further than  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles from our cantonments. After twenty days' marching, the 2nd Army was in the positions in which it would be able to fulfil its object of covering towards the south the Army investing Paris against the French Army of the Loire. The distance traversed was over 237 miles.

22nd November.—The 6th Division was ordered to move to its right to make room for the 2nd Army to form up. After dinner had been cooked in the old quarters, the 11th Brigade assembled, at 3 p.m., south-west of Jouy, and from there took up the line of outposts allotted to it by Atray-Crottes-Liphermeau farm.

The left flank of this line fell to the regiment's lot. On account of the close nature of the country, which in Beauce, the granary of France, is covered with villages, farms, and groups of trees, the adoption of an ordinary outpost line was quite impracticable. Recourse was had to positions of preparation, so arranged that strong masses capable of resistance were cantoned in the first line, secured by individual picquets being pushed forward and by an active patrol service being maintained, both by day and night. Entire companies were posted in alarm-houses on all the approaches leading towards the enemy.

The fusilier battalion was in the most advanced line, with three companies in Montigny and one company, with a zug of dragoons, in Bout-de-la-ville. Two outposts were placed south of Montigny, and one south of Bont-de-la-ville. Three companies of the 2nd battalion, with the regimental Staff, were in immediate support at Atray; the 6th company occupied Baudas, on the extreme right flank.

The whole of the 1st battalion was in the second line at Izy (see sketch 2).

23rd November.—The situation remained the same, except that the companies in support changed places with those on the outposts, and the regimental Staff changed their quarters to Baudas. The enemy had occupied the villages on the near side of the great Orléans wood. In front of the position occupied by the regiment, their presence was reported at Chilleurs-aux-Bois and Neuville.

24th November.—With a view to ascertain more clearly the position and strength of the Loire Army, reconnaissances were ordered along the whole extent of the line occupied by the 2nd Army. The force employed for this purpose by the 6th Division consisted of 4 battalions (the 1st and fusilier battalions of the 20th Regiment, and 2nd and 3rd battalions 35th Regiment), 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, under the command of the Colonel of the 20th Regiment. Its advance by Teillay-St. Benoit, towards the Orléans wood led to the engagement of Neuville-aux-Bois.

The order for the troops to assemble at 5 a.m. north of Teillay-le-Chêne was issued late on the previous night. Packs were to be left in the cantonment, and the ammunition carried in the haversacks.

It was quite dark when the troops were marched to the place of

assembly; the roads were very deep after the continuous rain of the preceding days. No one knew what was the object of the movement. The order received to avoid all unnecessary noise and loud words of command led to the idea that the intention was to surprise the enemy. On arriving at the place of assembly, the object and general disposition to be adopted were explained to the Officers.

At 5.30 the actual reconnoitring detachment, consisting of the fusilier battalion 20th Regiment, the 3rd battalion 35th Regiment, 6 züge of dragoons, and the heavy battery, marched off. The next column remained at Teillay in reserve.

The 11th company of the 20th and the 11th company of the 35th Regiment formed the advanced guard, the command being given to the Officer commanding the latter, as he had been on outpost duty with his company opposite St. Germain, and therefore knew the ground.

The 9th, 10th, and 11th companies of the regiment and the dragoons followed immediately in rear of the advanced guard. The cavalry had orders to move forward directly the farms situated in front were attacked, and getting in flank and rear of them, to take as many prisoners as possible of the retiring enemy.

The 9th, 10th, and 12th companies of the 35th Regiment and the battery formed the main body, and were to take up a sheltered position temporarily at Mauregard. The advance of the advanced guard companies took place west of this place, the 11th company 20th Regiment on the left, the 11th company 35th Regiment on the right. Each company had one zug extended; the other two züge followed at about 50 paces distance in close order.

The expectation of surprising the enemy was disappointed. The places reported the previous night to be strongly occupied were found to have been evacuated. Wheeling to the left, the advance was continued in the direction of Neuville-aux-Bois.

The 9th and 12th companies followed the 11th, in company columns at deploying interval. The 10th company received the order to maintain communication with the company of the 35th Regiment, and to extend in the gap between it and the 11th company.

On approaching the ridge on which was situated the Moulin-de-la-Motte, the enemy's advanced troops posted there opened fire on the skirmishers as soon as they appeared on the open ground. A further advance could only be carried out at the expense of serious losses. The Commander, therefore, ordered up the battery to fire on the mill from a position south of Mauregard. After the artillery fire had produced its effect, the position was assaulted, and the enemy driven back on Neuville.

From the Windmill ridge the ground slopes down gently to the little town of Neuville, distant 700 to 800 metres. The ground is generally flat, only in places covered with stone houses, outlying buildings of the town. On the easterly side of it the Orléans-Pithiviers Railway sweeps in a great curve in the general direction north-east and south-west.

An immediate advance on the town would at this moment have



probably been successful, for the enemy seemed to be still in the act of assembling, and now for the first time hastened up to occupy various points of their line of defence. But the companies were so out of breath that it was necessary to give them a moment's rest. Besides, the supporting companies, retarded by the sticky clay, were not yet up.

In the meantime the battery was ordered up to the Windmill ridge, and opened fire from its position east of the mill on the enceinte of the town. The enemy had occupied the border of the town, the issues from which were strongly barricaded, the houses situated on the front of attack, and a portion of the railway embankment.

When the battalion had assembled again the order was given for a further advance. The 10th company and the 11th company of the 35th Regiment advanced on the right of the St. Germain-Neuville road; the 11th company on the left of it. The 9th and 12th companies followed in close order.

The embankment was successfully assaulted, though with considerable loss, owing to the advance being over open ground in clay soil under a heavy fire. The enemy fell back into the town. The 11th company, entirely extended in a skirmishing line, occupied the embankment; behind it were the 9th and 12th companies, also protected in some degree by the embankment. The 10th company was extended on its right, opposite to the northern border of the town, only scantily sheltered by the garden hedges. Two of its *züge* were extended as skirmishers; the third was in support in close order.

The fire only ceased for the few minutes during which the enemy was occupied in getting into their new positions. It then broke out again with renewed intensity at close range, not exceeding 200 paces.

The enemy was difficult to get at; they were covered by a fortified enceinte which had been made almost secure from assault. A stationary fire action ensued, while the artillery from its position on the Windmill ridge endeavoured to set fire to Neuville. In spite of the accurate fire it did not succeed in doing this, as the buildings were massive and the roofs slated.

In the meantime, the Commander received intelligence from cavalry patrols sent round to the rear of the town, that strong infantry columns were visible there, and that all the farm buildings situated between the town and the Orléans wood were occupied by the enemy.

In these circumstances, as the only object in view, which was to force the enemy to deploy so as to observe his strength, had been attained, the order was given to retire slowly. It was now about 8.30 o'clock. The retirement, over open and bad ground under the enemy's close fire, was carried out by the several lines occupying successive positions to cover the movement of the advanced line.

The reconnaissance actions engaged on the 24th November in front of the entire line occupied by the 2nd Army showed that the enemy occupied with all three arms the line Chevilly-Neuville-aux-Bois-Chilleurs-aux-Bois-Bellegarde.



25th November.—The general distribution remained unaltered, as from the reports received from the cavalry and other news it was now beyond doubt that considerable and far superior forces of the enemy were situated about Orléans. Prince Frederick Charles determined to remain on the defensive until joined by the Duke of Mecklenburg's troops, which had been directed on Beaugency, and the arrival of which would nearly double the number of troops at his disposal.

On account of the close proximity of the enemy, the duties in cantonments, especially in those situated in the first line, became every day more arduous. Numerous precautionary measures made the outposts' duties more difficult. Amongst others, the positions of the several posts were frequently altered at night, so as to be more secure from the enterprises of the enemy.

Cavalry Officers' patrols went out early in the morning to the front to observe any changes in the occupation of localities. Special reconnaissances of the ground were made by infantry detachments under the command of Officers. These had particularly to obtain reliable information regarding the direction and condition of the existing communications. The maps of the neighbourhood in possession of the troops were very inaccurate, and urgently required correction. It was of the utmost importance to fix accurately the metalled roads, for the roads shown on the maps had proved when used for concentration to be frequently impassable.

On the 28th November was fought the battle of Beaune-la-Rolande, in which the regiment took no part.

On the 29th the regiment went into cantonments at Boynes.

At this period the supply of the troops became again a matter of difficulty. The entire district was completely exhausted, and an *étappen* line with a regular service of supplies from the rear did not exist. The villages occupied, though generally willing, were not for the most part able to furnish anything, as they had been taxed to the uttermost by the prolonged stay of the army in this position. Indeed directions were given by the superior Officers not to take the last resources of the inhabitants, lest famine should ensue.

In order to ensure supplies in the event of a longer stay, committees were appointed to buy provisions of any description and at any price. The gold always brought to light much that could never have been got at without it. Altogether, and especially in the regiment, the want was not very great. The men learnt that they must depend on their own activity to supplement the irregular issues.

1st and 2nd December.—The regiment remained in its cantonments at Boynes until the evening of the 2nd. On the afternoon of that day a telegram was received from headquarters at Versailles, to the effect that the situation demanded a general attack on the Loire Army, and the advance on Orléans. In preparation for carrying this out on the following day, Prince Frederick Charles assembled on the evening of the 2nd December the IIIrd Army Corps about Pithiviers, and the Xth Army Corps at Boynes and Beaune-la-Rolande.

Late in the evening the order for this concentration was received

by the regiment, which reached Pithiviers at 11 P.M. An Officer had been sent on to arrange the billets, so that notwithstanding the lateness of the hour there was no confusion in getting into quarters.

3rd December.—The forward movement undertaken by the whole force on this day led to a series of isolated engagements on the 3rd and 4th December, which, taken together, constituted what has been termed the battle of Orléans. The 20th Regiment participated in the actions of Chilleurs-aux-Bois on the 3rd, and of Vaumainbert on the 4th December.

*Engagement of Chilleurs-aux-Bois. (See Sketch 2.)*

About 6 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd December the regiment commenced its march to the place of assembly ordered for the division, on the Pithiviers-Orléans main road, north of Mareau-aux-Bois. The following was the strength of the several battalions:—

Regimental staff and 1st				
battalion .....	15	Officers, 46	non-com. officers, 608	men.
2nd battalion.....	12	„ 61	„ 633	„
Fusilier battalion .....	13	„ 43	„ 608	„
Total.....	40	„ 150	„ 1,849	

The ground was frozen and covered lightly with snow; a cutting, cold wind blew across the fields.

The 6th Division was concentrated across the Pithiviers-Chilleurs-aux-Bois road, with the corps artillery behind it, and the 5th Division on its left. Officers' patrols returning reported Santeau, which was situated in front, to be strongly occupied.


In accordance with the orders given by the Corps Commander, the 6th Division with the corps artillery commenced its advance on La Brosse at 9.45 A.M. The 11th Brigade formed the advanced guard, followed by the 12th Brigade as main body; the divisional artillery moved between the two. The 20th Regiment followed the 35th Regiment as second line. The deployment followed in every respect the regulation pattern of a peace manœuvre. The brigade advanced in column from the centre at full deploying distance until it reached the limit of the enemy's fire. North of La Brosse the companies in the first line were extended.

Owing to an unfortunate accident the Commander of the 2nd battalion, whose leg was broken from a kick by a led horse, had shortly afterwards to be replaced by the senior Captain.

A halt was made at the village of La Brosse. The Fusilier Regiment occupied the border of the village, the 20th Regiment was placed behind it, sheltered as far as the open nature of the ground would allow. The artillery took up a position from which to bombard the enemy's position. This led to a lively artillery action, which was shortly supported on our side by the corps artillery coming into action on the right flank.

The French artillery fire caused little damage, some shells burst

SKETCH 2.



Scale, about two miles to an inch.

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in front of the battalions, some behind them, while a great number never burst at all, notwithstanding the hard state of the ground. Their guns gradually ceased firing, and the infantry was also seriously shaken. A retrograde movement began to be apparent at different points.

About noon, therefore, orders were given for a general advance. The 11th Brigade, with the 20th Regiment in second line, advanced against the heights of Santeau. The enemy, without a-waiting the attack, withdrew to Chilleurs-aux-Bois.

The enemy's batteries had already withdrawn to a position south of this place. The village itself was occupied strongly with infantry. But our skirmishers were not to be stopped in their forward movement, which was joined in by the artillery. A lively artillery action took place again; but it was of short duration. The enemy's guns were overwhelmed, and the 35th entered the village without serious opposition about 2 P.M. The enemy disappeared into the Orléans wood.

A long halt was made south of Chilleurs, so as to assemble the troops of the first line, and to rest the men after their fatiguing march through the heavy ploughed fields. The cavalry followed the enemy, and established the fact of his retirement into the wood without rallying.

The weather had changed to heavy snow, mixed with rain; but, notwithstanding this, and the lateness of the hour, the pursuit of the enemy was resumed at 4 o'clock. Both divisions entered by different paths into the thick wood. Before the main Orléans road was reached the regiment had to force its way through the thick under-wood. The main road, when reached, was found to be obstructed with trenches, wire entanglements, pits, and every kind of obstacle. Evidences were to be seen in every direction of a disorderly retreat. While other portions of the division were still in the middle of the wood, a heavy musketry and artillery fire suddenly broke out in the direction of Neuville, which necessitated their forming up. The rest of the division, including our regiment, continued their march to Loury 4 or 5 miles further south on the Orléans road; Loury was reached in the dark at about 6 P.M.

The 35th Regiment furnished the outposts south of the village, and our 2nd battalion did so in the wood itself; the two other battalions bivouacked at the northern issue of the village.

It was bitterly cold, the men were drenched through, and, owing to the rapid advance, the provision columns had not been able to come up. Some straw and damp wood from the village were the only aids to comfort available. The careful men who had carried in their haversack some coffee or a piece of bacon or erbswurst, prepared their warm meal, envied by many. The majority had to go without. During the night the bivouac was alarmed by firing at the outposts, bullets falling thickly in the bivouac, and the 3rd company turned out to support the outposts.

*Action of Vaumainbert.<sup>1</sup>*

4th December.—The order was received for a further advance on Orléans; the 6th Division to march by the main road, and the 5th Division by the Vennecey road, to its left. The baggage, for the protection of which on the previous day the 9th company had been left at Pithiviers, was ordered forward to Loury, there to await orders.

At 8.30 A.M. the 11th Brigade assembled south of Loury, and, shortly afterwards, commenced its forward movement.

The 1st battalion 35th Regiment led the advance, followed by the 10th, 11th, and 12th companies of our fusilier battalion, the 5th heavy battery and the 1st and 2nd battalions of the regiment. The 2nd and 3rd battalions 35th Regiment protected the right flank, marching by Rebréchien and Marigny.

On approaching the outskirts of Orléans, the village of Vaumainbert was found to be strongly fortified, and the cavalry advanced guard was received with a hot fire.

Most of the farms situated on both sides of the road leading through the village were prepared for defence, and connected by entrenchments. The vineyards to one side and behind the village, as well to the south of the ridge as far as the main road, were furnished with trenches. The defence had been entrusted to the marine infantry, the best troops of the Republican Army.

The 1st battalion 35th Regiment extended for the attack, and, notwithstanding a determined resistance on the part of the enemy, penetrated the village. But a further advance was impossible without reinforcement.

The brigade Commander, therefore, ordered the 1st and 2nd battalions, 20th Regiment, to advance right and left of the road against the enemy's flanks. It was now about 2 P.M. The 1st battalion advanced with the 2nd and 4th companies to the right of the road, and the 1st and 3rd to its left. The movements of the former two companies will be first described.

The 2nd company, covered by a strong firing line formed by the 4th zug, turned a half to the right and moved forward towards the vine-covered hill in front. Pressing forward rapidly against a farm, situated on the northern edge of the village, it gained possession of this without a check. The enemy withdrew through the gardens to the hill, and thus enabled the company, which now extended, also, its rifle zug on its right flank, and took position with the 3rd zug in close order at a deep-cut ditch, to occupy the farm buildings, and bring from thence an effective fire to bear on the enemy.

On the further side of the garden a pretty broad ditch, filled with water, brought the advance temporarily to a standstill. An attempt

<sup>1</sup> Vaumainbert is a village about 2 miles N.E. of Orléans on the Pithiviers Road. No plan, except on a very large scale, would render the details of the attack clear, and this is not forthcoming. The account is, however, inserted, as it may be useful to any Officer who may at any time be studying this part of the campaign on the ground.—ED.

to jump over this obstacle failed. The Lieutenant in command of the company was severely wounded in reconnoitring for a way to advance.

To the right of the riflemen of the 2nd company was situated a larger farm which the enemy still occupied strongly. The 4th company was directed against it, and advanced under a murderous fire. Both the battalion Commander and the company Commander accompanied the 7th zug, which was the first extended, and advanced to the right of, and in line with, the 2nd company against the farm.

In order to take the enemy more in flank, the riflemen crept along the ditch, already referred to, until they were able to bring their fire to bear on the farm from its north side. Shortly afterwards the two züge of the company, still in close order, were brought up to this point at the double. As soon as the company was recruited it dashed forward towards the farm, from which the enemy withdrew in the direction of the main road.

The 4th company now established itself behind a garden wall fronting towards the road, and from thence brought its fire to bear upon the enemy's position.

During these occurrences the 2nd battalion was brought forward from its reserve position. With the exception of the 5th company, which received orders to remain in close order at the eastern issue of Vaumainbert at the disposition of the brigade Commander, the battalion advanced in line of company columns to the right of the road.

The 7th company formed the right flank of the battalion, and moved forward half right immediately on the border of the village. With the 5th zug in advance, it pushed on, suffering heavy losses, to the vine-clad heights north of the village, and wrested from the enemy a row of houses lying to the east of them at the moment that the 4th company took the farm, as recounted above. From here the company joined in the advance of the 4th company.

The 8th company was to follow the 7th, but, receiving a hot fire from the left flank, it took shelter in the nearest farm, which was occupied by detachments of the 2nd company. From here the company pressed forward with the 7th zug leading against the heights, while the company Commander, with the 8th and the rifle züge, moved further to the right and established connection with the 7th company. Gradually gaining ground, the company succeeded in capturing a large building only 200 paces from the enemy's entrenchments, but any further advance was impossible. A long stationary fire action now ensued with the enemy posted under cover in front. A decision could only be arrived at by simultaneous energetic action on the south side of the village.

We must recall the situation that had been developed here. As has been already related, the 1st and 3rd companies were intended to operate on this side of the battle-field against the enemy's right flank. The 3rd company advancing south of the road, found itself soon in front of an entrenched line, opposite which lay the 35th Fusiliers firing on it. The company joined them, and was immediately hotly engaged with the enemy at a distance of barely 200 paces. The 5th

zug was in front, opposite the shelter trenches, whilst the two other züge were still in close order behind a farm belonging to the village situated in rear.

The 1st company, still further to the left, had occupied two houses very favourably situated for firing on the entrenchments, and kept up from here an effective fire on the enemy's position. In spite of this well-sustained fire action along the entire front, for a long time it was not possible to suppress the enemy's fire. On the contrary, it increased every moment in intensity. The flanking fire from a corner of the entrenchment jutting out still further south, made itself particularly unpleasant. The losses inflicted from thence on our 5th zug and the 35th made it necessary for the rifle zug, and soon afterwards the half of the 6th zug, to extend against it.

The enemy lay, completely covered, in the shelter trenches. Their fire appeared to be delivered in part without aim; seldom was a head seen above the parapet for the purpose of firing. Still the attack on this position was most difficult owing to the open approach which offered no sign of cover. Only very gradually single small parties succeeded in gaining ground to the front.

The resistance of the enemy appeared slowly to relax in face of the well-aimed fire and determined perseverance of our men. Their fire became weaker, and already single French soldiers could be seen falling back in the direction of the main road. At this moment Bugler Selchow, of Blumberg, of his own initiative, sounded the "Advance rapidly!" The entire skirmishing line rose up, as if on the parade ground, and stormed the entrenchments with a ringing cheer.

After a short halt, caused by re-forming and sending back the prisoners taken, the company, reinforced by a portion of the 1st company, proceeded to the attack of the salient jutting out to the left, before which, during the general advance, a section of the rifle zug of the 3rd company had been left to occupy the enemy. Emboldened by the success just obtained, a long preparation by fire was not awaited. The assault was made with the bayonet, accompanied by a lusty cheer. The entrenchment was carried, and 40 unwounded prisoners fell into the hands of the victors.

Those detachments of the enemy which had succeeded in withdrawing from the entrenchments in time fell back to a large farm situated about 150 paces further back, and held it. Against this the company Commander led the 5th and the rifle züge, while the 6th zug rallied in the entrenchment, and remained there in close order. After seizing a small farm on one side of it, in which ten prisoners were taken, the company brought an effective fire to bear on the larger buildings, which were then successfully assaulted, and 100 prisoners taken.

In the meantime the enemy in the farm buildings, situated on the main road, had to retire owing to the determined advance of our troops. The greater number of the buildings as far as the hill rising behind the village was already in our possession. Two züge of our 1st company were engaged here in concert with the 35th and the 6th company was further to the right.



The 1st company, after taking a large villa, had turned up a village street parallel to the main road, and was engaged opposite the row of houses in front, which was still held obstinately by the enemy. The 1st zug had entered a park further to the left, and was able, from the park wall, to bring an effective fire on that portion of the entrenchments still in the enemy's hands.

The 6th company shortly after joined on to the right of the 3rd company. Here again the resistance of the enemy was overcome; the row of houses was captured and occupied. The village of Vau-mainbert was in our hands. It was now 4.30 p.m. and night was falling. The enemy were in full retreat on Orléans.

The 12th company had been kept in reserve, and was not seriously engaged.

The losses of the 1st and 2nd battalions were 1 Officer, 2 non-commissioned officers, and 12 men killed; 2 Officers, 7 non-commissioned officers, and 29 men wounded.

5th December.—An advance was made as far as Bourgogne, a suburb of Orléans, which city had been already occupied by the 17th Division during the preceding night. By its capture the attempt made by the French to relieve Paris from the south was frustrated. The next point was to break up the remainder of the Loire Army—it had lost 20,000 men on the 3rd and 4th December—which was reported to have divided and retired in three directions. The 3rd Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division had for their task to ascertain whether any large bodies of troops were in the neighbourhood of Gien and Montargis.<sup>1</sup>

The 6th December was a rest day.

7th December.—The 11th Brigade formed the main body for the march. It assembled west of St. Denis at 8.30 a.m. The regiment went into march quarters at Chateauneuf and St. Martin d'Abat.

8th December.—The order to march reached the troops at 3 a.m., and they assembled at St. Aignan at 8 a.m. As the advanced troops observed signs of increasing resistance which led to the expectation of a collision with large masses of the enemy at Gien, the baggage was left with an escort in the cantonments.

About 4 kilometres west of Gien a halt was made, and, after a long period of waiting, the order was received for the battalion to be cantoned at Dampierre and its neighbourhood, some miles in rear. The evening was pitch dark, and the troops did not reach their cantonments till 7 p.m. On this day the regiment marched altogether 18½ miles, which, looking to the extremely unfavourable condition of the weather, was a considerable performance. After a hard frost snow had fallen. The roads were like glass, and on foot progress could only be made with difficulty. Riding was only possible with the shoes turned up, and was then extremely difficult.

9th December was a rest day, much needed for mending boots, which had suffered from the constant marching. The day of rest was followed by a disturbed night. About 9 p.m. orders were received for the battalions to march at once independently in the direction of

<sup>1</sup> To the E. and S.E.—Ed.

Orléans. It was early morning when they reached their new quarters, Les Bordes, Bonnée, and St. Père, after a very arduous march. The reason for this sudden change in the previous arrangements was that the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's force had since the 7th December been seriously engaged with far superior forces of the 2nd Loire Army. The IIIrd Army Corps, therefore, as well as the IXth and Xth Corps, was ordered to reinforce it.

10th December.—The march was continued on Orléans; the brigade assembled at St. Martin d'Abat, and thence the battalions marched by the shortest route to their new march quarters (St. Denis de l'Hôtel and vicinity); on the way the regiment was joined by an Ersatz draft of 1 Lieutenant and 150 men, who were distributed among the companies.

11th December.—A short march brought the troops about mid-day to Orléans, where quarters were provided, and in most cases the men were well fed in them. They also received an issue of tobacco and cigars, which were very welcome. A regular transmission of cigars from home by post had been established; but latterly the postal service had not been up with the troops, so they had for some time been without them. In Orléans also erbswurst was again received for use in times of emergency.

In order to hasten as far as practicable the march of the advanced guard, of which the regiment had formed a part since the march back had commenced, 50 wagons of a provision column were placed at the disposal of the 20th and 35th Regiments, to carry their packs on the following day.

12th December.—The march of the advanced guard was continued to Beaugency, where it remained the following day.

14th December.—It advanced to Maves, from which point the battalions moved independently to their cantonments at Conan and the neighbouring localities.

#### *Action of Coulommiers.<sup>1</sup>*

15th December.—The Xth Army Corps was ordered to push forward a reconnaissance on Vendôme. The advanced guard of the IIIrd Army Corps, together with a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, was directed to advance by Selommes-Coulommiers-Villetrun, and from there to push on to Vendôme, in order to gain news of the strength and the positions of the enemy, or else to support the movements of the Xth Corps.

The following was the order of march :—

1 squadron.

1st battalion 20th Regiment.

2 batteries (1 light, 1 heavy).

2nd and fusilier battalions 20th Regiment.

<sup>1</sup> The maps on which the further movements of the regiment can be followed are those in the official account of the war, namely, 28A in Section 14, 28C in Section 15, plan of the Battle of Le Mans, Section 16, and the sketches given in this last-named section.—ED.

## 35th Regiment.

1 section of sanitary detachment.

On arriving at the heights of Villemardy, packs were taken off. From Selommès the fusilier battalion branched off to the left, to cover that flank of the advance.

On a report being received north of Villarceau that the hostile cavalry had appeared at Villetrun and fired on our cavalry, the light battery was sent forward to a hill commanding Villetrun. Simultaneously the 1st battalion deployed into line of company columns, and took post with two companies on either flank of the battery. After a few shots had been fired into the village, the enemy's cavalry were observed withdrawing in a north-westerly direction.

The 2nd and 3rd companies, with skirmishers thrown out in their front, advanced on either side of the road against Villetrun, where some infantry still held their ground. The 1st and 4th companies followed in close order as a half battalion. The village was not defended, and Coulommiers, upon which place the advance was continued in the same formation, was found not to be occupied.

By order of the brigade Commander, the regiment occupied Coulommiers defensively; the 1st battalion was disposed on the southern and western borders; the 2nd battalion occupied a reserve position in the vicinity of the church. The fusilier battalion was directed to establish communication with the Xth Army Corps from the Houzée valley. It might now be about 2 P.M.

The two batteries had come into action north of the village, and thence fired on the enemy's artillery situated on the heights south of Bel-Essort. The 35th Regiment had now already left its position behind Coulommiers, and deployed for action on Rocé, as well as in the wood west of that place. The 5th and 7th companies 20th Regiment were in the meantime pushed forward to the single farm situated at the northern issue of Coulommiers, to cover the batteries.

At about 3.30 P.M. the brigade Commander ordered a battalion to attack that portion of the wood situated on the opposite heights, which was sharply marked by a row of poplars in front. The advanced guard Commander detailed for this service the 2nd battalion 20th Regiment, which advanced in two lines in the direction ordered. The 6th company was on the right flank of the front line, with the 5th company on its left. The 7th and 8th companies were in the second line overlapping the left flank.

The ground rose towards the front in a gentle slope to a broad ridge. No enemy was at this time visible. But hardly had the skirmishers of the 5th and 6th companies reached the ridge when suddenly the rattle of musketry broke out in their front, and a thick hail of lead whistled through the ranks of the battalion. The enemy, posted behind a hedge situated in advance of the wood, had on this occasion, contrary to their usual practice, reserved their fire for the most effective range. The volley delivered, at about 250 paces, was immediately followed by the hottest, rapid, independent fire.

At the first moment of surprise the whole battalion had thrown

themselves down on the ground. Almost at the same instant all appeared to be animated with the same feeling. "Forward and at them!" With a loud ringing cheer, skirmishers and columns rose up, and threw themselves, without firing a shot, upon the enemy, who thought it best to retreat at a very rapid pace. On arriving at the hedge, the 7th and 8th companies were also extended in the advanced line.

On the other side of the hedge lay a meadow, the north side of which was also bounded by a thick hedge. From thence the enemy now received our skirmishers with a hot fire, whilst on each side, to the right and left, the troops driven out of the former position disappeared into the wood. This well-considered retreat, in which evidently a rapid clearing of the front of the new position had been kept in view, evidenced a better and surer leading than had been observed in our former engagements.

After a short fire action, and after all had got through the hedge, an advance was made at the double against the new position. The Captain at the head of his company gave the first impulse to this advance. The enemy again fell back into the real position on the border of the Bel-Essort wood. Along this extended the row of poplars, visible from a long way.

The ground rises gently from the hedge now evacuated to the wood, and is covered with thin bush. This bush is completely overlooked, and can be kept under fire from the edge of the wood. In prolongation of the wood towards the east a shelter trench had been thrown up, and was occupied by the enemy.

After taking the hedge, the 8th company received orders from the battalion Commander to assemble, and to follow the advanced companies as reserve. The company assembled in a ravine running in front of the wood, and remained there. The other companies continued their attack on the wood, pressing forward from copse to copse. Whilst the 5th company, wheeling slightly to the left, took a portion of the border of the wood in flank, the 7th company joined this movement on the extreme right flank, and in its further advance cleared the shelter trench. The 5th company penetrated simultaneously into the easterly corner of the wood, and thereby forced the enemy to give up the border of the wood.

The 6th company which, situated on the left flank of the battalion, had not found it possible to make rapid progress, was placed by the wheel of the 5th company in rear of its firing line. The Commander therefore assembled his skirmishers and joined the 8th company.

Whilst the 5th company occupied the edge of the wood, the 7th company on the right flank succeeded in occupying a clay pit, from which could be brought under fire the further border of the wood, and the open ground beyond, which had to be passed by the enemy in his retreat from the wood.

Shortly afterwards the 5th company also pressed forward to a ridge north of the wood, from which also this open ground could be brought under fire.

The darkness setting in—it was 5 o'clock—as well as its isolated situation, forced the battalion to make a short halt in its victorious advance. After a patrol had been sent to the large wood lying eastwards, and reported it to be occupied by the 3rd battalion 35th Regiment, the advance was continued to La Forêt farm, where the battalion received orders to halt and assemble.

Notwithstanding the fatigues of the day and the falling rain, the men were in excellent spirits at the success gained, and jokes were indulged in freely. One source of merriment was the Ersatz men, who for the most part had for the first time been under fire. The important order to search for bullets after the close of the action was given them. "A lance corporal and six men to the front, to look for bullets!" was the joke of the day.

About 7 P.M., a dragoon brought the order to the brigade to march into quarters at Villetrun, which place was reached by the battalion at 10 P.M.

The 1st battalion had not come into further contact with the enemy; neither had the fusilier battalion, which, as has been seen, was detached to maintain communication with the Xth Army Corps. The losses of the 2nd battalion were 7 killed and 39 wounded.

16th December.—The whole regiment was cantoned at Villetrun, which proved very close quarters.

17th December.—The 20th Regiment, together with the 35th Regiment, two squadrons of dragoons, and two field batteries (one light and one heavy), a sanitary detachment, and a field hospital, were constituted until further orders the "11th Combined Infantry Brigade."

In consequence of the news received from the Upper Loire, the march back there was ordered, and the brigade assembled east of Villetrun at 9 A.M., and reached at 1 P.M. its new quarters at and about Marchénoir. Though not actually raining, the roads were almost impassable.

18th December.—Assembling at 9.15 A.M., the brigade reached its next march quarters at Beaugency, at 2 P.M., the packs being carried for the men. It halted there the following day. The 1st company was detached as escort to the Army Corps provision columns. About thirty men of the regiment, unable to march, together with others from other regiments, were also detached for stationary duty at Mer with the departments.

On the evening of the 19th orders were received for the IIIrd Army Corps to go into extended quarters and rest for some days. The news was received with great joy, for, apart from the rest being very welcome, both clothing and boots had suffered severely from the constant marching in all weathers on bad roads, and repairs were urgently required.

As soon as the troops had settled into the allotted quarters, all the available tailors and shoemakers were set to work, the materials for repair being in part served out and in part obtained by requisition. Even billiard cloths were employed in repairing the men's coats and trousers. It was many days before the piles of clothing and of boots

for repair showed any material diminution in bulk. As articles were carried away, others were brought in, to the despair of the workmen.

At the same time the arms and accoutrements underwent a thorough cleaning and inspection: workshops were established, and all necessary repairs carried out.

On the 30th a convoy arrived from the Ersatz battalion with 750 long boots. Almost all the men were now in possession of two pairs of serviceable boots.

1871.

*From the Loire to the Sarthe.*

On the 1st January the 2nd Army received orders to take the offensive against the enemy advancing from the west, from the line Vendôme-Illiers.

3rd January.—The regiment marched in brigade to Beaugency, where it was rejoined by the 1st company.

4th January.—The regiment marched independently to St. Leonard and Marchénoir, with the exception of the 7th company, which had preceded it, accompanied by a cavalry zug, to patrol towards the Bauvilliers and Villegomblain forests.

5th January.—The brigade assembled at 10 o'clock at the eastern outlet of Oucques, and marched to Noyers. Thence battalions moved independently to Renay, Champlain, &c.

The 9th company was detached to form a guard to the Army Corps Headquarters.

During the entire march the fog was so thick that it was impossible to see more than 50 paces ahead. In the evening patrols were sent out from all the cantonments in the direction of the Loire.

*6th January.—Action of Azay-Mazange.*

The strength of the regiment on this date was as follows:—

Regimental Staff and 1st			
battalion.....	15	Officers, 44 non-com. officers, 664 men.	
2nd battalion.....	12	" 59 " 627 "	
Fusilier battalion .....	13	" 42 " 602 "	
Total .....	40	" 145 " 1,893	

Reliable information had not been received of the enemy. To all appearance he had occupied the Braye position, and intended from there to make strong offensive movements.

The 6th Division received orders to cross the Loire at St. Firmin and Meslay, and from there to gain the Azay position with its advanced guard. This was composed of the 1st and 2nd battalions 20th Regiment, the 35th Regiment, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries.

The fusilier battalion 20th Regiment, with 1½ squadrons and a pioneer company with light bridging train, formed a flank detach-

ment on the right. The brigade assembled at 10.30 and crossed the Loire, by the bridges which had been re-established in the early morning. The cavalry was in advance, followed by the 2nd battalion; then a battery, followed by the 1st battalion.

The 5th and 8th companies, with a zug of cavalry, were detached by Belair-Château to advance on the Vendôme wood, clear it of the enemy, and then move in the direction of Azay, and cover the right flank of the advanced guard.

The remaining six companies of the regiment, with the advanced guard, reached the Vendôme-Epuisay road about noon. When the column had arrived on the alignment of La Briochetterie, reports were received from the cavalry patrols that the rear edge of the Le Plessis ravine was occupied by the enemy's infantry. The 6th and 7th companies, leading the advance, were deployed at once into company columns, the leading zug of each company extended, and they advanced, the 6th company on the right, against the ridge.

The 1st battalion followed in column, in rear of the centre.

The two companies advanced at a rapid pace, without firing a shot, and drove back the advanced detachments of the enemy.

The enemy had apparently occupied in force the farm of La Charbonnerie, situated about 500 paces in front. The 1st battalion now deployed against this. The 1st and 2nd companies were placed on the right in extension of the 6th company. The 3rd company was to follow in support of these in close order. The 4th company was placed in reserve behind the 6th and 7th companies.

An advance in the direction of the main road was hardly practicable on account of a heavy flanking fire from the wood and the Georgeat farm situated on its border; line was formed in this direction and a sustained fire brought upon it, assisted by a battery at La Merillière.

As, however, the 6th and 7th companies had been brought to a stand, and a rapid advance was not to be expected without reinforcement, it was determined to assault La Charbonnerie without further delay. The line gradually worked its way up to within 300 paces of the farm, and then successfully stormed it.

The enemy fell back across the meadow valley of the Boulon stream to the ridge beyond, and occupied the village of Azay on the slope, and the buildings and thick stone fences which here traverse the country in all directions. A hostile battery came into action east of the village, and fired on the slope.

A heavy fire action was now developed against the enemy, and especially against the village of Azay from the opposite ridge.

The troops gradually pushed on into the low-lying meadows; but no decisive effect could be achieved against the enemy, who were sheltered behind the houses, walls, and hedges. After a brief preparation, therefore, the assault of the village was ordered.

The 2nd and 4th companies led the advance, the 1st company making a turning movement towards the northern issue. The 5th zug of the 3rd company, which at this time occupied the La Fosse buildings with two züge, joined in the advance.



By 3 P.M. the village of Azay was carried by  $3\frac{1}{2}$  companies of the 1st battalion and detachments of the 35th Regiment.

In the meantime the 6th and 7th companies pressed forward on the left, and succeeded in gaining the La Galette buildings.

At 4 o'clock, when it was beginning to get dark, the fire suddenly increased in intensity along the entire line, and the enemy made a desperate attempt to take the offensive.

All available troops were pushed up into the firing line to meet it, and the advance melted away before the fire brought to bear on it from all sides.

About 9 o'clock P.M. the 12th Infantry Brigade arrived to take over the outposts for the night. Our battalion marched back at once to the quarters allotted to them north of Vendôme, where they arrived late at night. The losses of the 1st and 2nd battalions were 13 Officers, 16 non-commissioned officers, and 101 men killed and wounded.

The fusilier battalion, with the right flank detachment, reached Danzé.

7th January.—The brigade assembled at 9 A.M. at Courtiras. An ammunition column was waiting drawn up on the road, from which the ammunition was completed.

Prince Frederick Charles rode up and addressed the regiment: "You have again fought as bravely as you always do, only too impetuously; hence the heavy losses." The joy of the men at this honourable recognition from the lips of their distinguished leader was to be read in their beaming faces.

8th January.—The brigade assembled at 7.30 A.M. on the main road near Poirier. About noon St. Calais was passed, and shortly before 4 P.M. the regiment was told off to quarters in Conflans and neighbouring farms.

9th January.—The orders to march reached the regiment at 5 o'clock. The brigade was ordered to be formed up on the main road opposite Le Mesnil farm at 8.30. Owing to the companies of the Fusilier Regiment being scattered about the assembly of the regiment could not be effected before 9 o'clock.


In accordance with a divisional order, the more serious cases amongst the sick were sent back to Savigny, to be conveyed thence to Orléans by the Army Corps columns. As escort, thirty-five foot-sore men and stragglers were detached from each regiment.

The continued fatigues of the march increased the sick list from day to day. The cases of frost-bite of the extremities were especially numerous; but were fewer on fighting days than on days spent in marching, when the main body followed the advance guard at a very slow pace, repeatedly interrupted by long halts.

The sick in hospital on the 7th January numbered 3 non-commissioned officers and 45 men; and on the 12th January, 6 non-commissioned officers and 71 men.

While the 12th Brigade was engaged at Ardenay, the regiment had to remain for hours at the junction of the main road and the Surfond-Le Breil road. Dead tired by the march on the slippery





road, and wet to the skin, the men threw themselves down in ditches filled with deep snow. After 7 o'clock P.M., the order arrived at last for them to go to quarters, the Staff and fusilier battalion at Le Breil, the 1st battalion at Soultres, the 2nd battalion at Nuillé.

*Battle of Le Mans on the 10th, 11th, and 12th January.—Engagement at Changé on the 10th. (See Sketch 3.)*

It appeared from the reports that the XIIIth and Xth Army Corps, on the right and left flanks respectively, were far from having reached their objectives, and that the IIIrd Corps was in advance in the centre like a wedge. The intention, on the contrary, had been to carry out an enveloping attack. Notwithstanding this, Prince Frederick Charles ordered the advance of the IIIrd Corps to be continued.

The enemy was to be attacked along the entire line Champagné-Changé, and to the left as far as Parigné l'Evêque, in order to facilitate the advance of the Xth Corps on the Grand Lucé road.

An advance in four columns was ordered by the Corps Commander. The 12th Brigade was placed on the extreme right flank, and advanced by the Ardenay-Le Mans road. The 11th Brigade moved on its left, turning to the left at Ardenay, through the Bois de Loudon on Changé. The 5th Division advanced on the left, also divided into two columns, in the general direction of Parigné l'Evêque.

This advance led, on each of the four roads, to serious fighting.

The proceedings of the 11th Brigade only will be followed here.

The 1st and the fusilier battalions<sup>1</sup> marched at 8 o'clock to the brigade assembly at the cross roads Bouloire-Le Mans and Surfond-Le Breil. In accordance with superior orders, the 2nd battalion remained at Nuillé to protect the right flank.

A thick fog lay on the morning of the 10th over the snow-covered fields. The air was somewhat milder, but this intensified the slippery condition of the roads. It was hardly possible to ride.

At 10.30 A.M., the advance was commenced from the place of assembly; the 35th Regiment led, followed by the two battalions.

About 3 o'clock, the advanced guard—2nd battalion 35th Regiment—came into contact with parties of the enemy at Le Puits, a farm situated about 2 kilometres east of Changé. A brisk action ensued in which the whole of the 35th Regiment was soon engaged. The enemy, at first driven back along the entire line, was soon reinforced to such a degree that at some points an advance could only be made very gradually through the close country devoid of any clear view; whereas at other points the positions already gained could be maintained only by great efforts.

The 1st battalion 35th Regiment was detached from the right against the enemy's left flank. As owing to the long and difficult way, the early action of these companies was doubtful, our fusilier battalion received the order about 3.30 P.M. to advance north of Les

<sup>1</sup> One Zug of the 11th company remained at Le Breil, to guard the hospital.

Gars on Amigné-Château, in order to relieve the pressure on the parties of the 35th Regiment fighting beyond that farm.

On arriving abreast of Les Gars, the 9th company was advanced against the copse lying north-west of that farm, with a view to establishing from there communication between the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 35th Regiment, and to supporting the attack in a westerly direction. The 2nd zug of this company occupied the hedge of the garden belonging to the farm-house, and from thence carried at the first rush the southern border of the alder plantation beyond.

During the advance the zug had been molested by fire from the left flank, directed on it by the enemy from Le Pavillon farm.<sup>1</sup> The two other züge, therefore, proceeded to attack the farm. Running forward from one quick-set hedge to another, they succeeded in reaching a deep ditch lying south of and at about 250 paces distance from the farm. From thence they opened a lively independent fire on the houses and walls of the farm.

The other companies of the battalion had, in the meantime, continued their advance along the main road. Beyond Les Gars, they moved off the road in a northerly direction in order to gain the right flank by passing behind the companies of the 35th Regiment engaged here. The extended 35th, in the direction of the stream of Gué Perray, suffered sensible losses here from flanking fire from a northerly and north-westerly direction. The Commander of the fusilier battalion 20th Regiment, therefore, directed the 10th company to advance to the left of the country road to Amigné against an alder thicket abreast of Le Pavillon.

The 4th zug pressed forward up to a hedge running diagonally up to this thicket, and was at this moment supported on its right by the 3rd zug, which had been led up by the company Commander himself, who was wounded, and his place taken by a Second Lieutenant.

In order to strengthen the fire at this point, the 12th company, which had hitherto remained posted in reserve on the road, was now ordered up. It took post on the right of the 10th company. Advancing along a thick-set hedge, it soon reached a ditch, from whence the alder thicket could be outflanked. After the first shots the enemy began to give way. Their retreat was converted into a confused flight, when immediately afterwards the hurrah of the two companies resounded, and these rush forward to the border of the thicket. By the time they reached this, the enemy had disappeared into the wood.

In the further advance the 12th company moved with its right in touch with the 9th company, which was posted behind a hedge west of the thicket and parallel with it, and firing on Le Pavillon. The enemy, shaken by the troops falling back from the alder thicket, now gave way here also, and retreated from the farm in a northerly direction upon Amigné-Château. The next moment our men crowded into Le Pavillon from all sides.

With a view to the attack of the château and the wood situated behind it, the 9th company received orders to move further to its

<sup>1</sup> I cannot fix the position of this farm.—Ed.

right, in the direction of a wet ditch, to seek for a crossing point further up, and then to advance against the eastern border of the wood.

In front the 5th zug of the 11th company had now joined the left flank of the most advanced fighting line. During the advance on the château it made prisoners a post of sixteen Frenchmen, whom it surprised.

In the meantime the 9th company had reached the further bank of the watercourse, and had just formed front towards the château, with the 1st zug on the right, when some of the enemy's riflemen came out of the wood in front, pressed by parties of the 35th Regiment, who followed them with "hurrah!" The company was able from its sheltered position to direct aimed fire without hurry, and at barely 200 paces distance, on the retiring enemy. It was one of those very rare moments in the field, where every man was able to observe the effect of his own fire. The enemy left on this spot a number of killed and wounded.

The other companies of the fusilier battalion, and on the extreme left flank a company of the 35th Regiment, having gradually gained ground from hedge to hedge, had also crossed the stream and were engaged in a fire action against the château. When the fire from thence began to slacken the buildings were carried by a general advance. Over fifty Frenchmen were found in the château and made prisoners.

Shortly afterwards the 9th company also arrived there.

After the companies had assembled, the battalion Commander ordered the 9th and 12th companies, the latter on the right, to examine the extensive park. Parties of the enemy were found in it, but they offered a very slight resistance.

While these occurrences were taking place, our 1st battalion had not been idle. Soon after the fusilier battalion had become engaged, it had received abreast of Les Gars farm the order to advance south of the Changé road, and to move round two companies sufficiently far to turn the enemy's right flank. The latter had occupied the group of houses that are situated opposite to the passage of Ardenay-Changé road over the Perray stream, and held it with great determination. The energetic attacks by the 35th Regiment had up till now been driven back with heavy losses.

The 2nd and 3rd companies received the order to advance along the road and support the front attack by the 35th Regiment. The 2nd company extended one zug, and placed itself north of the road, on the right flank of the troops already extended there, which were directing from the bank of the stream a lively fire on the Gué la Hart farm. Shortly afterwards the other two züge were also brought into the firing line. For the moment further progress here was impossible.

The 3rd company moved south of the road, and aligned itself with the 35th Regiment on the left flank, occupying a hedge in front of the Goudrière farm.

The 5th zug succeeded in crossing the stream, and sheltering itself

in a hollow way immediately before Le Bordage, on the Parigné-Bordé road.

The other two companies—the 1st and 4th—were led between the farms of Goudrière and La belle Prêle, in order to undertake from the left bank of the stream the attack on the south side of the farms; by the help of ladders and planks the stream was crossed with small losses, notwithstanding the heavy fire by the enemy.

On the other side of the stream the Officer in command of the two companies found two companies of the 35th in front of him, which had crossed it earlier, and were now firing on Le Bordage. Portions also of the 5th Division had towards the evening been directed from the southerly roads upon Changé, and now came into touch with our two companies on the left flank.

The various units thus collected here now precipitated themselves with a lusty hurrah upon the buildings. After a brief struggle, in the course of which it often came to hand-to-hand fighting, the positions fell into our hands.

The 2nd battalion, as already related, had been left behind in Nuillé. At 11.30 it marched, by order of the division Commander, by Le Breil, Ardenay, and Rossay to rejoin the regiment. It arrived at Changé at 4.30 P.M., before the decision had taken place at Gué la Hart, and was ordered to the Les Gars wood in reserve.

About 6 o'clock the regiment Commander received orders from the brigade Commander, and almost simultaneously from the corps Commander, to advance with the 2nd battalion on Changé and seize the wooded heights to the west of it. Two companies of the fusilier battalion—the 9th and 12th—were ordered to support the movement on the right flank.

Immediately on crossing the water-course, which is traversed by the main road, hardly 200 paces from the village, the battalion was fired at from its border. Two companies—the 6th and 7th—extended to the right and left of the road, and brought their fire to bear on the village. After a long fire action, lasting for nearly half an hour, all moved forward to the attack. In the village our men met the 52nd. The enemy gave way on all sides, followed closely by our troops, who pursued them as far as the heights beyond Changé.

It was now past 7 P.M. The firing shortly died away on both sides, and the engagement was at an end.

The 1st and 2nd battalions took up alarm-quarters late in the evening in Changé. The place was so fully occupied with Staffs, troops of the 5th Division, prisoners, and wounded men, that place could not be found for all to lie down. Still they rejoiced to have a roof over their heads during the cold night.

Outposts were placed by the fusilier battalion on the heights west of Changé. In the snow, with 8 degrees of frost, without wood or straw, the fusiliers passed a night of hardship. Their food also was insufficient, for the baggage had not been able to get up owing to the slippery roads.

Notwithstanding this the spirit of the men was excellent; they comforted themselves with the thought that the French were suffering



still more than we did from the cold, as could be seen by the miserable appearance of the prisoners. In the early morning, when all in the bivouac were stiff from the frost, a wag was not to be denied his joke. He remarked that he had not been cold for a moment during the night, explaining, "I had two helmets. With one I covered myself, and the other I put under my head as a pillow."

The losses of the regiment were comparatively small—2 killed and 12 wounded. The result of the action was brilliant. The IIIrd Corps had pushed forward close up to the enemy's main position. The corps on each flank had also moved forward successfully.

*Engagement at La Landrière and Le Tertre on the 11th and 12th January, 1871.*

During the night the order reached the regiment to complete the men's supply of ammunition at once. The ammunition wagons were to be filled up again early next morning from an infantry ammunition column situated at Changé.

Prince Frederick Charles had ordered a continuation of the attack by the IIIrd Army Corps, in the direction of Le Mans, for the following day.

The troops had been severely exhausted by their previous efforts, but the Prince judged it to be of the utmost importance to hold the enemy in the centre of his positions on the Huisne stream, so as to prevent his falling on the XIIIth Army Corps, which was threatening him by a turning movement on the north.

At this time it was believed that the enemy's main position was on the heights situated on the further side of the stream, and that there were only strong detachments to be dealt with on the near side.

After the attack only it was learnt that the main force of the enemy was posted on the wooded heights, running to Champagné, on the Huisne, north of and in a direction parallel to the Chemin-aux-Bœufs. The IIIrd Army Corps had three hostile divisions in front of it.

At 8.30 A.M. the 11th Brigade assembled in a meadow east of Changé. At 10 o'clock the advance was commenced by the Changé-les-Arches road. The brigade had for its task to attack from the Perray stream the left flank of the enemy posted on the heights, and to hold the passages of the Huisne stream at Les Arches Château and Les Noyers Château against the enemy situated on the Auvours heights, and on the right bank of the Huisne until the arrival of the 12th Brigade. The 5th Division was to advance simultaneously to the front upon Le Tertre.

In the neighbourhood of Beauregard farm the outposts of the fusilier battalion were drawn in. The battalion received orders to assemble towards the right flank and follow in rear of the Brigade. The 35th Regiment was told off to occupy Les Arches, it halted at the passage over the stream south of the castle, and prepared it for defence.

Our regiment continued its march from here, the 1st battalion on Les Noyers Château; the 2nd battalion, wheeling to its left, through

the wood south of Les Arches; the fusilier battalion followed in close order in rear of the centre.

At the point of junction of the Chemin-aux-Bœufs with the Les Noyers Château-Changé road, the advanced line of two companies (the 7th on the left, the 8th on the right flank), each with one zug extended, moved by their right and with the left resting on the road, and examined the wood in front.

The extended züge had hardly reached as far as the Maison Blanche, when they were received by skirmishers' fire, and suffered some loss.

The enemy were posted in a thin firing line at a ditch which offered them shelter, in the middle of the wood. At that moment the order was given to the two companies by the battalion Commander—"Double!" The companies rushed forward with the bayonet cheering, and drove the enemy back. But a long closed line came into view through the thin brushwood. The enemy in the strength of at least two battalions was doubling forward to restore the fight. The battalion Commander moved up the other two companies of the 1st line at the double, the 5th on the left, the 6th on the right flank. The enemy was again charged with a cheer. They paused, delivered a terrible rapid fire, and then fled, followed by our men, who in a few minutes were in possession of the hostile position, a hollow way at the edge of the wood.

The enemy took up a fresh position in a wood opposite. On the left an elevation covered with small fir trees was strongly occupied. A stationary fire action was now engaged against this height and the wood, during which the companies posted in the hollow road suffered constant losses, notwithstanding their excellent cover. The cause of this was soon discovered. During the incautious advance of the battalion a farmstead, La Landrière, situated on the road, had been disregarded. It was still occupied by the enemy, and gave them the opportunity of firing on the flank and rear of our men in the hollow way.

The fusilier battalion had been moved to the left, behind the 2nd battalion as a reserve, and from it the 9th and 12th companies were sent against the farm. The 10th company received at the same time the order to keep up communication with the 1st battalion. To this end the 3rd zug was detached to the right to the path through the wood; the remainder of the company was kept temporarily behind the 8th company in close order.

The 9th company went forward to the left of the road, the 12th company in the wood close to its edge. Covered by hedges and brushwood, which stretched to its left close up to the path, the 9th company succeeded in getting to within 150 paces of the farm. The 12th company had advanced simultaneously by the edge of the wood to a position north of it. After the needle-gun had been at work for some time from both directions, the order was given for the assault. The buildings were carried with the bayonet, regardless of the enemy's fire, which was kept up with great determination from the windows and roofs.

Whilst the fusiliers advanced victoriously on the left flank, the 6th and 8th companies on the opposite flank had succeeded in occupying a quarry situated about 150 paces in advance of the hollow way, in a clearing in the wood. From this spot there was a clear field of fire to the heights on the left front. Parties of the enemy were driven by this fire from the fir woods in front, behind the crest of the heights, whence a lively fire was kept up against the edge of the wood and the La Landrière homestead.

Already, shortly after this had been captured by the fusiliers, the 12th company had attempted an independent attack on the heights. But it had to be abandoned on account of the superiority of the enemy, who took the offensive from the fir wood on the approach of the attackers. The company withdrew with loss into the wood, as far as the hollow way, and had now again taken position between the 9th company, which had advanced as far as a hedge west of the homestead, and the left flank of the 2nd battalion (5th company).

On the order of the battalion Commander, both züge of the 10th company were now brought up here. They extended to the left of the 12th company on the edge of the wood.

The three companies in common now fired on the heights; the 2nd battalion joined them; the 6th and 8th companies extended to the right, further forward, and came in here very effectively. The more the enemy suffered from the fire, the greater importance he seemed to place upon holding on to the heights. Fresh troops were continually brought into the advanced line. An almost nervous movement was apparent with the enemy. It was taken by us to indicate the commencement of their withdrawal, particularly as at certain points individual men could be seen to go back. "It is time!" shouted our Officers to one another, "Up, hurrah!"

All rose up for the result. At the same moment the French were to be seen advancing on us from the brushwood. The uneasiness had been nothing more than the preparation for the offensive. But our brave Märker<sup>1</sup> were not to be confused by the enemy's advance. Without any special order being given, the drummers beat the charge, the buglers sounded. The enemy stopped and began to fire; but he soon learnt that the 20th were in bloody earnest with their attack.

He still hesitated for a moment, one could see how the Officers exerted themselves to get the lines forward; then all turned about and hastened back to the heights, which were reached almost simultaneously by our companies, so that destructive losses could be inflicted on the retiring Frenchmen by our rapid fire.

On the other side of the clearing, even the enemy had been unable to withstand the general advance and abandoned his position—a ditch with perpendicular banks—which was occupied by the companies of the 2nd battalion.

A portion of the men had pressed on beyond the ditch in the excitement of the attack, and followed the retiring Frenchmen close up

<sup>1</sup> A name for the inhabitants of the Brandenburg District, to which the regiment belonged.—Ed.

to the far edge of the wood. Amongst them was Private Wille, of the 7th company, a native of Berlin. He suddenly found himself in the presence of three Frenchmen, who pressed in on him and tried to drag him off. But in spite of a wound in the hand, he succeeded in holding his own in the hand-to-hand fight until other men came up and overpowered the Frenchmen.

In the meantime on the left flank still further progress had been made. A battery came up on the heights south of La Landrière, and after long search found a position on the road from which it could fire on a group of houses, Les Granges, situated on the edge of the wood, which was occupied by the enemy. Encouraged by the co-operation of the artillery, the Commander of the 12th company led it and a portion of the 10th company out of the wood as far as the road, and stormed the buildings.

The first care of the companies was now to place Les Granges in a state of defence. The seven companies had now advanced so far, that the 5th Division, at Le Tertre, was fighting almost in their rear. Not the noise only, but still more the bullets falling from that direction, made us aware of this fact. It was 1 P.M.

The men were still occupied in making openings in the walls abutting on the front, which were completely devoid of windows, when a battery moved up south of L'Epan, and shelled the buildings. Soon infantry masses advanced by the road. In spite of the works of fortification being hastened on, it was not possible to complete them. They had to be abandoned, and a hedge with ditch at the side of the homestead was occupied. From thence a veritable shower of lead was poured on the advancing Frenchmen. Presently, however, the situation began to become very serious. A strong hostile column appeared on the slope to the left, and threatened to turn the fusiliers. The 4th zug, 10th company, was detached to meet this. But the superiority of the French, now pushing on from all sides, was so great that the homestead had to be abandoned. The fusiliers fell back with heavy loss in a northerly direction on the road. Only now could it be seen with what strong masses this offensive movement had been undertaken. The enemy had brought up another brigade from the reserve, so that now the two battalions were engaged with an entire division of the enemy.

The enemy's attack had been made with equally superior forces against the 2nd battalion in the wood. Here also the companies, with the exception of the 5th company, posted further back, pressed from all sides, had to give up their endangered position, to save themselves from complete destruction. The fight slowly moved back. But the battalions took post in the hollow way, the first position captured from the enemy, with the fusiliers in the La Landrière farm on the left, determined not to give way a foot further, but to wait there the arrival of reinforcements.

As at the commencement of the fight, the 2nd battalion was on the right flank with the 10th and 12th companies on its left. The 9th company was in the farm.

Shortly before, so soon as the great superiority of the enemy was

recognized, the Adjutant of the 2nd battalion had been sent to the regimental Commander, at Les Noyers Château, and the Adjutant of the fusilier battalion to the 35th Regiment, to ask for support. At the same time the regimental Adjutant had ridden back to fetch up an ammunition wagon, as the 2nd battalion was beginning to run short of ammunition.

The enemy had fixed a limit to his advance in the middle of the wood. He was now situated at a distance of barely 250 paces from the position. A furious musketry fire broke out along the entire line.

Gradually the fire on our side almost ceased, by order of the Officers, on account of the lack of ammunition. The enemy, apparently encouraged by this, immediately resumed the offensive; but the moment they rose up, such a rapid fire was directed on them that they abandoned the attempt after the first few paces. A second attempt was made to advance, but with a similar result. In face of the steady bearing of our men, any purely frontal attack was bound to fail.

In the meantime the 2nd and 3rd companies had come up from Les Noyers Château, and taken position by the 6th company. It was high time, for the enemy, constantly pushing forward on his left flank, threatened to outflank our right.

Our ranks became thinner and thinner in this long fire action. The 2nd battalion was almost without Officers. Yet there was no unsteadiness, no apprehension. Gradually, and owing to the increasing lack of ammunition, the situation of our troops had become worse. Already the cartridges had been taken from the dead and wounded men and distributed; cartridges had also been brought up in haversacks and handkerchiefs from the two companies of the 1st battalion. Again the enemy had tried to advance; and, brilliantly as this attempt had been hindered, still a renewed attack could only be regarded with anxiety, for some of the units had literally fired their last round.

The first support was received from the fusilier battalion. Its Commander, so soon as he heard of the difficult position of the 2nd battalion, sent his 9th company from the left to the extreme right. The 3rd battalion 35th Regiment occupied, directly afterwards, the La Landrière hamlet in its place.

As soon as it was relieved, at Les Arches, by the 12th Brigade, the Fusilier Regiment (35th) had moved to our support. Its 3rd battalion had now arrived on the left flank. Shortly afterwards the two other battalions brought direct support to our pressed right flank. Our 2nd battalion, that had suffered the most and had fired all its ammunition away, assembled on the arrival of these reinforcements behind the fighting line, as 2nd line, and soon afterwards completed its ammunition from the wagons which had been brought up with great effort.

It only remains now to turn to the action of the 1st battalion. As already recounted, it had advanced against Les Noyers Château, and, finding it unoccupied, took possession of it and set to work to prepare it for defence. Admirably adapted by its situation for defence,

the castle was, on the one hand, a powerful supporting point for the other two battalions in the case of their being driven back; while, on the other hand, from it the enemy, posted on the heights on the other side of the Huisne stream and on the heights of Le Luard, could be held in check and prevented from debouching.

The position was occupied as follows:—The 1st company was posted at the bridge over the Huisne and in the mill buildings situated there; the 4th was in the château, and the third in the out-buildings adjoining it. The 2nd company was posted in reserve behind the château.

The whole of the buildings were prepared for defence in the most approved manner, and shelter trenches constructed at appropriate points.

About 2 o'clock the 2nd and 3rd companies were despatched to the assistance of the 2nd battalion.

A lively fire, both of musketry and artillery, was maintained on both sides throughout the day. The enemy sent forward a thick skirmishing line against the bridge; but the attempt was easily repulsed.

Nightfall brought the fight to a close along the whole line.

Late in the evening the regiment was despatched to its quarters in the farms north-east of Changé, which were reached at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 12th January.

The losses of the regiment were:—Killed, 3 Officers, 7 non-commissioned officers, 33 men; wounded, 7 Officers, 11 non-commissioned officers, and 85 men.

The final decision at Le Mans itself had yet to be fought out. The rest of the force had also gained ground, and reached forward positions towards that place.

At 6 A.M. the regiment was turned out, as the enemy had attacked the outposts.

On assembling it numbered only 15 Officers and a little over 1,000 men. The 2nd battalion was broken up, and two companies were attached to the 1st and two to the fusilier battalion.

The 6th Division remained the whole day in readiness at Changé.

About 6 P.M. news reached that place that Le Mans had been captured in the course of the afternoon by the Xth Corps after severe fighting.

The losses of the whole Army between the 6th and the 12th January was 189 Officers and 3,470 men killed and wounded. Of these numbers, 127 Officers and 1,771 men belonged to the IIIrd Army Corps, which had the severest portion of the fighting. The actual capture of Le Mans, on the 12th January by the Xth Corps, was effected with comparatively small losses, and resulted in 22,000 prisoners being made, and the rest of the French 2nd Loire Army dispersed.

The regiment entered Le Mans on the 16th January, and received there on the following day a convoy of 644 Ersatz men, convalescents, and Ersatz recruits; 155 had been left sick on the way owing to the extreme cold.

On the arrival of this convoy the battalions were again organized in four companies. Of the 12 companies, 3 were commanded by First Lieutenants, the remaining 9 by Second Lieutenants.

The regiment remained at Le Mans until the 23rd January, when it moved out to relieve the Xth Corps, which, with the IIIrd Corps, was forming the advanced guard, and furnishing the outposts in front of the Loire Army.

Shortly afterwards the first armistice occurred, at the expiration of which, on the 20th February, the regiment had the following strength:—

	Officers.	Non-com. officers.	Musicians.	Men.
Regimental Staff and 1st battalion .....	15	65	23	848
2nd battalion .....	19	73	15	760
Fusilier battalion .....	10	61	18	860
Total .....	44	199	56	2,468

The armistice was prolonged successively to the 24th February, the 27th February, and then to the 12th March—after the Peace preliminaries had been signed.

Active operations were not resumed; but the 20th Regiment was destined to remain a long time yet in France, as part of the Army of Occupation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> One of the features in the campaign was the constant changes in the commands of the companies, but time and space are wanting to put this in tabular form. Discipline did not depend on personal relations between Officers and men, but on the ingrained habit of obedience to rank, no matter who was the possessor of the rank. I strongly recommend those who in our own Service insist so strongly on the need for men to work under their "own" Officers, or who advocate personal relations among "groups" in the ranks, to study the histories of the German regiments who did most work in the campaign, and then tell us how their remarkable proposals would work under similar circumstances.—ED.





## MILITARY LAW IN GERMANY.

By Colonel W. A. EARDLEY WILMOT, Deputy Judge Advocate.

### *The Development of the Prussian Military Code.*

THE military system of Germany has so many points of interest for soldiers that an account of the origin and development of the Code by which its well-known discipline is maintained may prove not unattractive to the numerous readers of this Journal. I propose, therefore, to give a summary of a paper on the subject which appeared last year in the "Militär-Wochenblatt," from the pen of Major-General V. Estorff, f.p. German Army. Writing, however, as he did, for German Officers, it was unnecessary for him to give any account of the system of Military Law and Procedure which is at present in force in the German Army; I think it, therefore, will not be amiss, for the sake of comparison with our own, if I add to Estorff's narrative a short account of it, taken from Gran's "Justice Militaire." General V. Estorff, in the introduction to his article, remarks that all Military Codes faithfully reflect the manners and customs of their time, and it is interesting to trace the resemblance between many expressions in the old German Articles and those which are to be found in the successive Mutiny Acts and Articles of War by which the British Army was governed for nearly two centuries, and which can still be traced in our Army Act.

Of course, the German and British Codes have a common origin, being derived from the laws which governed the men-at-arms of the 15th century, which were first crystallised and put into the form of Codes by such leaders as the Emperor Maximilian I and Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden.

As we all know, our Mutiny Act dates from the Accession of William and Mary, but the Articles of War have an older history. The most complete of the earlier ones are those of Richard II (1385) and James II (1686), and the latter are clearly derived from the Articles of Gustavus Adolphus.

The Articles of Richard II, James II, and Gustavus Adolphus are given in Winthrop's (United States) "Military Law." The Articles of Gustavus Adolphus given by Winthrop are taken from Ward's "Animadversions of Warre," published in London 1639.

General V. Estorff divides his history of the development of the German Articles into three periods:—

1st Period: When the Articles formed a contract.

- (a.) In the days of the Men-at-arms (*Landsknechte*).
- (b.) During the Thirty Years War.

2nd Period : When the Articles formed a Military Penal Code.

- (a.) When mercenary standing armies were employed.
- (b.) When universal liability to defensive service was enforced.

3rd Period : When the Articles became a manual of duties.

*1st Period.—(a.) The Man-at-arms.*

On the decay of the feudal system, the Sovereigns of Continental Europe, being continually at war with one another, found themselves obliged, during the latter half of the 15th century, to employ foreign mercenaries, and the natural tendency among these was for the natives of each country to band themselves together somewhat after the nature of Guilds.

When a Prince wished to indulge in the luxury of a war with a neighbour, or was forced to defend himself, he issued commissions to some of his Officers or Nobles to raise regiments. On this the person to whom the commission was issued, and who received at the same time a Deed of Articles (*Artikelsbriefe*) containing the terms of the engagement and the conditions which those who engaged were required to fulfil, raised his pennon and called for volunteers. On this all the warlike and adventurous men from highland and lowland who were not already engaged made their appearance, and inspected the Articles. If the terms suited them, they engaged to serve for a limited period, usually from three to six months. At the expiration of the term the soldiers were relieved from their contract, and were free to re-engage or to transfer their services to another master. Thus, as General V. Estorff observes, the Articles at this period formed a species of contract between Sovereign and soldier.<sup>1</sup> The first Articles he mentions are those of the Elector Albert Achilles of Brandenburg, issued for his war against Pomerania in 1478. Although more particularly belonging to feudal times, General V. Estorff says that he mentions them because they are the first Brandenburg Articles which laid down the soldier's duties, although they only, in a very cursory way, deal with penalties. According to these Articles, soldiers were to be peaceable, and live together in harmony; they were not to take the field except on the business of their Gracious Lord or of their Captain. "They are not to dig holes in the Leaguer<sup>2</sup> so as to obstruct the passage of Horse or Foot." "Whoever steals shall be hung without mercy." Minute orders were given about victualling, and drawing up the Army. Proper formations were to be kept, and the Army was to be divided into eight divisions. One division was always to be on duty to protect the arms and guard the camp by day and night. There was to be a Captain's guard at night with every line, and it was the Captain's duty to know whether

<sup>1</sup> We find traces of this in our English expression "signing articles," which is still used amongst seafaring people.

<sup>2</sup> Leaguer, hence beleaguered. We know the Cape Dutch word *Laager* for a camping place or entrenched camp.

his line increased or diminished in numbers, or if any strangers entered, and to report the same to the other Captains. There were only nineteen of these Articles.

General V. Estorff says that the first real Articles of War of the men-at-arms were issued by the Emperor Frederick for his war against the Turks in 1486. These were not only Articles of War in the modern sense, but also regulations for equipment, rationing, recruiting, &c. They contained such orders as the following: "Whoever assisted the enemy was to forfeit his property and be outlawed;" deserters were to forfeit their goods, and their wives and children were to be "for ever banished." They contained only general cautions against disobedience. Thieves were to be hanged, and gamblers to be beheaded. No mention had been made in earlier Articles about drunkenness, but it now appears as one of the besetting sins of the men-at-arms. Particular mention is made of the "drunken gambling devil"!

Maximilian I paid particular attention to the task of organizing the men-at-arms, and issued, in 1508, a "Deed of Articles," wherein General V. Estorff traces some resemblance to the oath and general provisions now in force in the German Army. Maximilian's Articles (twenty-three in number) commence "They shall swear," or "Thou shalt swear," to do or not to do, as the case might be, *e.g.*, "Above all, they shall swear to defend and shield His Imperial Majesty from all hurt or danger and contrariwise to do all in their power to advance his interest and profit."

General V. Estorff says that Maximilian's Articles were short and clear, and presented a great contrast to the lengthy bombastic Articles of later times. Military Law, however, was expounded by the Auditeurs (Judge Advocates), who presided over the military tribunals, or pronounced by a kind of popular vote according to the "Law of the Long Lance." The characteristic of Maximilian's Articles was freedom of speech, publicity, and trial by comrades corresponding to the rank of the accused. The following were some of Maximilian's regulations:—One squadron, in the presence of the enemy, was never to refuse to assist another; no one was to quit the ranks on the march without permission; nor to quit his guard, nor to pay another to take his duty; whoever did not fall in when the alarm sounded was to forfeit his goods. General V. Estorff says that religious observances, which later on were more fully treated, were first enjoined in Maximilian's Articles. The following are other orders taken from these Articles. Whoever runs away in action, him "shall anyone who stands next to him smite and kill in virtue of his oath." The leaders of other companies were to be obeyed; unlawful assemblies were forbidden; the Commander-in-Chief (*Kriegsherr*) could alone reduce superior Officers, although, as General V. Estorff points out, a part of the Officers were elected by the soldiers. Then there are orders against disturbances in the leaguer (camp); against plundering without permission; against drunkenness; for the protection of priests, women, and children, and of the bringers of provisions; "under pain of punishment for perjury or of death." As armies consisted of men of various nations, harmony was an important matter,

and therefore in the Articles of this period many allusions are to be found concerning the necessity of maintaining peace among the men-at-arms. General V. Estorff quotes an old order given in "Fronspergir's Book of War": "No German was to gamble with anyone who did not understand him or speak his language." Persons who, when peace was called in a fray, "refused to obey the said peace, were to be slain without mercy."

General V. Estorff goes on to say that succeeding Articles of War were more or less framed on those of Maximilian, and much alike. The most complete were those of Maximilian II issued 1570. The first Maximilian's Articles had said little about penalties, as these were left to the judgment of the "godly men-at-arms," who, however, as General V. Estorff shows, soon ceased to deserve that title, and he quotes a complaint of Luther, in 1529, that "Our German common people are a wild dissolute set, half devils, half men." Maximilian II in the introduction to his Articles says: "In former days, the German men-at-arms possessed every manly virtue, honesty and decency, and observed martial order and discipline, so that they became renowned among all nations; but now it has come to pass, that the old German freedom in war being too much abused, oppresses and offends the poor people everywhere, and will cause all honourable discipline and military order to be forgotten and destroyed." "Noble or commoner, high-born or low-born," was to govern his conduct by these Articles. And now we come to time-honoured expressions which will remind English soldiers of the days of the Mutiny Act. "Every soldier shall abstain from godless words and deeds, and sincerely pray to Heaven for victory against the enemy, and whenever he is ordered to attend Divine service or the preaching of God's Word, shall betake himself thereto." This order, says General V. Estorff, seems to have been very necessary for the men-at-arms, for they were to be "clapt in irons" if, during Divine service, "they are found entering taverns or beer shops or any disorderly houses." Blasphemy was to be punished with "life or limb." The men-at-arms do not seem to have appreciated the clergy, according to a verse given from an old stave of 1530.

"Alas! on the broad heath  
Shall I be shot to death;  
To the grave that is near me  
Long lances shall bear me.  
Boom! boom! the drums sound my doom.  
But better far to hear that drum  
Than list to parson's prosy hum."

Deserters who remained at large were publicly proclaimed felons. This is the only ignominious punishment to be found in the Articles of the 16th century. Superior Officers were authorized on the march to kill any soldiers who quitted the ranks without leave, or who disobeyed orders. No man-at-arms was to remain absent all night from his company under pain of "bodily punishment." As a complete freedom of migration existed among the various States of

Germany, it was important to prevent the soldiers of one army holding communications with friends or acquaintances in another. Everyone was sworn to denounce treason, and persons caught in the act were to be handed over to the Provost. This word Provost is translated in Ward's "Animadversions of Warre" as "Parforce."<sup>1</sup> By virtue of their honour and duty no garrison was to dare to talk of surrender.

The principal cause of disobedience was the irregular issue of pay to the soldiers. As before stated, they engaged to serve for a limited period, but were bound to re-engage if required to do so. They received an advance of half a month's pay at starting. Time was calculated at the rate of thirty days to the month. They were considered to have earned a full month's pay after a victory or the capture of a fortress by storm, so also the garrisons of places the siege of which was raised. There was a provision that they were bound to fight although their pay might be in arrear. The first payment was made after the Paymaster's muster, and we soon begin to hear of tricks and frauds. Men lent one another equipment, answered to false names, Captains mustered the same men, and so on. Pikemen had to muster with lances and two-handed swords, arquebusiers with arquebus and rapier; Captains and superior Officers with complete equipment. The Imperialists had to wear a red cross on their coats and a red band across the breast.

There were definite rules about pillage. No one could begin to help himself until the battle was decided; or touch anything under safe guard (literally when *Salva-Guardia* was beaten); any prisoners of distinction and artillery material had to be surrendered on payment; captured cattle or provisions could only be sold within the leaguer. Plunder, however, was altogether forbidden on imperial soil. Generally speaking, ploughs, mills, wine, corn, meal, and (after 1570) baking ovens were to be spared.

Soldiers were not to fight on guard. "Whoever shall be found sleeping on his post, or shall go therefrom before he is regularly relieved, shall be punished without mercy in life or limb," has a familiar sound. Drunkenness was an increasing evil, and so we find "every-one must abstain from drinking bouts and drunkenness. When anyone intentionally assaults another, or even treats another rudely ('provoking speeches and injurious words' of English Articles), he shall not only be certainly punished therefor, but doubly so if he was drunk." General V. Estorff says this provision is repeated in German Article 48 of 1872. He then gives extracts from the Articles of Rudolf II, dated 1591. Whoever failed to fall in on the alarm sounding, or on the appearance of the enemy, was to be punished in life or limb. Whoever gambled on credit could not enforce payment if he won. Disorderly females were generally for-

<sup>1</sup> Two expressions are used in the Articles of Gustavus Adolphus for the office of Provost: "*Ampt des obersten profoss oder General-gewaltigers.*" Ward sometimes speaks of "provost" and sometimes of "parforce," which latter is evidently the translation of "*gewaltiger.*" It would seem that *profoss* and *gewaltiger* are two names for the same official.

bidden, though, in some cases, regulations are to be found concerning "women who are common property."

The use of the sword in frays was allowed in protection of life, but "other murderous means of defence" were forbidden. Peace was to be thrice proclaimed between combatants, and "whoever strikes another after peace is called, or when he is on the ground, or when he is defenceless, shall be punished in life or limb." The person who reported an offence was not to suffer prejudice, and the Provost who was particularly charged with the maintenance of order was not to be impeded in the execution of his office.

The same sort of precautions that we have in our Military Law were taken in those early times. Whoever was serving, but who from any cause had failed to take the oath, was bound by the Articles, which were always open to inspection. The last Articles of this period which General V. Estorff mentions were those wherein "Life Guards (Leibguardi) of the high-born and illustrious prince the Margrave and Kurfurst (Elector) at Brandenburg were sworn to serve at his Court and to obey everywhere and keep inviolate" in 1592. The duties of the escort (Trabanten) chiefly pertaining to Court and Guard were laid down in twenty-nine Articles. Treason was to be punished with death, much importance was laid on discretion. Faults were generally punished by fines. Articles much of the same kind were issued to his men-at-arms by Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, in 1570.

(b.) *The Thirty Years War.*

We now come to the times of the Thirty Years War. General V. Estorff says that the Articles of the 17th century remained much the same, but owing to the poverty of the princes and the incidents of a long war, the character of the soldiers deteriorated, and armies had to support themselves. The country was overrun by herds of penniless rascals, and this appears to have been the period when the recruiting sergeant began to earn his ill-name.

It was only under such leaders as Wallenstein<sup>1</sup> and Gustavus Adolphus that the soldiers were properly paid and discipline regularly maintained. Wallenstein issued in 1617 his "Troop Law." He commences by saying that "every soldier shall continue to serve as long as the Lord Wallenstein shall please to retain him in his force." Again we find traitors and deserters proclaimed felons. Wallenstein lays more stress than his predecessors on honourable conduct. Thus, he says, "whoever advisedly curses or blasphemes God's Name shall be punished in life or limb." Special mention is made of running away in action ("Streichens von den Fahnen"). Cowards that ran away might be cut down or shot by those who remained staunch, and these latter were not to be blamed, but to be considered as having merited great thanks. Wallenstein laid great stress on obedience. "Insubordinate soldiers and mutineers are to

<sup>1</sup> I believe it was Wallenstein that was the author of the maxim that "War ought to support war."



be punished in life or limb." A Supreme Military Court appears to have been established as the chief means of punishment. There was to be no rushing to the front without orders. "And if the enemy be beaten by other Divisions, whoever shall obey orders as aforesaid and do his duty, shall be as well regarded as those who gain the victory." Booty "according to the ancient custom of the land" was to be equally distributed, but oppression, extortion, and indiscriminate pillage were forbidden; receipts were to be given to landlords for provisions not paid for at the time. General V. Estorff observes that, notwithstanding Wallenstein's fair-sounding Articles, robbery and pillage were the principal crimes of the Wallensteins, and he quotes a satirical verse of the day, put into the mouth of one of Wallenstein's men, to the following effect:—

"Real folk of quality are we,  
No beggar in our ranks you'll see;  
Rustics scaring, cursing, swearing,  
Nought for Hell or Heaven caring,  
Their goods from us must all conceal,  
For, like the ravens, we do steal.  
Good juicy joints enjoy we all,  
Though people us do hirelings call."

The following are instances of the character of armies of that time:—The Duke of Friedland writes to the Imperialist Colonel Count Montecuculi: "We are weary of being told that great disorders are taking place in the cavalry under his command, so that we warn him to put a stop to them, otherwise, if the slightest complaint is brought to our notice that he permits his soldiers to rob, steal, pillage, and carry off cattle with impunity, he will have to answer for it." Another message to Colonel V. Arnim, dated 1627: "It often happens that the Officers take the money intended for the soldiers' subsistence, and shove it in their pockets (*sic*), and manage somehow or another that the inhabitants have to provide their soldiers with meat, drink, and forage, which is most unjust and in the highest degree punishable." Under such conditions, General V. Estorff observes, hangings and executions did no good; the number of marauders and stragglers increased and were the curse of the country. A contemporary says of this mob: "They keep no watch, the men throw up no entrenchments, they take care never to fight, yet they always manage to subsist themselves."

The vice of drunkenness must, according to the Articles of War, have been very prevalent in the 17th century. Article 15 says: "Since, unfortunately, it has come to pass that there has arisen among the soldiers, especially among the Germans, a vile and bestial habit of swilling (*voll saufen*), which is almost their only occupation, whereby the whole nation is much degraded, dishonoured, injured, and scorned, and, consequently, obtains but few successes or victories in war, it is to be most strongly impressed on the Captains that not only are they themselves to abstain from such inebriety, but especially to prevent any such excesses among their soldiers and followers." General V. Estorff remarks that it is strange that Wal-

lenstein's Articles do not allude to gambling, which flourished as luxuriantly among the Imperialists as it did later, and he says Schiller was guilty of no unmeaning joke when he made a rustic say—

“A certain Captain, by another stuck,  
A pair of dice has left me full of luck,”

probably insinuating that they were loaded.

The next Articles mentioned are those issued by the Emperor Frederick II, in 1642, and by Leopold I, in 1665, both of which follow the Articles of 1570. The Articles of 1642 contain strict orders about duels. Such were only to be fought in the forenoon, and in the appointed place, and wounded combatants “shall not be treated by any camp barber or shaver” (the chirurgeon or surgeon was originally a barber) “without the foreknowledge of the Colonel.”

There was a considerable advance in organization and discipline in the armies of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. He issued Articles of War in 1621, and General V. Estorff says that they formed the models of the first Brandenburg Articles delivered by the Great Elector. I have also mentioned that the English Articles are also clearly founded on them.

The Articles of Gustavus Adolphus, given in Ward's “Animadversions of Warre,” under the same date, vary slightly in the numbering to those given by General V. Estorff. The original appears to have been divided into headings (*titel*), each comprising a number of distinct Articles bearing on the same subject, in the same way that our Army Act has side references, such as “Fraudulent Enlistment,” “Disgraceful Conduct,” &c.

The first heading (Arts. 1–17) treats of “Reverence towards God and Divine Service.”

As the Swedish Army was mainly composed of his own subjects, the Sovereign was able to make his Code more complete.

To every regiment there was appointed a Chaplain, with an assistant, who was placed under the jurisdiction of the Swedish Ecclesiastical Commissioners, the appointment being in the hands of the Bishop of the Diocese to which the soldiers belonged.

Art. 1 says: “As we see that all our welfare and prosperity proceed from Almighty God, and that it is the first duty of man to serve Him, we deem it incumbent on one and all not to make use in any way of idolatry, witchcraft, or enchantment, by means of devilish incantations of any kind whatever, and if any be convicted of such practices he shall be dealt with according to the Law of God and of Sweden; and in any such case the punishment prescribed by the law shall be inflicted on him; and, furthermore, care is to be taken that this class of malefactor is not allowed to associate with other soldiers.”

It was currently believed that protection was to be gained by means of charms, consisting of ridiculous and senseless formulæ, e.g., “The virtue (*mittel*) of the following words protects you against bullets

striking you :—' Stand in one spot, there no one aims, there art thou safe ' ”<sup>1</sup>

General V. Estorff says that Gustavus Adolphus always sought to excite a feeling of honour in his soldiers. Thus, his 4th Article says : “ Likewise, whosoever during the hours of Divine service shall be found drinking, or in any other evil exercise, shall forfeit half a month's pay to the nearest hospital, and at the next assembly of prayer or preaching shall be brought on his knees before the whole assembly, and there crave pardon of Almighty God, remaining there during the whole time of prayer or preaching.”

For any breach of honour, riding the wooden horse was also introduced, so that the offender was exposed to the gibes of his comrades. Fines were often imposed, and the amount mostly went to benefit the hospitals. Arrest on bread and water came more into use. Punishments were generally more severe than in the older Articles.

The fourth heading treats of “ Fealty, and respect towards the King and Obedience to the Chief Commander, the Generals, and other Superior Officers.” For grave breaches of discipline the punishment of death was imposed. Whoever offered violence to his superior lost his hand and was dismissed the Service. Officers had to answer before a Court-Martial for abuses of military authority, and soldiers who had complaints to make against their Officers for injuries done them, made them before the same tribunal. Art. 48 is directed against unlawful orders. “ If, on the other hand, a soldier be commanded to perform any duty which tends to our hurt, such soldier is not to obey the Officer, whatever order he may give, but is to report the same.” General V. Estorff says that the same order is to be found in the Imperial Articles of 1642 and 1665.

The next headings are “ Of Riots and Drawing the Sword.” “ Of all Kinds of Military Labour.” “ Of Alarms and Guards.” “ Of the Order of March and Alignment.” The following are some of the provisions contained in the Articles : Whoever drew his sword in anger, in the presence of his superior Officer, or of a Court of Justice, when the colours were flying, or in a fortress, was severely punished (according to Ward's Articles—lost both hands). “ The Major who has the chief command in the whole Leaguer is to be obeyed in all that concerns his office by every one, according to his best intelligence.”<sup>2</sup>

It was found necessary to caution the soldiers not to think themselves “ too grand to labour upon any piece of fortification,” as they had been only required by their engagements to construct ordinary entrenchments (*schanzbauern*). “ Whoever is found sleeping on his place of sentinel, whether in a fortress or in entrenchments, or the like, shall be shot to death.” “ Whoever at the sound of drum or trumpet repaireth not to his colours, shall be clapt in irons.”

The headings, 9-13, run thus :—

<sup>1</sup> This is not very clear. The German is, “ Steh' an einim Ort, da niemand hinschuesset ; da bist du sicher.”

<sup>2</sup> According to Ward, the Major was a sort of Quartermaster or Camp Commandant, as, until lately, we have had officials called Town Majors.

"Running from the Field;" "Of Assaults;" "Of Capitulations and Agreements with the Enemy;" "Of the Surrender of Fortresses;" "Of Treason, and of holding Intercourse with, or giving Intelligence to, the Enemy." Single fugitives might, as before, be shot down without question. In the case of cowardice, treason, or mutiny, among whole companies, all were liable to punishment. Thus, Art. 73 says, "They who give over any strength (*i.e.*, stronghold) unto the enemy, unless it be for extremity of hunger, or want of ammunition, the Governor and all the Officers shall die for it; all the soldiers shall be lodged without the leaguers, without any colours, and they shall be made to carry out all the filth of the leaguer; thus to continue until some noble exploit be performed which shall promise pardon for their former cowardice" (Ward's translation).

For any heinous common offence every Officer was to die, and every tenth soldier to be hanged. No traitor was ever again to be received into the ranks.

The following were the headings 14-37:—

"Of Mutiny, Quarrelling, and Fighting" (*balgen*); "Of Rape and Whoring;" "Of Camp and Quarters;" "Of Selling and Pawning Arms, Implements," &c. Art. 82 deals with an offence coming under the last heading. "Whoever flings away his arms, whether in the field or elsewhere, shall be scourged through the quarter, and then be lodged without it; he enforced to make the streets clean, until he redeem himself by doing some worthy exploit."

The duel was forbidden, although Gustavus Adolphus himself fought a duel outside his dominions with a certain Scottish Colonel, named Seaton, whom he had publicly insulted. Gustavus Adolphus established regimental courts of honour to investigate complaints.

Headings 18-19 are, "Of Arson, Robbery, and Theft," "Of the Pillage of Towns, Fortresses, or Places, and of the Booty Found Therein." General V. Estorff observes that the Swedes appear at first to have kept good military discipline, but owing to successes and the contagion of foreign mercenaries soon became infected with the general spirit of license.

The Law of Pillage is described in Art. 96: "When the enemy be assuredly beaten then may the soldiers fall on their own quarters, every man taking what he findeth therein."

Gustavus Adolphus saw the deterioration of discipline in his Army, and complained about it at Nuremberg to his Officers, as follows: "Princes, Counts, Lords, and Gentlemen of Germany, many and grievous complaints have come to my ears how our troops, under your several commands, commit murder, arson, and pillage; how the people complain that their friend the King of Sweden does them more harm than even their enemy Wallenstein; how the Swedes are beginning to make war like Croats. These reproaches cut me to the heart, especially as I know that they are not without foundation." He issued therefore, in 1631, twenty additional Articles, principally dealing with this subject. Billets were ordered to be provided in town by the burgomaster. General V. Estorff says, however, that the

Swedish Army soon became as bad as any other of the time, and quotes the following from an edict given at Erfurth: "Everywhere there is a terrible amount of drinking, outrage, and violence. Nothing is safe, nothing held sacred, nothing remains inviolate; neither order, virtue, nor religion avails anything. Mercy and all thoughts of humanity remain locked in the deepest slumber."

The last headings are: "Of Musters," "Of Discharges," "Of Pay and Wages," "Of the Dismissal and Harboursing of Wrongdoers," "Of the Oath and of the Performance of Duty by All and Every Officer and Soldier of Horse and Foot." The orders relative to the trials at musters, embezzlement, and retention of soldiers' pay reappear. There seems to have been two tribunals, "the General and Supreme Court-Martial," and the Regimental Court.

Thirteen members at least were required; confirmation by the King or his Lieutenant had to follow. Criminal actions had to be decided in the open air "under the blue skies." Trials were conducted in public, and *vivâ voce*.

The fourth heading of the Court-Martial Ordinance treats "Of the Provost-Colonel or Corrector (Gewaltiger) General and of the Regimental Provost." In the last Article (No. 150), it is commanded that the Articles "be read publicly once a month before every regiment, to the end that no man may pretend ignorance." General V. Estorff then goes on to mention other Articles issued before 1656, such as those of Saxony, in 1631; of Augsburg, in 1649; of Wurtemberg, in 1652; and of Brunswick, in 1655. Johan George I of Saxony based his Articles mainly on those of Maximilian, of 1570. The Articles of Saxony contained many orders relative to pay and settlement on discharge, and the Elector was very particular that the "upper armour" which he supplied should be returned on a man's discharge. The Articles of Wurtemberg were issued by Duke Eberhard III to his territorial Militia. The following are some of the provisions contained in them:—Soldiers when dismissed from training were to resubmit themselves to the Civil Power; were always to hold themselves in readiness for service, and were to abstain from extortion; their arms were to be taken care of at the headquarters of the corps, and all deficiencies were to be paid for by the soldier. Deserters were only to be safely secured. "The Deed of Articles of Duke Augustus of Brunswick, Luneberg-Wolffenbittel, dated 21st April, 1655," contained the strictest Penal Code of that time, taken from the Ordinance of the Emperor Charles V, of 1530-32. This Ordinance General V. Estorff says is known in Germany by the name of the "Karoline Articles," and it defines the various modes of punishment.

The first Article deals with capital punishment, which it arranges under the following heads:—Death by burning, by the sword, by the arquebus, by quartering, on the wheel, by drowning, by burying alive, and by empalement!

The second relates to punishment in limb, cutting off the tongue, the finger, the hand, the ears, the nose, putting out the eyes, pinching with red-hot tongs, branding, and scourging! For breaches of

honour the punishment was, riding the wooden horse or ass, and standing in the pillory, besides imprisonment on bread and water, placing in irons, and fines. Absconding delinquents were publicly proclaimed felons, and their names affixed to the gallows. General V. Estorff says that Brandenburg at this period had no military position.

The Elector George William and his Minister Schwarzenberg pursued a fluctuating policy, the former being a brother-in-law of Gustavus Adolphus, and the latter a faithful adherent of the Emperors. Sundry attempts were made to raise a Militia, but owing to the general scarcity of money they had to subsist by begging, and soon dispersed. The following is a specimen of an order directed against these vagabonds, dated 1616: "Among the monstrous swarm of pesterers and oppressors of the poor,<sup>1</sup> there is seldom one, scarcely more than two or three, that have ever served any one in any corps; the rest is a mob of lewd, dissolute rascals, who are absolutely good for nothing," and the inhabitants were authorized to use force against them. "A military Code and troop regulation for the business of territorial defence in Prussia, passed between 1st and 11th January, 1623," was issued to the Territorial Militia lately raised in that country for defence against Poland. It naturally strikes General V. Estorff as strange that it contains the following caution. The Master of the Horse is not "to venture anything rash against such good-for-nothing rascals" as the Poles, which sounds like Dogberry's address to his men! Disobedience, oppression of the inhabitants, disorderly living, are as usual the principal crimes.

The Burgraf V. Dohna writes in 1653 concerning this Militia establishment, "the Militia is commanded by inexperienced Officers; it is badly horsed, badly armed, undrilled, and in such a condition that in case their services are wanted much more confusion than assistance is to be expected." The regiments jointly raised by the Emperor and Brandenburg caused difficulties. The regiments complain in 1641 about insufficient subsistence, and beg for leave of absence in order to obtain their maintenance from the Emperor, since, as they say, "in the service of Brandenburg this is quite impossible, more especially as the Elector has forbidden us to attack the enemy (*i.e.*, the Swedes), and we have therefore no means of getting booty."

#### *2nd Period.—The Articles as a Penal Code.*

##### *Standing Mercenary Armies.*

General V. Estorff next passes to the times when standing Armies first began to be employed, and when the Articles of War became a Penal Code. He says that the experiences of the Thirty Years War had convinced the Great Elector that a State to be powerful

<sup>1</sup> The word is "*pawrenschinder*," which I take to be a compound French and German word, from French *pauvres*.

must have a good army, and that an army to be a good one must be a standing army. Economical causes, he says, also pointed to the same conclusions. In order to bring back prosperity it was necessary to free labour and to create a special military caste. The Great Elector obtained pecuniary resources for his purpose by direct and indirect taxation, and by permitting the nobility, and later on, the towns, to commute personal service for a definite tax. Throughout the Prussian dominions men experienced in war were enrolled, receiving a retaining fee to serve in case of war. Discharged soldiers were invited to settle as military colonists. With a view to protection against Poland, the Elector ordered "that from every twenty resident citizens there shall be provided and appointed a good well-armed man, suitable for war, who, if possible, is to be a soldier that has served" (Ordinance of 1656). Thus, as General V. Estorff observes, the Great Elector laid the foundation of the Prussian military system, although a voluntarily enlisted army has gradually merged into a universal service army. Enlistment could only be carried out by the orders and at the charges of the Elector. Officers were collected in numbers from the Imperial, the Dutch, and the Swedish Armies. The superior Officers were nominated by the Elector, the subordinate ones by the regimental Commanders. The gradation of the Officers was settled by an edict of 1684. A school of cavalry instruction (war school) was founded at Kolberg, in 1653, and the ground prepared for the National "Offizier-Corps" of the present day. The Great Elector issued in 1656, "the Brandenburg-Electoral Law of War or Deed of Articles," and was thus, General V. Estorff says, the original founder of the Brandenburg-Prussian discipline. In these Articles the Maximilian and the Swedish Articles, but especially the latter, served as models.

The first two headings of these articles treat "Of God's Honour and Worship," "Of Divine Service and Preaching." Remains of superstitious belief are still to be found. The General-Auditeur (Judge Advocate-General) Hoyer, who wrote a treatise on the Articles, deals with the subject seriously. He spoke of the difference it made whether an accused person "had made a compact with the Devil, and sold himself of his own free will," or whether he practised witchcraft without any such compact! If "anything suspicious happens on account of the execution of any such abandoned person," the person concerned is only to be banished from the country.<sup>1</sup> General V. Estorff says a later writer, Kanitz, explains "suspicious circumstance" as follows: "The intervention of the Devil or one of his angels to remove from earth by punishment one of his *protégés*<sup>2</sup> (Schützling) by means of a visible hellish apparition." Divine

<sup>1</sup> I confess the meaning is not clear to me. Whether the person who was about to be executed, or whether a bystander who had a demoniacal appearance was to be banished, I do not understand. Kanitz, as quoted by General V. Estorff, does not make it clearer to my mind!

<sup>2</sup> One has often read how French was the fashionable language of the German Court in the days of the Great Elector; and we find all through his Articles and Ordinances numerous French words, written not in German but in ordinary characters



service was to be held twice daily ; no revelling or drinking was permitted among the market people while it lasted.

The third heading treats of "Obedience," and both the arrangement of the Articles and scale of punishment closely follow the Swedish Articles. "Whoever sells or buys stolen goods shall, on proof obtained, have his goods confiscated and forfeited, half to our Treasurer of War, and half to our Staff. Art. 18. "Whoever bares his sword against a superior or inferior Officer with intent to do harm shall be *arquebusiret*." Whoever refused to perform camp fatigue "shall, as opportunity may offer, ride the wooden horse, and be fed for three days on bread and water." On the other hand, soldiers were not to be required to do any "slavish labour." Art. 28 says, "Whoever, when posted as sentinel, goes to sleep, or quits his post before he is relieved, or who drinks so deeply as to be unfit to take his tour as sentinel, shall be *arquebusiret* without mercy."

Excepting as regards the clergy in Art. 5, there are but few regulations about drunkenness and gaming. Concerning the former, the Elector appears to have been a liberal-minded man, though he expresses himself characteristically in pedantic language. The following draft of a cavalry regulation is taken from a manuscript of 1665, in the Prussian Royal Library:—

"Although it would not become us to philosophize too deeply on this account (*i.e.*, drunkenness) concerning the old German race and its descendants, and to quote the Socratic doctrine of moderation, and as we do not wish to scold like some old maid from an exaggerated sense of propriety about a glass or two of wine, and although we may occasionally thoroughly enjoy a drink with a comrade, and like to be merry in the good old German fashion, still such fashion is to be observed with all due moderation, so that at drinking bouts no excess or rioting, or abuse of God's gifts, no loss or obfuscation of senses, conscience or intelligence, no disunion, squabbling or fighting, or a chaotic and bestial habit of life be the result"! Whoever should be found a quarter of a mile (German) away from the line of march was to suffer imprisonment; if over a mile, the punishment was death.

Deserting the colours and treason were the seventh and eighth headings. The Articles said that a runaway in the field, who did not stand by his colours "until the last drop of his blood," forfeited his life, and was to become a prey for the birds of the air. Fortresses were to be held until the last extremity, very much in the terms of preceding Articles. So also as to common punishment of Officers and men in such cases. General V. Estorff says that desertion was not so common at this time as it became later. In Article 50, under Heading 9, it is ordered that, "Whoever gets into a quarrel and asks for seconds, shall suffer in life, and the seconds shall be punished as rebels." The Great Elector seems to have looked upon duelling very much in the same way as Gustavus Adolphus, and mainly sought by his orders on the subject to repress quarrelling, bullying, and discreditable brawls.

Headings 10-14 treat of dissolute life, billeting regulations, care

of arms, robbery, thieving, and pillage. "No horse or foot soldier shall enter or quit any town, except by the proper gates and roads, under pain of life or limb." Loss of arms by selling or neglect was punished by bodily punishment<sup>1</sup> and degradation. Horses and cattle were the principal objects of theft. The inhabitants were not to be deprived of fuel or forced to give drink-money under pain of "passing through the guard." General V. Estorff says that Art. 66 concerning pillage was clearly derived from the times when money was scarce and armies had to subsist by plunder, as it allowed pillage only when the victory was assured. Then only may the soldier "plunder that part of the enemy's camp which has been allotted to him." The evils of the thirty years were still apparent in the orders against straggling;—on the 29th May, 1655, the Elector has heard "with the most serious displeasure of what great *insolentien*, annoyances, and deeds of violence, levies on their way to join, troopers in garrison, and other wandering parties are guilty; wandering from village to village demanding everywhere free entertainment; and how they have the audacity to grumble at what our poor lieges and countrymen are able to spare, taking all they possess, ill-treating them besides and squeezing what money they have out of them; and how they forcibly compel inhabitants and unmarried men to serve as soldiers." As the Elector had provided himself with a standing corps of Officers he was able to make them more effectually responsible for the disorders of the soldiery than had before been possible. So it is said, "Furthermore when Officers show a want of zeal and good will in such matters they shall be held as bad as the wrongdoers, and shall be deprived of their offices and punished like them." The Officers were to see "that an alert patrol goes out nightly to prevent thieving, and to see that no soldier is allowed to remain in any public-house or wander about the streets after tattoo beating." The regulations for musters, discharges, and pay closely resemble those of the Swedish Articles of 1621. Very strict musters had to be taken owing to the loose ideas of honesty produced by a long war, so as to be able to keep the Army in a fit state for service. Hence two or three Commissaries were appointed, whose duty it was to inspect every man and his equipment and see that he was fit for service. They had to see the establishments were complete, and the under-Officers had to swear that every man present actually belonged to the company. The Articles of War were to be read four times a year at the head of every regiment.

Frederick I carried on the organization of the Army on the lines laid down by his father. He established in 1701 a Territorial Militia on the district system, thus giving expression to the axiom that every citizen is naturally bound to defend his fatherland. He settled the seniority of the Officers, and founded cadet schools at Berlin and Magdeburg, thus taking a further step towards creating the corps of Officers. He turned his attention to suppress gambling in an order of 20th July, 1699. "We see with the greatest displeasure that,

<sup>1</sup> Bodily punishment means imprisonment, riding the wooden horse, &c., and not what we understand by corporal punishment.

owing to the constant and excessive gambling which goes on among the soldiers in ale-houses, beer-shops, and other drinking places, much inconvenience and mischief arises, so that it has come to such a pass that too many murders and deadly combats take place." Therefore whenever such things occurred both the soldiers and the landlords were to be punished. General V. Estorff says that the laws against desertion and notices of amnesty for the offence are conspicuous in the statutes of this period. The severity of punishment for the offence continually increased. Thus an edict of 1711 says that in consequence of the frequency of desertion "process is to be commenced within 24 hours, and in place of the capital punishment of hanging, deserters are to be proclaimed felons, the nose and one ear are to be cut off, and they are to be chained to a cart in a fortress, and never pardoned, but those who desert to the enemy are to be forthwith hanged." The change does not, however, seem to have been effectual, for capital punishment was reinstated in 1712.<sup>1</sup> Both the locality and the division of troops to which a deserter belonged were fined. The crime was looked upon as one of "special malice" against authority. Frederick III wrote about it as follows in his "Antimachiavelli": "These people have no more attachment or love for their Sovereign than if they were foreigners. Desertion is rife throughout our armies; it was a crime unknown to the Romans, for they, who fought for their hearths, their household gods, and for all that they held dearest on earth, never thought of frustrating so righteous a purpose by basely deserting them."

Frederick William I deserves great praise for his promotion of army organization and military discipline. By a law of 1713 he forbade emigration, and divided his State into cantons for recruiting purposes. From these cantons the various regiments and companies received a fixed quota of men from those who had already been enrolled who were duly provided with red collars. There were a large number of exemptions, such as wealthy persons, linendrapers, &c. The company Commanders arranged the recruiting business with the local clergy, and made up any deficiencies in their companies by getting foreigners from abroad. Notwithstanding the law of unlimited service, soldiers that were thoroughly trained were granted "King's furlough," and a number were appointed "free watchmen," whose wages the Captain received, and thus obtained money to raise other men. The King changed the permission granted by the Great Elector for commuting personal service into a money payment to a general definite tax. In place of the Territorial Militia he raised territorial regiments, in which everybody who did not belong to the regular Army was liable to serve.

General V. Estorff credits Frederick William I with being the founder of the ideas of obedience and fidelity to duty which now exist in the German Army. In 1713 he issued *fresh Articles*, which were compiled by the Auditeur-General Katsch. These Articles,

<sup>1</sup> I have been reading lately the records of *English Courts-Martial* of this period. Most of them were cases of desertion, and the punishment was usually death, occasionally commuted to corporal punishment of 1,000 lashes!

unlike preceding ones, were only intended for the non-commissioned officers and privates. The Articles of War were public, but the Regulations, Part III of which contained the "orders which are to govern the Officers," were confidential, and only in the possession of the Officers. Such orders were that no reply was permitted on matters of duty; all disputes were forbidden; Captains were to be treated with the greatest respect by their subalterns; if superiors made use of unbecoming expressions to those under their command, no Officer was to attempt to justify himself unless his honour was attacked. Up to this time the regimental Commander had appointed the under-Officers, but Frederick William countersigned every Officer's commission. Although there were separate codes for Officers and men, the general punishment for common misbehaviour was retained. The punishments prescribed for Officers were generally less severe than those of 1656. The orders about Divine service, &c., are the same as before. The King expresses, moreover, his belief that "a man who does not fear God can hardly serve his King faithfully, or pay proper obedience to his superiors." Desertion, however, was sternly dealt with. Art. 19 said, "Any soldier that runs away from his colours in violation of his oath, either on the march, in the field, the camp or garrison, shall when retaken be put to death without mercy on the gallows; no excuse shall be allowed for him, whether he has been forcibly impressed into the Service, or whether he has been seduced to desert by another, or whether his desertion is his first, second, or third offence of the kind, in every case he is to be hung without mercy."

According to edicts of 1713 and 1723, "The night before the troops are to march, the landlord of the house must sit up and watch, and on no account allow the soldiers billeted in his house to leave it;" and for any default in this way he was to take the place of the deserter until he was recaptured, or until he himself provided a suitable substitute. Whoever was found a quarter of an hour's march in rear of or to the flank of the column, and had the appearance of deserting, and could show no permission or assign any honest motive, was to be punished as a deserter in life or limb (Art. 17). Art. 31 of 1656 had mentioned a quarter of an hour or a whole mile from the division. In the instructions for the chiefs and commanders of five infantry regiments who were ordered to take the field in 1734, it said that every regiment is to take from the enemy all the deserters it can get, and use them for fatigue.

There is no longer any mention of immediately killing runaways in action, but they are to be subsequently executed by musketry. The Soldier King, as General V. Estorff calls him, insisted upon unhesitating obedience. Thus Art. 7 says, "Any soldier that disobeys either a superior or an under-Officer of the body to which he belongs, either by words or by arguing, shall, according to his rank and the circumstances of his offence, be punished by running the gauntlet thirty times. But whosoever wholly unsheaths his sword or draws any other weapon shall be '*arquebusiet*.'" The Regulations of 1726 went further: "A man that answers only a single word when on duty

shall be immediately placed in arrest." But if a soldier had any complaint to make, he was immediately to make his report to an Officer. "Men who wilfully presume to provoke and challenge others to fight," were, if fatal consequences ensued, to be hanged for it, and in case of wounding must be punished with hard labour for life in a fortress, or with some other severe bodily punishment. Frederick III had, in 1688, issued an order about duelling, which was extended by Frederick William I in 1713. He expressed himself very strongly about "such audacious duels," but in this order he excepted cases of self-defence and questions involving a soldier's honour, saying: "Since it is not intended by these orders that the point of honour should be neglected, and as our Officers ought not to be excluded from the intercourse and society of other persons of honour and reputation." Outside Prussia, however, his Officers were to avoid such intercourse as much as possible. "But if, as may not infrequently occur, they are attacked in their honour by foreigners who are not our subjects and vassals, without our dominions by means of excessive banter (*kitzel*) and license, and get into duels with them, in such cases the offender in the like unavoidable rencontres and duels shall not be considered a duellist; if, however, fatal consequences ensue—*pro ratione delicti*—he shall be equitably punished by the Common Law, since we can never altogether pardon the shedding of human blood, but we shall leave the matter to be decided by the Law." Inside Prussia, the King punished both challenger and challenged in the severest manner. Gambling was punished by running the gauntlet. "Whoever absents himself from his guard, or comes drunk thereto so that he cannot perform his duty as sentinel shall be punished by running the gauntlet" (Art. 14). Marriage contracted without permission was declared "null and void;" the man was punished by running the gauntlet, and the woman sent to the *spinnhaus*.<sup>1</sup> In the event, however, of the marriage having been performed by a priest, "the prescribed punishment shall be doubled"! Unauthorized contracting of debts was punished more or less severely in proportion to the amount of the debt.

In 1719, the King had to issue orders to prevent the ill-treatment of citizens who were threatened "with cudgelling, laying under the sweating-bench (?), and similar bad 'treatment,'" and also against thieving, which had increased in certain garrisons.

In 1724, Frederick William I issued fresh Articles of War with the following preamble:—Whereas he had "heard with the greatest displeasure how some soldiers of the Army have lately failed to obey the Articles of War in various matters, wickedly asserting their ignorance of them, although they were sworn on them and have had them read to them individually, We therefore, His Most Gracious Majesty, in order to prevent desertion and other crimes which are in breach of the duties and obligations of a soldier, as well as to prevent any excuse of ignorance, do most graciously command and

<sup>1</sup> We have lately been reminded of this old word by the incident of a woman at Cambridge being committed to the University female house of correction called the "spinning-house."

direct that in future the Articles of War be carefully read to the under-Officers and soldiers in every company."

Art. 19 deals with the crime of "abetting desertions," and declares that it is the duty of everyone to report such offence under pain of himself being treated as a deserter. A similar duty devolved on all that observed "suspicious plotting." Sentries were to be considered as superior Officers in cases of assault or resistance.

Drunkenness was to be considered an aggravation of an offence.

Debt was treated in a special law of 1726, which says, "No Subaltern Officer is to owe more than 8 thalers," under pain of "stopping (*sitzen*) in the Main Guard," and doing his duty as well, until the debt was paid! Whoever lent money to soldiers "not only shall not be paid, but shall be further punished." General V. Estorff says that the discipline established by Frederick William I shone brightly during the wars of Frederick the Great. Frederick II left his father's Army Regulations substantially unaltered. In 1763, he enlarged the existing company cantons into regimental ones, in which the recruiting was conducted by a mixed civil and military Commission. Foreign enlistment had naturally ceased during his campaigns, but was again opened after the peace of Hubertsburg, so that the burden of raising men was much lightened in order to permit the Kingdom to recover itself after the ravages of the Seven Years War.

The King, General V. Estorff says, laboured hard for the intellectual advancement of his Officers. He furnished the War School (now the War Academy) at Berlin, and raised what had been the trade of war to the position of a science. He gradually freed himself from the business of Military Justice, and a little later the Auditeur-General was no longer required to make an immediate report to him, and at the same time he increased the powers of the Commanders. The Articles were revised in 1749, and in them still greater stress was laid on religious observances. In 1750, he directed the Lutheran Consistory to look after the preachers, and see that God's Word, pure and simple, was preached by them. Desertion was as rife as ever, notwithstanding the numerous orders on the subject. Death was the punishment for all concerned. Whoever allowed a prisoner to escape or concealed one had to run the gauntlet.

Fraudulent enlisters were to be treated as deserters.

In his instructions, issued in 1748 and 1759, for Major-Generals of infantry, he notifies that "Officers are not to gamble, nor to quit their brigades without leave; the soldiers (*bursche*) are not to wander beyond the lines of their regiments or battalions, as such only results in disorder." The following is rather characteristic: "The Generals are not to ride in front of their brigades dreaming, as used to be their habit," but "are to take every imaginable precaution against desertion, particularly when marching through defiles or forests;" and they are to see that "their troops are not in want of any thing necessary, such as bread, meat, brandy, or the like." The Generals were also to "maintain strict order, and a '*rigoureuse*' discipline, which things are the souls of duty," and must, "without

favour, overlook nothing, and exact the uttermost, from the highest Staff Officer to the humblest musqueteer." According to the orders of 1743, whoever disobeys "shall, without hope of pardon, be *arquebusiret*." By Art 35, whoever resisted running the gauntlet<sup>1</sup> was first to undergo his punishment, and then be tried by Court-Martial for his resistance. General V. Estorff says that, owing to the waste of war, the King found a difficulty in maintaining usual high levels among his Officers, and so he writes to Major-General Krusemark, "We send you all the Officers we can get to complete the battalion, foreigners and such as we can scrape together, *greti und pleiti*;<sup>2</sup> since it is not possible to send you any from the regiments here, as we want both Officers and men." The following is an extract from an order of 1743: "If an Officer is insulted by any superior or Staff Officer, or threatened by such with the stick so as to apprehend being pushed or struck, then must the injured Officer, if he be on duty, remain quiet." He might, however, subsequently demand satisfaction. But if only hard words were used to him, and he demanded satisfaction, he was liable to eight years detention<sup>3</sup> in a fortress; if he had drawn his sword, he was liable to detention for life; whilst if he had wounded any one, he was to be "*arquebusiret*;" and if his offence was further aggravated by his being on duty, he was to be beheaded (*decolliret*). Superiors were to avoid arguing with tipsy subordinates. For self-mutilation or attempt at suicide, the penalty was banishment from the fortress and from the Kingdom, "according to the degree of his wickedness." General V. Estorff observes that these crimes must have been frequent, judging from the detail with which they were treated. Coiners were punished with the gauntlet and fortress imprisonment; incendiaries with death. The Articles of 1636 had provided for the case of Officers lending money to soldiers, and the converse was now dealt with. "If an under-Officer or private lend a superior Officer money, the under-Officer shall be degraded, and the private run the gauntlet 200 times." It has already been explained that the penalties prescribed for Officers were embodied in the Regulations. The following is an extract from the Regulations of 1743. Officers are not "to begin any excesses, are not to ill-treat their landlords or the citizens, but are to subsist on their pay; and all the Officers are to be told that His Majesty the King is firmly of opinion that no Officer can be respected by his company if he is not a good master." Lieutenants and Ensigns who were bad masters should never get command of companies. With reference to camaraderie, the Regulations of 1743 directs that the senior Officers are to educate the junior Officers and non-commissioned officers. "In order to prevent all irregular and

<sup>1</sup> Running the gauntlet. There are two words for this in the original—" *spieß-laußen* " and " *riemenlaußen* ." In the first case an infantry soldier ran down the ranks and was beaten with pike-staves or sticks, and in the second a cavalry soldier was thrashed with stirrup leathers. Gauntlet was written originally " *gatelope* ," then " *gantelope* ," and was derived from the Swedish *gata*, a street, and *lopp*, a course.

<sup>2</sup> I cannot interpret this expression of the Great Frederick. Is it a way of expressing " *grand et petit* " ?



wicked kind of living among the Officers, the seniors are to invite the juniors" into their society, "to associate with them in a proper manner, and often to converse with them." This seems to have been carried too far, for the King writes, under date of December, 1744, to Colonel V. Schwerin, saying, "You are particularly to cease for the future from familiar intercourse with Subaltern Officers;" and he requests that greater strictness may be observed by the seniors towards the juniors. Art. 47 ordered, in cases where there was not sufficient evidence to convict an accused, but where the case was very suspicious, "no strong measures are to be used to obtain evidence" (probably meaning that he was not to be tortured), "but he is to be sent to perform moderate manual labour in a fortress." Certain points were treated in Addenda, such as saluting, guard duties, and the demeanour of individual soldiers. A sentinel was not to go more than 10 paces from his post, and "as soon as it is dark, call out 'Who comes there?' whenever the clock strikes." "When a soldier has arms in his hands, he is to uncover to no one, not even the King himself." The following order, which had been accidentally omitted in the preceding Articles, was inserted: "When a soldier who is a foreigner deserts to the enemy and is afterwards retaken with arms in his hands, he shall be punished by running the gauntlet thirty times between 200 men and by detention in a fortress for a fixed term; but if he is a native subject, and is taken with arms in his hands against us, he shall be forthwith hanged." There were orders for the protection of the soldiers against their superiors. "No Officer is to permit himself to strike a soldier in the face with his fist, or to ill-use him by striking him on the shins or thighs with a stick, or by using any improper punishments or expressions." For a second offence of the kind, an Officer was to be sent to a fortress, and for a third to be cashiered.

General V. Estorff says that Frederick William II had the best intentions, but wanted the necessary energy to prevent his Army becoming antiquated. In his new order as to cantons, given in 1792, he proclaimed the real basis of national defence. "No one is exempt from the duty of defending the State whose protection he enjoys."<sup>1</sup> Exemptions from service, however, became more frequent than ever. The life-long liability to service was changed to twenty years, the District Regimental formation was suspended, and the increase of the Army failed to keep pace with the growth of the State. In 1787, Frederick William II issued fresh Articles, which General V. Estorff says included, and closely resembled, the Articles of 1713, 1749, and 1764, but more clearly explained the soldier's obligations, and prescribed milder punishments, whilst at the same time they promised rewards for good service. A confidential regulation was added for

<sup>1</sup> It is somewhat remarkable that the English hold themselves up to the world as an exceedingly free and magnanimous people, and put forward as a proof of it, the fact that no man is compelled to serve his country as a soldier or a sailor except by his own free will. The result is that the rich, who have the greatest interest in the freedom and prosperity of the country, pay those whose necessities alone compel them to do so to undertake what is the duty of all.

Officers. The following preamble explains the fresh issue:—The King has “caused former Articles to be revised and altered according to the circumstance of the present time, so as to bring them into conformity with the existing organization of the Army.” Art. 16 defined desertion. He was to be considered “as a deserter who is to undergo the aforesaid punishment, who, with intent to abscond, is either captured or found without the walls or limits of his place of garrison.” Soldiers who made any reply were at once to be confined, and sent before a Summary Court-Martial (*Standricht*). “Such summary proceedings,” said the Regulations of 1788, “make a strong impression on the private soldiers; no excuses are ever to be allowed, nor is the arguer ever to be excused because he is a fine soldier or on account of his youth.” In the explanation accompanying the Articles the King says he trusts that superior Officers will not incite their inferiors to acts of insubordination “by tyrannical or brutal treatment.” He had already expressed himself to the Inspector-Generals on this matter in a Circular Order of 17th July, 1787: “Such a condition of affairs cannot fail to be very prejudicial to the good name of the Prussian Army; that the treatment of the private soldier has here and there degenerated into excessive severity, offensive to human feeling, and the result will be that truth will be abandoned by honourable men, and replaced by sordid, lucre-seeking false statements.” Art. 9 speaks of the soldier’s duty more strictly than ever: “From tattoo beating until reveillée, every soldier, if he is not on duty, or has not permission from his superior Officer to stop anywhere else, must be in his quarter or tent.” When a soldier was guilty of an offence, if there was apparent an “intention of committing any other offence,” the punishment of running the gauntlet was to be doubled. Art. 10 says, “Whoever is drunk on duty shall be punished with 6, 8, up to 10 times running the gauntlet.” Art. 34, however, says: “If the soldier can clearly prove that his drunkenness is quite accidental, and that he himself is not in the least degree to be blamed for it, then, according to circumstances, there may be a mitigation of punishment.” This provision must have afforded a considerable loophole for thirsty souls! Later on (1788), a regulation observed that drunkenness off duty was to be considered as a failing only to be reprobated in culprits of moderate rank! Attempts at suicide “from melancholy or depression” had come to be viewed more leniently. Thieves were not only to be punished (probably with the gauntlet), “but, according to the nature and degree of the offence, by banishment from the kingdom, or by hard labour for life in a fortress, lest such dissolute scoundrels should re-enlist in any regiment.” General V. Estorff says that duelling had by this time been brought within proper bounds, and no longer required such sharp penalties to restrain it. Thus, in the explanation to these Articles, it was said, “If, when a duel has taken place, the offender has not been brought into the scrape from inclination for such business, nor from malice, but, rather, owing to the unseemly or insulting behaviour of the slain person,” in lieu of capital punishment, he was to “suffer bodily punishment proportionate to the circumstances of

his offence." Civil offences were to be dealt with by the civil laws.

It is interesting to learn that running the gauntlet twelve times was equivalent to six months' imprisonment in a fortress. Under-Officers were reduced, in place of running the gauntlet from six to ten times; and, if any graver punishment had to be added to reduction, they were treated like privates. The punishment of running the gauntlet was regulated by the following instructions:—Care was to be taken "that in consequence of such punishment the soldier is not rendered unfit for service, more especially that it does not cause death." Summary Courts-Martial could only award running the gauntlet up to twenty times. All sentences of capital punishment or imprisonment in a fortress had to go to the King for confirmation; other sentences were confirmed by the Chiefs or Commanders. This was the period, General V. Estorff observes, when rewards for good service were first instituted, and when the military authorities first became impressed with the idea that more could be got out of the soldier by working on his feelings of honour than by continually scolding him, and making him run the gauntlet.

The last Articles of War issued by Frederick William II are dated 1797, and differed little from those of 1787. The offence of drunkenness was treated in greater detail; incorrigible foreigners and thieves were to be branded W (?) and banished. If a soldier who possessed a medal granted for exemplary conduct on active service were convicted, the loss of the medal was to be considered equivalent to running the gauntlet thirty times.

#### *Period of General Service.*

General V. Estorff next passes to the Articles of War of the present century, during which universal liability to defensive military service has been the law. Frederick William III caused the existing Code to be examined by a Commission, but the task was interrupted by the mobilization of 1806. King Frederick William III issued fresh Articles of War to his Army in 1808. The main difference in these, General V. Estorff says, lay in the punishments prescribed being much milder. In "the order relating to military punishments," attached to the Articles, it was said: "As the general military conscription will have the effect of placing in the ranks, as private soldiers, young men of good education and high feelings of honour, it may be confidently expected that not only will they themselves willingly follow the example of their superiors, and, by careful study, easily master their military duties, but that they will also present to their comrades who come from less educated ranks an example of rational obedience and of the proper application of powers and abilities, and that by such means, with proper management, good order and discipline may be maintained in the Army. His Majesty looks to the Officers always to realize their honourable vocation of being the educators and guides of a considerable part of the nation." Thus, as General V. Estorff observes, the Prussian Army became a school and educational establishment.

"Running the gauntlet," a legacy from the "Law of the Long lance" of the Men-at-Arms, was now limited to soldiers who had been disrated to the newly introduced grade of the 2nd class. The various kinds of imprisonment remained unaltered, except that the limit of "severe arrest" was extended up to six weeks, and that the prisoner had to lie on plank beds. In cases of dishonourable crimes, the offender was deprived of the right of bearing the national military cockade, which could only be restored by the King himself. This, General V. Estorff says, is the rule at the present day. Hard labour in a fortress corresponded to the present fortress imprisonment. Prisoners sentenced to labour in the construction of fortresses had to perform heavy tasks in chains, and wore a convict dress, a punishment corresponding to the present German military imprisonment. Under-Officers were punished by reduction, Officers by arrest in the Officers' arrest room. In cases of any special neglect on the part of an Officer, a majority of the corps of Officers, acting as a court of honour, could exclude him from time to time from promotion. The references to religion disappear from the Articles, although the troops had to attend Divine service as a part of their duty, as before. The Officer's career was opened to all educated persons, and its only requirement was an educational examination, and selection by the corps of Officers. The 2nd Article adds that persons who have specially distinguished themselves may, "according to the extent of their abilities and knowledge—without consideration as to birth—look for advancement as Officers, even up to the highest rank." The punishment regulations in the Code distinguished between offences committed on or off duty. Ordinary offences had formerly been dealt with by the civil law, but now the crimes of the civil law were embodied in the Code. General V. Estorff says that perhaps Art. 17, which prescribes a severer penalty to cowardice, may be traced to the melancholy experiences of 1806. "As to this, no consideration shall be paid to the excuse of a soldier that he is a scout (? *marode*), or fatigued, for such imaginary or pretended fatigue is only used as a cloak for cowardice."

General V. Estorff says that appeals to honour may sometimes verge on absurdity, as was shown by the order that funklers (? *schill leute*) who had proved themselves cowards were stripped of their uniforms, and provided with women's caps and aprons, and had to ply for a whole hour a spinning-wheel in front of the troops. The system of prolonging the service of deserters beyond the regular term was introduced, and they were deprived of the national cockade. In 1713, the plan of attaching the names of deserters to the gallows had been abandoned, but it was re-introduced.<sup>1</sup> Men who purposely maimed themselves were declared incapable of serving the State, of acquiring real property, or of obtaining a citizen's rights. Particular regard was paid to the maintenance of the feeling of honour. Soldiers, as a

<sup>1</sup> It used to be customary, and it may be the rule now, in England to attach the names of deserters to the church doors in the parishes to which they belonged. The Regulations provided that one of the deserter reports should be sent to the churchwardens for this purpose.

rule, could not be fined, or suffer bodily chastisement or imprisonment, unless they had been reduced to the 2nd class. The means used for self-defence must be proportionate to the injury sought to be averted. In a third instance of theft, a soldier was to suffer "severer cudgelling and imprisonment until he shall have amended his ways, and given satisfactory proof that he knows how to deserve honourable treatment." In 1809 a short addendum was issued, which said that drunkenness was not to be considered in mitigation of punishment, and that Commanding Officers were to make known, by beat of drum or sound of trumpet, when the orders laid down for active service were to be applied in peace. General V. Estorff says that the Campaigns of 1813 and 1814 proved for Prussia the stern reality of universal service, and led to the organization of the Landwehr and Landsturm. From this time the period of service was three years with the colours, and recruiting was managed generally as at the present day.

As military discipline became better established, the King found himself able to relax punishment. He said: "I feel confident that the troops will find in this recognition of their good behaviour an incentive to show themselves still more worthy of it." General V. Estorff says that, owing to the low peace establishment, the growth of population, and the scanty revenues of the State, it was found impossible to pass many men through the ranks of the Army Training School, and the Landwehr Recruits received a still shorter training. The period of army training was reduced to two years to supplement in some degree the deficiencies of the Landwehr, which General V. Estorff says was prejudicial to the Army. He quotes a contemporary account given by Auditor-General Frickius of the state of things about the year 1840, which shows that the Army had become somewhat rusty. Frederick William IV took over the Army in this rusty condition, and in 1843 issued a Supreme Cabinet Order to the effect that he has heard with displeasure that the soldiers are ill-treated by the Officers and non-commissioned officers in a way that was quite contrary to the profession of a soldier, forbidden by the laws, and opposed to his wishes. He issued penal regulations in 1841 and fresh Articles in 1844. In the former, stress was again laid on the feeling of honour. Care was to be taken that a minor punishment was not to injure a man's feeling of honour. Corporal chastisement was never to be carried out in the view of the public, and if doubts existed as to a man's capability of enduring it, they were to be decided by medical examination.

General V. Estorff says that the Articles of 1844 were much more clearly drawn than their predecessors, and present an unmistakable resemblance to those of 1872 which are now in use, the punishments, however, being somewhat more severe. The following treats of desertion: "Whoever deserts in time of peace is to receive from 6 months to 2 years' imprisonment in a fortress, on the second occasion from 2 to 4 years, and for the third offence is to be discharged from his position as a soldier, and to undergo from 10 to 15 years' convict labour." The order confiscating the property of a deserter

was cancelled in 1850. Art. 20 says, "Whoever, in action with the enemy, first takes to flight from cowardice or induces his comrades by words or signs to fly, has earned the punishment of death, and may be killed on the spot." General V. Estorff regrets that this order is not directly given in their present Articles, but only referred to in connection with the enforcement of obedience. Losing arms and equipment was more severely punished. In such a case, it was said the soldier "commits a breach of trust with regard to his arms, his horse or its fodder, or when damage is caused by malice." The Articles of 1844 made a distinction whether an offence was committed in peace or in war, whilst the Articles of 1851 made a further distinction in the case of war, whether the offence were committed "in the field" or "before the enemy."

Injunctions against dissolute living still find a place in the Articles. Art. 46, "Whoever leads a dissolute life, loses his power and ability to fulfil the duties of his calling." Art. 48 treats of drunkenness. "Drunkenness off duty is, as a rule, to be disciplinarily punished with arrest. But whoever comes on duty drunk, or gets drunk after he has been detailed for duty, and has thereby rendered himself unfit for duty, shall be punished as severely as he who gets drunk on duty with severe arrest up to six weeks." According to § 151 of the present Military Penal Code, the punishment is military imprisonment or fortress imprisonment up to one year. Unauthorized marriage was still punished, but the marriage was no longer declared void.

#### *Duty.*

General V. Estorff then reviews military legislation since 1848, and says that the Articles of War became a manual of duties, existing side by side with a Penal Code for their enforcement.

He says that if the revolutionary year of 1848 demonstrated the devotion and discipline of the Prussian Army, it also disclosed not a few defects in organization. Measures were therefore adopted to improve the Landwehr, such as more closely connecting them with the line regiments, whilst the three years service with the colours was re-established. In 1850, Prussia received a Constitution which declared the liability of everyone to defensive military service, the nature and extent of which was declared by the law. In 1851, a General Penal Code replaced the Military Penal Code of 1845, and amended Articles of War were issued in 1852.

General V. Estorff says that, although military punishments were included in the Penal Code, they were in some cases mitigated or increased by provisions in the Articles of War which were, generally speaking, confined to enunciating the soldier's obligations. By the Order of 1848 and the Law of 1852, corporal punishment was abolished as a judicial punishment. The experiences of 1848 caused the introduction of new Articles on "Sedition." Art. 20 defines military sedition in much the same terms as the present German Law on the subject, except that the number of persons required to complete the offence was three instead of two as at present. Art. 21 declared that

no soldier, on or off duty, was permitted "to criticise with others existing military arrangements, orders or regulations, or to take part in meetings or assemblies which are antagonistic to the Sovereignty of H.M. the King, his realm or to his properly constituted authority." And Art. 22 says, "Whoever, with arms in his hands, takes part in a tumult within the realm, shall suffer the same punishment as he who takes part in military sedition." General V. Estorff says that at this period, although universal liability to service was the law, its existence as a fact was threatened by excessive parsimony. The Prince Regent of Prussia (the late Emperor William) thoroughly reorganized the Army in 1859—60, and largely increased it so effectively that by its aid he was able to gain the brilliant triumphs of 1864, 1870—71, and to accomplish the reconstruction of the German Empire.

On the 1st January, 1872, the Penal Code for the whole German Empire came into force, and was followed by the Military Penal Code which made necessary a revision of the Articles of War.

The Emperor William issued accordingly the Articles now in force on the 31st October, 1872. Bavaria and Wurtemberg followed suit with Articles which are word for word the same as the Emperor's. General V. Estorff repeats that the Articles of War in their present form are essentially a Manual of the soldier's duties, although in places they prescribe punishment. In no cases are Courts-Martial to consider the Articles as the basis of Military Law or to take their punishment from them.<sup>1</sup>

The last remnant of corporal punishment was swept away by the new disciplinary punishment regulations. By these, convict labour in a fortress and "latten-arrest" were replaced by minor fortress punishments and the longest term of strict arrest was reduced to four weeks.<sup>2</sup> The Articles now embrace the Officers as well as the non-commissioned officers and men, as they had formerly done in 1656. General V. Estorff concludes his pamphlet with a short *résumé* of the salient points in the various articles to which he has alluded. Maximilian's Articles and those of Frederick William I, short and sharp in form, and in expression clear and comprehensible to all classes of the Army, at the same time asserting the religious basis of all human obligations. Fidelity to duty coupled with religion—the chief points of the Articles of Gustavus Adolphus and the Great Elector. Courage was the chief requirement of the Articles of the men-at-arms, whilst unquestioning obedience was that of the Articles of Wallenstein and Frederick William I, whilst the Articles of the present century lay most stress on honourable conduct and camaraderie. The Articles of War, General V. Estorff says, are no longer replete with threats of punishment nor overlaid with antiquated legal forms, but are permeated with a fresher and brighter spirit calculated to animate the recruit, and revivify the old soldier, should he be recalled to service with the colours.

<sup>1</sup> In the same way that with us a Court-Martial cannot award the summary punishments prescribed for offences in the Queen's Regulations.

<sup>2</sup> "Latten" were lath floors to the cells, or narrow boards set with intervals, so that the prisoner could not stand or lie down with comfort on them.



*The Administration of Military Law in Germany.*

It has already been shown by General V. Estorff's account of the origin and development of the Prussian Military Code, that the discipline of the German Army is maintained by the Military Penal Code of 1872 and its corresponding disciplinary punishment regulations. Although Bavaria and Wurtemberg have adopted the Code of Military Law passed by the German Reichstag, they have preferred to retain, for the present at least, their own method of procedure. It is probable, however, that in course of time, the procedure of the whole Empire will be the same, and I shall therefore confine myself to an account of the Prussian system.

In order to provide for the proper administration of military justice, there exists a Military Department called the Auditoriat, corresponding to the Judge Advocate-General's Department in our Service, but on a much larger scale and charged with far more extensive duties. The Auditoriat-General has its headquarters in Berlin, but one or more Officers of the department who are called Auditeurs are attached to each Army Corps, Division or Garrison of the German Army. These Auditeurs are civil officials attached to the Army who have been trained for the purpose and have taken degrees in law.

There are two classes of Courts-Martial; Superior Courts called *Kriegsgerichte*, corresponding to our General Courts-Martial, and Inferior Courts called *Standgerichte*, corresponding to our Regimental Courts-Martial. There are also courts called *Instanzengerichte*, which are assembled for the trial of non-combatant officials of the Army. These *Instanzengerichte* may be either Superior or Inferior Courts, and are rather a variety of the *Kriegsgerichte* and *Standgerichte* than distinct forms. It may be here mentioned that medical Officers are treated as combatant Officers for disciplinary purposes in the German Army.

The *Kriegsgericht* has jurisdiction over all combatant Officers, non-commissioned Officers and men of the Army, and can award the maximum punishments authorized by the law. It is a sworn court, and may be assembled by the Commanding Officers of Army Corps, Divisions and certain large Garrisons. The *Standgericht*, which is not a sworn court, may be assembled by the Commanding Officer of any regiment or garrison. It can try all non-commissioned officers not above the rank of sergeants and privates. It can reduce non-commissioned officers, degrade soldiers from the 1st to 2nd class, and award arrest up to six weeks. Every offence that is not summarily dealt with, is made the subject of a Court of Enquiry (*Untersuchungsgericht*). If it is such as would ultimately be brought before an inferior court, the enquiry is conducted by a military Officer (*Enqueteur*) appointed to the office by the Regimental Chief for a period of six months. In other cases beyond the regimental jurisdiction, the General or other Officer Commanding orders the preliminary enquiry to be made by an Auditeur and two Officers whose rank varies according to the position of the accused.

The enquiry then takes place, and in private. It does not appear

that the members are sworn. The prisoner being present, the witnesses are examined, and their evidence is taken down, after which it is read to them, and they are then sworn as to its correctness. In certain cases the prisoner is allowed legal assistance, and in all cases he is permitted to make his defence, but it does not appear whether he is free to cross-examine the witnesses or not. The court expresses no opinion on the matter before it, but the proceedings are submitted to the Commanding Officer, who decides, with the help of the Auditeur who has assisted at the enquiry, as to further proceedings.

If a Court-Martial follows it may either be the *Kriegsgericht* or the *Standgericht*. Every Court-Martial is composed of members taken from five different ranks from Generals down to privates, according to the rank of the accused. The *Kriegsgericht* has 11 members, the *Standgericht* 9. Thus for the trial of a private a *Kriegsgericht* would have a Major, president; members :—2 Captains; 3 Lieutenants; 3 under-Officers; 3 lance-corporals or privates. A *Standgericht* would have 9 members of five classes.

For the trial of a Captain, a *Kriegsgericht* would have a Colonel, president; members :—2 Lieutenant-Colonels; 2 Majors; 2 Captains; 2 First Lieutenants.

If the punishment applicable to the offence of the accused is death or imprisonment for life there are three members of each class.

When a Court-Martial is assembled the Auditeur, or in the lower Court the Officer charged with the preliminary enquiry, informs the Court, the prisoner being present, of the object for which it is assembled. The prisoner has the power of objecting to any of the members for just cause. The Court is then, if a *Kriegsgericht*, duly sworn, after which the Auditeur or Officer reads the history of the case as taken down at the preliminary enquiry. It does not appear that any witnesses appear before the Court, and the Court is not what we call an open one. The accused is then called on to make his defence, after which he is removed, and then the Auditeur sums up, either verbally or in writing, the case, and informs the Court of all the laws bearing on the prisoner's offence, and expresses his opinion as to whether the prisoner ought to be convicted or acquitted. The president then directs the members to separate and deliberate by classes. Each class has a single vote. In case of equality in the individual votes of a class, the vote is given in favour of the prisoner. The vote comprehends in case of conviction the amount of punishment. If it differs from the conclusions of the Auditeur presented to the Court the reasons are attached. The votes of the several classes are received by the Auditeur in presence of the president, and entered on the record. If the vote of any class is contrary to law, and is adhered to, the Auditeur is bound to take it, and at the same time to record the reasons given for it. The classes deliver their votes in succession, beginning with the lowest. The result of the voting is announced by the Auditeur, entered on the record, and signed by himself and the president. What is called the judgment seems to be a separate document, which is prepared by the Auditeur, signed and

sealed by all the members of the rank of Officer, and finally by the Auditeur.

No judgment is legal until it has been confirmed by superior authority, and before confirmation it is examined by the Auditoriat. If considered illegal by the local Auditoriat it is sent for examination to the Auditoriat-General, and if it is again pronounced illegal it is laid before the Emperor, who if he pleases orders the case to be tried again by a Court wholly composed of fresh members. The Emperor reserves confirmation in cases of death or imprisonment for life, in all Officers' cases, in any case where an Ensign (*Portepesführer*, who is not an Officer) has been reduced, and in cases where non-commissioned officers or privates have been sentenced for a military offence to more than ten years' imprisonment.

The confirming Officer at the time of confirmation has power to mitigate but not to commute nor wholly remit the sentence, neither has he power to reduce the sentence below the legal minimum attached to the offence. In no case can he increase the punishment. After confirmation the judgment is read to the prisoner by the Auditeur (or Officer) in the presence of the members of the preliminary Court, after which the General or other Officer commanding causes the sentence to be at once carried out.

The records of the judgments of lower Courts are forwarded every three months to the local Auditoriat for examination. In cases where a soldier and a civilian have committed an offence together, the preliminary enquiry is made by a mixed tribunal composed of Officers and civilians. There is a limited right of appeal against the judgments of Courts-Martial in cases where fresh evidence of innocence is forthcoming, or where the condemned asserts that the judgment against him was based on forged documents or suborned witnesses. In the former case, a *précis* of the additional evidence is forwarded to the Auditoriat General, who makes his report to the Emperor. If there is good ground for reopening the case the Emperor orders a fresh trial. In the latter case, if the Auditoriat reports that an illegality has been committed the judgment is quashed. As the proviso adopted in Germany is somewhat long and circuitous, and not well adapted for use on active service, an Act of 1867 provides that if the charge against a prisoner is simple and the witnesses forthcoming, the Court itself may conduct the preliminary enquiry and pronounce judgment.

In addition to the Courts already described there are Courts of Honour (*Ehrengerichte*) for the Officers, who consider whether the conduct of any particular Officer has been such as to bring discredit on the whole "Offizier corps."

The following points of difference strike one between the German and the English systems:—

1st. The trial consists of two parts, the examination of witnesses by the preliminary Court, and the judgment passed by the Court-Martial on the facts which have been previously elicited. It does not appear whether the Court-Martial proper can call witnesses before it, and re-examine them.

2nd. At both the preliminary enquiry and at the subsequent Court-Martial the military members are almost entirely in the hands of the Auditeur, who advises as to the innocence or guilt of the accused.

3rd. Although the prisoner may defend himself, or in some cases have counsel to defend him, there is no mention of his having power to cross-examine witnesses.

4th. The Courts are closed Courts.

For many years military reformers in Germany have sought to make Courts-Martial open Courts, and to have the evidence taken verbally before them, but the Military Authorities have up to the present time, as far as can be ascertained, hesitated to make the change.

#### *Punishments.*

1. Death in the case of military offences by shooting; in the case of civil offences by beheading.

#### *Punishments involving Loss of Liberty.*

2. Penal servitude (*zuchthaus*) for life or for any fixed term not less than 1 year or exceeding 15 years.

3. Imprisonment (*Gefängniss*) for life or for any term not exceeding 15 years.

4. Detention in a fortress (*festungshaft*) for life or for any term not exceeding 15 years. This punishment involves simple loss of liberty.

5. Arrests from 1 day up to 4 weeks—of five kinds:—

(a.) Officer's arrest (*stuben arrest*) may be either "simple" or "strict." In the former case the Officer is confined to his quarters. In the latter he is confined in the Officers' arrest room. The superior Officers are not liable to strict arrest.

(b.) Confinement to barracks as in the English Army. Applicable to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

(c.) Simple arrest (*gelinde arrest*). Applicable to all non-commissioned officers and men—undergone in separate cells.

(d.) Middle arrest (*mittlerer arrest*). Applicable to non-commissioned officers, without swordknot, and privates. Deprivation of bed, with bread and water only. Bed and full diet restored on 4th and 8th days and 12th day, and every 3rd day for remainder of sentence.

(e.) Strict arrest (*strenger arrest*). Applicable only to privates. Same accompaniments as the last, with the addition that the cells are dark.

#### *Summary Punishments.*

The following summary punishments may be awarded by superior authority.

*Privates and Lance-Corporals.*

1. Fatigues, extra duties, and retention (not forfeiture) of pay.
2. Confinement to barracks, up to 4 weeks.
3. Simple arrest, up to 4 weeks.
4. Middle arrest, up to 3 weeks.
5. Strict arrest, up to 2 weeks.
6. Deprivation of lance rank.
7. For soldiers in 2nd class—transfer to a labour detachment.

*For Non-commissioned Officers.*

1. Reprimands.
2. Extra duties.
3. Confinement to barracks, up to 4 weeks.
4. Simple arrest, up to 4 weeks.
5. Middle arrest, up to 3 weeks only for non-commissioned officers without sword-knot.

*For the Officers.*

1. Reprimands.
  - (a.) Simple. Given in private.
  - (b.) Official. Before the other Officers.
  - (c.) Severe. Entered in orders.

2. Arrests, as before described, up to 14 days.

The power to award punishment is only awarded to an Officer in command of a unit not smaller than a company, but every military superior has power to place an inferior in arrest, as a preliminary to enquiry, for any breach of discipline.

A company chief can award up to 8 days' simple arrest to non-commissioned officers and privates. To junior non-commissioned officers and privates middle arrest up to 5 days; to privates strict arrest for 3 days.

A Captain commanding a detached company can punish any of his Officers with arrest up to 3 days.

The Officer commanding a battalion, not detached, can award 14 days' simple arrest, 10 days' middle arrest, and 7 days' strict arrest. He can give Officers chamber arrest, but must report to the regimental chief, who fixes the term.

The Officer commanding a regiment, or a detached battalion, can award Officers arrest up to 6 days; junior non-commissioned officers and privates middle arrest up to 3 weeks, and privates strict arrest up to 14 days.

Commanders superior to the Officers commanding regiments, as well as Governors and Commanders of garrisons, have the same powers of summary punishment as the regimental chiefs.

The General commanding an army corps can punish an Officer up to 14 days' arrest; the General of Division up to 10 days; and a General of Brigade up to 8 days.

M. Gran gives two or three instances of punishments awarded by Courts-Martial in Germany, but they are not of much value for comparison with our English system, as there is no information given as to the prisoners' ages, service, or previous characters. Still the following is one:—

Private E.

1. Breaking out of barracks.
2. Attempting to escape from arrest.
3. Offering violence to the non-commissioned officer who arrested him.
4. Escaping from arrest.

He was found guilty and sentenced.

1st. To one year's imprisonment for insubordination to superior.

2nd. To 14 days' strict arrest, for disobedience, showing wilful defiance of authority.

3rd. To one week's middle arrest for breaking out of barracks.

The whole being commuted in accordance with the Penal Code to 1 year and 1 month's imprisonment.

There appears to be no right of appeal. In any case where a summary punishment has been awarded, and the soldier thinks himself wronged, he has first to undergo his punishment, after which he can make his complaint, which is enquired into. If his complaint is found to be groundless he is liable to a year's imprisonment, I presume, by sentence of Court-Martial.

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## NOTICES OF BOOKS.

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*Modern Naval Artillery.* London: Griffith and Son. Pp. 95. Weight under 12 ozs. Price 5s. 3d., post free.

As the Naval Exhibition has been already open some time, it is to be regretted that this book did not come to hand sooner, so that it might earlier have been brought to the notice of our readers. It is a guide to the Armstrong Gallery of the Naval Exhibition, and is issued from Elswick itself. But it is not only a guide, for it gives a great deal of valuable information on the subject of modern naval artillery, and that of modern battle-ships as well. It should be read carefully before visiting the Exhibition, and it is so written as to be pleasant of perusal. But those who do not go there, but are interested in these matters, will do well to buy it.

*The Artillery of the Future and the New Powders.* By J. A. LONGRIDGE. London: Spon, 1891. Pp. 76. Weight under 10 ozs. Price 5s., post free.

By way of counterblast to the last-named work, comes simultaneously Mr. Longridge's advocacy of high pressure in strong and comparatively short guns. The little treatise is, of course, highly scientific in character, but is a valuable contribution to the study of the difficult question of gunnery.

*A Complete Bibliography of the Art of Fence, with a Classified Index.* By CARL A. THIMM, late Captain 2nd London Rifles. London: Thomson and Co., 1891. Pp. 251. Size 7" x 5" x  $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Weight under 14 ozs. Price 5s.

This gives a list of works, foreign and English, on fencing, sword play, bayonet exercise, duelling, &c.

*Hazell's Annual for 1891. Cyclopædic Record of Men and Topics of the Day.* Edited by E. D. PRICE. Sixth year of issue. London: Hazell, Watson, and Viney, 1891. Pp. 706. Size 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 1 $\frac{3}{4}$ ". Weight under 1 $\frac{3}{4}$  lbs. Price 3s. 6d.

It would be beyond the competency of any reviewer to pronounce decisively on the exact value of a book of reference which contains "above 3,500 concise and explanatory articles of current political, social, biographical, and general interest referred to by the press and in daily conversation," so we give it up. Life contains a good many more topics of conversation than even 3,500, but still here are that number at little more than a hundredth part of a penny each. A reader or talker must find some topics he deals with among them.



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
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
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EXTRACT FROM THE BYE-LAWS.

Section II.—Composition.

1. Princes of the Blood Royal; Lords Lieutenant of Counties; Governors of Colonies and Dependencies; Officers of the Army, Navy, Marines, Her Majesty's East Indian Military and Naval Forces, Militia, Yeomanry, Royal Naval Reserve, and Volunteer Corps shall be entitled to become Members, without ballot, on payment of the Entrance Fee and Annual Subscription.

N.B. Any Officer coming within the above definition, who may wish to become a Member of the Institution, can do so by copying one of the subjoined Forms, and enclosing it to the Secretary:—

FORM FOR BECOMING AN ANNUAL SUBSCRIBER.

1B

It is my desire to become a Member of the Royal United Service Institution; and I hereby request and authorise my Agents [or Bankers], Messrs. \_\_\_\_\_, to pay my Entrance Fee (£1) and Annual Subscription (£1) now, and as it becomes due on the 1st of January in each year, to the Secretary of the Institution.

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Qualification  
for Membership \_\_\_\_\_

FORM FOR BECOMING A LIFE SUBSCRIBER.

It is my desire to become a Life Member of the Royal United Service Institution; and I hereby authorise my Agents [or Bankers], Messrs. \_\_\_\_\_, to pay my Entrance Fee (£1) and Life Subscription (£20) to the Secretary of the Institution.

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Qualification  
for Membership \_\_\_\_\_

2. Ex-Governors of Colonies and Dependencies, Retired Officers, Deputy Lieutenants of Counties, Civil Functionaries who are or have been attached to the Naval and Military Departments, the Master, Deputy Master, and Elder Brethren of the Trinity House, and Army and Navy Agents, shall be eligible to become Members by Ballot.

3. Gentlemen above the age of 40 years, whose names are on the list of the Commander-in-Chief for Commissions in the Army, or who are probationary for office connected with the Naval and Military Professions, shall be admissible, by Ballot, to become PROVISIONAL MEMBERS from year to year, on payment of the Annual Subscription; and after they obtain their appointments, they may become ordinary Members on payment of the Entrance Fee.

N.B. Members admissible by Ballot must be proposed and seconded by two Members of the Institution, and their names will be submitted to the Council for election. Ballot papers may be obtained at the Institution.

Form of Bequest.

I give and bequeath unto THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, situated in Whitehall Ward, London, the sum of \_\_\_\_\_

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Fifteen out of Thirty-four Pupils sent up have passed. Places taken: 1st, 2nd (twice), 6th (twice), 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 25th, 31st, and 40th.

JUNE, 1891—7th place, S. R. DANIELS, 2,246 marks; 18th place, A. W. McNAM, 2,103 marks; 23th place, F. T. JACKSON, 1,913 marks.

**UNIVERSITIES.**—Five Scholarships taken in 1889 and 1890 include two at Clare College, Cambridge, one each at Christ's College, Cambridge and Queen's and Lincoln Colleges, Oxford.

The Eleven pupils sent up were successful for Honours at Oxford or College Entrance Examinations at Cambridge.

**EASTERN CADETSHIP.**—In 1889 Examination, the only pupil, Mr. Gibbes, passed 4th, taking 1st place in Italian and German, and 2nd in French.

**WOOLWICH.**—Since January, 1887, FORTY-FOUR PASSED.

Places taken include—4th, 6th, 7th, 12th, 14th, 16th, 22nd, 23rd, 27th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 34th, 36th, 38th, 45th, &c.

JUNE, 1891. THREE passed, viz., 33rd, 42nd, and 44th.

**SANDHURST.**—Since January, 1887, ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY gentlemen obtained Cadetships.

Places taken include—1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, &c.

JUNE, 1891. SEVENTEEN passed, viz., 5th (Cavalry), 11th, 21st, 27th, 35th, 45th, 47th, 49th, 50th, 53rd, 102nd, 123rd, 124th (Infantry); 4th, 6th, 6th (University).

N.B.—These successes for Woolwich and Sandhurst will be found to be far in excess of any other Tutor or Public School. The Sandhurst numbers do not include those who merely obtained sufficient marks to be qualified as Militia Officers.

**PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.**—Since January, 1888, TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THREE gentlemen have passed this Examination in all subjects.

**STAFF COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION.**—Since 1881, one hundred and fifty-three officers have passed the Staff College, the FIRST place having been taken EIGHT times out of eleven examinations.

This year the FIRST and twelve others passed direct from Messrs. James and Lynch.

**MILITIA LITERARY EXAMINATIONS.**—At three Examinations, held annually in April and October, ONE HUNDRED AND SIX Officers have qualified from January, 1887, to the present date.

Places taken include—1st (twice), 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 6th (twice), 7th (twice), 8th, 9th, 10th (twice), 11th, 12th (twice), 14th, 15th, &c.

N.B.—This does not include others who qualified at the Sandhurst Examinations.

**MILITIA MILITARY COMPETITIVE.—FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FOUR** officers have been successful since this Examination was instituted (January, 1881), and eighteen times the FIRST PLACE has been secured by Pupils of Messrs. James and Lynch.

March, 1891.

Place.	Name.	Marks.
First	S. C. Long	2,063
Second	C. D. Neave	2,035
5th	E. M. Lithgow	2,022
8th	A. H. Buist	2,001
10th	T. L. Leeds	1,964
11th	W. L. Thurburn	1,979
14th	F. G. A. Wimberley	1,888
First	C. M. D. Bruce	1,853
19th	C. E. Cobb	1,803
33rd	R. R. P. Gabbett	1,658
34th	E. H. L. Warner	1,646
39th	C. L. S. Browne	1,600
43rd	G. F. Broadrick	1,533
45th	R. F. Uniacks	1,533
47th	A. Hitchie	1,490
48th	C. L. Macnab	1,527
49th	R. A. Gray	1,490
57th	W. M. P. Wood	1,497
56th	E. Dingwall	1,506
63rd	F. M. Raphael	1,769
69th	H. W. Seaid	1,707
8th	F. S. W. Hervey-Bathurst	1,789
10th	A. L. Powell	1,762
6th	R. E. F. Wemyss	1,742
	C. M. Swire	1,743
	J. Ralli	1,732
	G. Armitage	1,731

\* Artillery. † Cavalry. ‡ Subsequently admitted.

The Staff of Military Instructors numbers Fifteen Officers, of whom Five are Staff College Graduates in honours. The Civil Staff embraces Thirty-three gentlemen, of whom Twenty are University Graduates in high honours. The total number of Forty-eight is far larger than will be found at most Public Schools in England, and sufficient to give that individual instruction to the Pupils in which the remarkable success of the Establishment is due.

